Confidence-Building Measures and a Peace Regime on the
III. Direction of Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula through Confidence-Building
2. Constructing Gradual Military Confidence- Building Measures
Considering the reality of the state of affairs on the Korean Penin- sula, such as North Korea’s military threats and provocations and its
nullification of previous agreements on military trust-building, it is important to create the conditions for peace by taking measures to ease military tensions.
Construction of the conditions for peace can be carried out in three directions. First, previous agreements concluded by the two Koreas on easing military tensions should be restored. Until now, South and North Korea have concluded four types of military confidence-build- ing measures: 1) Direct telephone lines have been set up between South and North Korea. 2) Military agreements that assure exchange and cooperation have been adopted. In order to provide military assurance on the connection of the Gyeongui rail lines and roads, an agreement on military assurances on operations of rail and road works (September 2002) as well as a provisional agreement on mili- tary assurances on the train’s test operation (May 2007) were adopted.
3) As a means to prevent accidental collision, measures to prevent accidental collision on the west coast were adopted (June 2004). 4) In order to ease tensions near the military demarcation line, an agree- ment to halt propaganda near the area was concluded (June 2004).
However on January 30, 2009, North Korea announced that it would “nullify all the agreements related to the political and mili- tary conflict situation,” and thereby disable all agreements concern- ing military confidence-building. Furthermore, the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island heightened military tensions on the peninsula and ceased the channels of military talks between the two Koreas.
Considering such a reality, it is necessary to restore measures to build military trust stated in previous inter-Korean agreements, by resuming inter-Korean military talks. To this end, holding military
working-level talks and defense ministerial talks are recommended.9 Second, in order to promote exchange and cooperation, functional aspects of military confidence-building are needed. One aspect of easing tensions on the peninsula is that rather than easing military tensions itself, military trust-building must be carried out from a functional aspect to induce inter-Korean cooperation. One example in which a military agreement was reached for functional inter-Ko- rean cooperation is the case in which a partial demilitarization was implemented in the demilitarized zone to construct the Gyeongui rail lines and roads. In addition, the Jangjeon Harbor, North Korea’s military harbor, was opened and the North Korean army was relo- cated due to Mount Geumgang tourism. Furthermore, operations in the Kaesong Industrial Complex also had the effect of pushing North Korea’s military forces to a different location.10
In order to create the DMZ World Peace Park, one of the main undertakings of the trust-building process on the Korean Penin- sula, it is important to build military trust and hold military talks.
In doing so, it is also necessary to receive the cooperation of the United Nations, which is managing the demilitarized zone. To this end, in connecting the Gyeongui rail lines and roads, the precedent in which the UNC acknowledged inter-Korean cooperation for the peaceful utilization of the demilitarized zone can be applied. In addition, through this plan, the two Koreas should hold military talks and come to an agreement about military measures concerning
9 Cho Seong-Ryoul, “The Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula and a Balance Policy: In the Field of Security and Peace [in Korean],” Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula, vol. 53 (June 2013), pp. 50~56.
10 Jong-Chul Park, Plans to Implement Military Measures to Increase Inter-Korean Cooperation [in Korean] (Seoul: KINU, 2002), pp. 3~15.
removing land mines, withdrawing troops and equipment, opening paths, and constructing facilities.
Third, with consideration to the rudimentary restoration of peace between the two Koreas, it is necessary to adopt additional military confidence-building measures. Military confidence-building mea- sures should be agreed upon according to the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and the annex agreement on nonaggression. Above all, peaceful resolution to conflicts and prevention of accidental military collisions must be sought. In addition, agreements should be made to implement confidence-building measures mentioned in clause 12 of the Basic Agreement, including large-scale transfer of troops and notification of military practices as well as arms control, peaceful utilization of the demilitarized zone, and exchanges of military per- sonnel and information.
Meanwhile, North Korea has been against such measures, claiming that exchange of military personnel or information and notifica- tion of military practices will weaken its military superiority and expose its military situation. Therefore, it is necessary to find incentives in order to bring North Korea to the negotiating table to build military trust. West Germany provided economic incentives to East Germany to gain certain compromises such as extension of free passes, easing border control procedures, disarmament in the border areas, and such.11
11 The federal government of West Germany gave East Germany DM 1 billion in commercial loans in 1983, and DM 950 million in commercial loans in 1984. In return, East Germany took actions such as the improvement of national border control measures and passing procedures, the demolition of SM-70 automatic launchers in four borderline areas, and the removal of land mines. Short-term research group for German economic and social integration, Research on Ger- many’s Economic and Social Integration [in Korean] (1990), pp. 122~123.
In the case of pursuing inter-Korean trust, there are ways to carry out rudimentary confidence-building measures by linking the provision of economic aid, economic cooperative projects, and the provision of loans. For example, South Korea can utilize a part of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund or form a separate North Korean loan fund and provide loans to North Korea. Also, depending on the degree of trust built between South and North Korea, military trust building can be linked to cooperative projects that construct North Korea’s infrastruc- ture, including electricity, transportation, and communication.
3. Establishing a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula