Ensuring That the Alliance Is Not Cast Adrift Toshihiro Nakayama
1. The Importance of Japan-US Relations and the Primary Factors Transforming Them Assuming that the rise of China were to continue at its present brisk pace, and that the other
BRIC countries and NEXT11 were to continue growing stably, then the fact remains that Japan-US relations will serve as the most important bilateral relationship for Japan 20 years down the road.
Its relative importance will likely diminish following the structural changes in world politics. Out of the set of problems newly confronting the international community, the number that can be dealt with by the bilateral alliance’s ability for resolving and handling problems is on a downward trajectory. For this reason, we have already entered the era where simply establishing this bilateral alliance as the “cornerstone” of peace and safety for the region will not adequately produce them.
Yet in spite of this, tightly knit Japan-US relations will serve as a major advantage to both parties in facing up to this new set of problems. This is because both Japan and the United States share deep ties on the economic and security front, democratic values that underpin the political systems of both countries, and a fundamental image of how a desirable international order should be structured.
They also share a vision of a liberal international order with regard to how a desirable regional order should be structured in the Asia-Pacific region.i
Needless to say, Japan and the United States are not composed in such a way that they completely share every value. Rather, their self-images vary greatly. In Japan, collectives are fostered and grow up as if out of thin air, while the United States has been erected as a collection of principles. The United States regards itself as a missionary democracy, while Japan currently feels little reality despite hanging out its values as the cornerstone of its diplomacy. The United States proactively tries to shape international situations on its own, while Japan concentrates its attention on accurately responding to international situations and in searching for where it will touch down.
These two countries vary considerably in how their respective national self-consciousness is ordered. Yet it is because they share fundamental political and social values and comprehend one
another’s presence in a mutually complementary fashion that the bilateral relations of Japan-US relations are being put on a unique and sound footing.
When the first Armitage Report was issued about ten years ago, it ignited debate about Japan becoming a “mature partner” to the United States like the United Kingdom was, which was touched off by the passage in this report stating that the Japan-US alliance in Asia should be upgraded to the status of the US-UK alliance.ii This was primarily a concrete proposal concerning how the alliance should operate, but this has come to take on a scope that exceeds the intentions of the report. It was precisely around this time that the Koizumi Administration set out a clear pro-American line, and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks it embarked upon cooperation with the United States to a greater extent than ever before. Because of this, the synopsis of “upgrading the Japan-US alliance to the status of another US-UK alliance in Asia” raised hopes on the US side as well that this was not just a figurative expression.
However, the alliance is underpinned by the special relationship between the United Kingdom, which was once a hegemony, and the United States, which has inherited this position. The two countries are also connected via a deep-seated awareness including their language and share numerous values in common. The debate of overlapping this alliance with the Japan-US alliance conceals the special characteristics of the latter; that is to say, in the fact that the Japan-US alliance is an alliance that binds together two states which belong to different cultural spheres. What is more, both countries long occupied the number one and two positions in terms of their economic scale, which is also a unique characteristic. Whereas the US-UK alliance was an alliance between a former empire whose influence continues to decline dramatically and a new hegemon, the Japan-US alliance was one between a hegemon and a latent competitor (of course this did not solely occupy an economic dimension).
When you get right down to it, the subconscious mind on the Japanese side could be said to have undergone a revision in 1960, and the alliance has continued to be one between a victor nation and a defeated nation. This would bubble up to the surface at random, like ancient geological strata, and from time to time upward thrusts like impulses trying to rise to the surface would issue forth from both camps on the left and right. This is something that we have only experienced recently. For this reason, discussions concerning the alliance in some cases took the form of discussions concerned with national dignity rather than as discussions about security. Or to put this in somewhat simpler terms, it contained the latent risk that this would unfold in the form of postwar Japan’s self-discovery. For Japan, determining its relationship with the United States was a search for
identity, whereas to the United States, Japan rarely ever appeared in these sorts of contexts. A number of contortions and asymmetries were structurally internalized within the Japan-US alliance, and in some cases differences in how these contortions were handled have shaken the alliance itself to its very core.
It has been 50 years since the basic framework of today’s alliance was laid. Though the Japan-US alliance has time and again undergone constant corrections and upgrades according to the current state of affairs, it has played a significant role in maintaining regional order as an alliance that is without precedent. It consists of a type of alliance that can only be described in terms of the Japan-US alliance. Especially in the post-Cold War period, despite being a bilateral alliance its nature as a regional public good has grown stronger and stronger, and it grew ever clearer that it was composed in such a way that its destabilization would be unwelcomed by the other countries in the region. Despite facing a number of problems, over the past half century it has not yielded anti-American and anti-base conflicts that have embroiled the entire nation, and it enjoys a domestic base of support which is relatively stable. Of course, this assertion does not in any way negate the fact that there is discontent with the bases that is rooted in local regions. But such discontent has not necessarily been directed solely towards the United States; it has also been directed towards the Government of Japan and, especially in Okinawa’s case, toward the
“mainland.”
The world has literally grown smaller due to the fact that the cost of transport has fallen and information technology has developed rapidly centered primarily around the Internet. Despite this, and the fact that the speed at which the international situation is changing is increasing at an accelerated pace, it is difficult to imagine the basic structure comprising the Japan-US alliance collapsing in 20 years’ time. If this were to collapse, then it would likely be in a world where the majority of the presuppositions for thinking about contemporary world politics have collapsed.
Even if such presuppositions were to collapse and world politics were to enter into a major period of change, it would be hard to imagine Japan-US relations, which serve as a stabilizer, being allowed to decline, especially if the Japan-US alliance has grown in importance. This is because the Japan-US alliance is one that attempts to uphold the status quo rather than shake it up, and because it is an alliance that quintessentially strives to incorporate new factors for change into the current system.
One scenario in which this alliance would be on the brink of crisis would be a potential case in which Japan as one of the partners in the alliance were to choose a course of shaking up the status
quo. In The Next 100 Years (2009), George Friedman points to the possibility that Japan and the United States might fall into adversarial relations around the year 2040. Russia will once again retreat and China will be unable to affect a skillful takeoff, which will usher in a period of instability. Friedman posits that the 21st century rather than the 20th century will be the “American age,” and that it will be Japan that will initiate the regional resistance to American
“super-hegemony.” In the 2020s there will be growing friction between a Japan that has grown assertive as a seafaring country (within a Friedmanesque worldview, this is a Japan that has reverted back to its true form) and the United States. Then in the 2040s, Japan’s sphere of influence and US interests will collide, and a coalition against Japan will take shape which will involve a South Korea and China that are concerned about the reemergence of Japan. “Japan will be profoundly isolated,” and therefore Japan will once more walk down the path it has trodden before.
This is the scenario.iii
While this author is unaware of what sort of assessment Friedman’s predictions have been met with, they do not feel all that realistic. This is because Friedman’s argument tries to apply geopolitics in an overly mechanical manner to such an extent that an analysis of the collective conscious wherein nations constitute the agents is given short shrift. What is more, Friedman’s argument is founded upon the premise that postwar Japan’s diplomacy is nothing more than an
“adaptive tool,” and that as long as it were to decide to change course it would not be all that difficult for it to do so. Rather, his argument is that there is no alternative for it but to do so when pressed by geopolitical necessity. But is that really true? While the claim could be made that stability was achieved in postwar Japan on account of its depersonalized political adhesion, this is simultaneously the main culprit that makes it extremely difficult for contemporary Japan to change course. Nowadays this is often summed up as being “bureaucrat-driven politics,” and it is often argued that just so long as this could be put to rest then “individuality (=politician-driven politics)”
could be restored. But when it is taken into consideration that this was the very system of government in Japan, then today’s political circumstances keenly denote that doing so will not be that simple. If that were the case, then at present it would at the very least be considerably difficult to envision a bold change of course in terms of security. In other words, assuming that some sort of significant qualitative transformation could arise in Japan-US relations and the Japan-US alliance, then it would be appropriate to consider this as being due to some other factor rather than to any clear intention on the Japanese side—or in other words, rather than Japan serving as the force for shaking up the status quo.
Specifically, what sort of latent factors are there? Naturally of course, issues like what both countries respectively perceive to be qualitative threats and of what sort, the manner in which they consider ways of handling these, and how they conceptualize of one another’s roles within the process of handling these are all decisive factors. Frankly put, this comes down to what sort of presence these two countries go about acknowledging and accepting on the part of an emerging China. Of course, that is not to imply that the structural changes in world politics are being caused solely by the emergence of China. Nevertheless, it is hard to deny that the relative importance of the China factor to the United States and Japan stands out. Of course, it is unavoidable that Japan and the United States will have different impressions when it comes to China, that is only natural.
Yet the greater the degree of divergence grows, the more difficult it will be to manage Japan-US relations. This holds true regardless of whether it is the Japanese side that perceives of China as the greater threat, or conversely whether it is the US side that adopts this perception. Furthermore, China drawing excessively close to either Japan or the United States could also potentially serve as a destabilizing factor. In other words, in thinking about the prospects for Japan-US relations, it is essential to accurately determine where the two countries’ impressions of China overlap and where they are out of alignment.
Another factor is the issue of both countries’ self-perceptions and the manner in which these have an effect on their respective external behavior. In terms of the United States, if the country were to regard itself as a declining power (though the United States is not likely to acknowledge this directly), then in what manner will the isolationism found at the base layer of its external behavior manifest itself within this? This will also act as the foundation that shapes the United States’ impression of China. In the case of Japan, situations can be envisioned in which problems like cross-purposes surrounding the base issue and accidents involving residents in the vicinity of the bases will trigger a sense of discomfort regarding the US presence. It is beyond dispute that there is little in the way of strong politically determined anti-American sentiment in Japan. Yet sentiments which could be described as an “anti-Americanism Lite” or “mild anti-Americanism”
rooted in a latent feeling of discomfort toward the US military presence have deeply taken root in the postwar mental makeup of the Japanese people. This is because Japan has been resting on its laurels when it comes to its postwar pacifism, and because it has sealed off debates concerning security. Though these have been sealed deep down within its unconscious, they tend to rear their head at unexpected occasions when Japan is directly confronted with a clear crisis. To the United States, the Japan-US alliance is important as a security policy that extends out in a far-reaching
manner, but it is nothing more than one extremity. To Japan, it serves as an entrance into and exit out of security issues. This asymmetry makes handling the Japan-US alliance difficult. Frankly put, the US side has an environment in which the Armitage Report, which is grounded in bipartisan consensus, can be created, whereas Japan has not necessarily set in place an environment in which this could be done. In actuality, it has already been about ten years since the first Armitage Report and about four years since the second Armitage Report, but there has yet to be a genuine reply from Japan that responds to these consensus reports on the US side. To be sure, debates and work on initiatives for updating the alliance are somberly being advanced by experts at venues for managing the alliance, but it would have to be said that national debate is absent concerning new configurations for the Japan-US alliance for a new era.
Latent factors that have the potential to transform the Japan-US alliance will be inspected below, and the paper will look toward the future of Japan-US relations. This will be done from the perspectives of the United States’ self-consciousness, its impressions of China, as well as Japan’s self-consciousness. We will begin by taking a look from the US side.
2. Effects That a Transformation of the United States’ Self-Consciousness Would Have on