Regional Interests in Korean Unification
II. Regional Powers’ Conflicting Interests and Views on Unification
1. China
On September 3, 2015, President Park Geun-hye was the only leader of an American ally to attend the massive military parade staged by Beijing to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. To many, her attendance, along with the leaders of states such as Russia, Venezuela, and Sudan, highlights the increasingly close nature of the South Korea–China relationship now that China has become South Korea’s top trade partner. In 2013, the total trade volume between China and South Korea surpassed $270 billion, which is more than the value of South Korea–U.S. and South Korea–Japan trade com- bined.1 Now that a South Korea–China free-trade deal has been signed, Seoul’s trade ministry estimates that bilateral trade will grow to over $300 billion a year.2
But there is another factor that helps to explain President Park’s deci- sion: She was seated prominently on the dais overlooking Tianan- men Square, next to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s wife, while her opposite number—Kim Jong-un of North Korea—was not in atten- dance at all. North Korea did send a delegation led by Choe Ryong- hae, one of Kim Jong-un’s closest confidantes (who now appears to have been purged), but its attendance was overshadowed by the prominence accorded to South Korea’s president. Back in Pyong- yang, Kim must have been furious at this slight from North Korea’s
1 Lee Kangkyu, “Discussion Nears Conclusion on China-South Korea FTA,”
Asia Briefing: Business Intelligence from Dezan Shira and Associates, October 10, 2014; R.S. Kalha, “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to South Korea,” IIT Madras China Studies Center, July 9, 2014.
2 Shannon Tiezzi, “It’s Official: China, South Korea Sign Free Trade Agreement,”
Diplomat, June 2, 2015.
only real ally. That, in fact, may have been a large part of the reason why President Park was willing to grace Beijing’s propaganda show.
By cultivating a closer relationship with Beijing, she is hoping to change the very fabric of Sino–North Korea relations and ultimately retain Chinese support for Korean unification.
The only reason China is willing to risk international opprobrium and costly bills for continuing to support the Stalinist state in Pyong- yang is that the Chinese leadership fears the emergence on its border of a unified, pro-Western Korean state—especially if that state con- tinues to host U.S. troops. By cultivating a closer relationship with Beijing, President Park is hoping to assuage such fears, potentially making the Chinese leadership more comfortable with shifting its North Korea policy and acquiescing to Korean unification.
Yet President Park’s efforts notwithstanding, Beijing simply does not yet see Korean unification as being in its interests; it fears, in par- ticular, the instability that would precede any unification scenario.
From Beijing’s perspective, since North Korea is situated on China’s doorway, not only could instability south of the Yalu River emit northward, including massive refugee flow that would add to the tens of thousands of North Korean refugees who already reside in China, but also any military actions by the United States and its South Korean ally in the event of a North Korean regime collapse would send shockwaves rumbling across the Sino–North Korean border. In Beijing’s mind, the prospect of instability in North Korea means the disintegration of the North Korean barrier—“lips” to China’s “teeth”—and raises the specter of U.S. and South Korean forces operating north of the demilitarized zone. To the Chinese leadership, this would raise the same concerns that prompted Mao
Zedong to intervene in the Korean War in 1950.
In addition, China’s apprehension is geostrategic, as it is concerned about the possibility of a unified Korea metamorphosing into a
“pawn” in the U.S.-led strategy of strategic containment of China.
As a result, despite all the rhetoric about supporting peaceful Korean unification, in reality Beijing supports the status quo, thus perpetu- ating the division in the Korean Peninsula. China, above all, wants to ensure a friendly nation on its northeastern border that would provide a buffer between China and the democratic, pro-America South Korea, home to 28,500 American forces.
For this reason, China continues to subsidize North Korea. North Korea depends on China for up to 90 percent of its energy supply, 80 percent of its consumer products, and 40~45 percent of its food supply.3 An estimated 80 percent of North Korea’s foreign trade is conducted with China, with North Korea importing from China items such as oil, pork, electronics, and farming machinery, while exporting to China fish, low-grade steel, and minerals.4
China is also the biggest, most significant, and most consistent for-
3 Emma Chanlett-Avery, et al. “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,” Congressional Research Service, Devember 5, 2014, p.
10. For background information, see also Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin,
“China-North Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service, December 28, 2010.
4 Chanlett-Avery and Rinehart, “North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,” Congressional Research Service, December 5, 2014, p. 10.
For background information, see also Nanto and Manyin, “China-North Korea Relations,” and Trevor Park, “Lips and Teeth: Chinese-North Korean Trade and Foreign Direct Investment’s Impact,” U.S.-Korea 2012 Yearbook, U.S.-Korea Insti- tute at SAIS, 2013.
eign direct investment (FDI) provider to North Korea; North Korea’s only other significant source of FDI comes from the Kaesong Indus- trial Complex, which is a joint venture with South Korea.5 The bulk of foreign investment in the North, predominantly the extraction of mineral resources, port development, and closely related infrastruc- tural commitments, emanates from Beijing, with business enter- prises and provincial authorities in China’s northeastern region playing a key role.6 China’s trade with North Korea has steadily increased in recent years despite the strains caused by Kim Jong- un’s execution in December 2013 of his uncle, the second-most powerful man in the regime, Jang Song-taek, on charges of plotting against him.7
In sum, China’s primary goal regarding the Korean Peninsula remains maintaining stability and preventing the Kim regime’s collapse.