Regional Interests in Korean Unification
II. Regional Powers’ Conflicting Interests and Views on Unification
1. Impact on the Balance of Power
Korean unification will have far-reaching implications for the bal- ance of power in the region. After unification, East Asia will lose a dysfunctional socialist command economy and gain a more power- ful market economy, although given the high costs of rebuilding the northern half of the country, the Korean economy may be in for some difficult years. How much unification will cost depends upon its timing, conditions in North Korea, the economic goals of the unification process, and whether unification proceeds peacefully by stages or is imposed in haste. For years economists have been mak- ing predictions about the cost of unification, but there is little con- sensus. One of the difficulties of compiling an accurate cost analysis of such an event is the lack of transparency from Pyongyang regard- ing its current economic condition. The best estimates from econo- mists warn that the total bill for unification likely would be considerably higher than the USD 1.9 trillion cost of German unifi- cation. The entire rehabilitation process over a thirty-year period could well cost USD 5 trillion if unification began today.14 Neverthe- less, a unified Korea will emerge as wealthier and more powerful than the divided peninsula of today.
The impact of unification on the regional balance of power will depend on which way the new Korean state orients itself strate- gically. Will it remain close to the United States, move closer to
14 In 2010, South Korea’s unification minister mentioned the USD 5 trillion sum. “Hyun In-taek: It would be Hard for Two Koreas to Coexist If Peace Not Achieved,” Interfax interview, September 17, 2010, cited in Korean Unification and the Positions and Roles of the Four Neighboring Powers [in Korean], ed. Bae Jung-Ho (Seoul: KINU, 2011).
China, or adopt an independent posture balancing between the two Pacific superpowers? Other permutations are also possible, such as a multilateral security arrangement or a collective secu- rity pact on the Korean Peninsula, but for the most part, a unified Korea would likely confront these broad strategic choices. Given Korea’s strategic location and the fact that it has already become a middle power in its own right, unified Korea’s future choice of alignment among the great powers could potentially tilt the bal- ance of power in the region.
This is why Korea’s neighbors are so eager to influence united Korea’s strategic orientation. Historically, China has viewed the Korean Pen- insula as part of the Sinic sphere of influence.15 China likely hopes that its geographic proximity and strong economic links to both North and South Korea will be the determining factors in the strate- gic orientation of a unified Korea. And although Beijing will not be able to reestablish a new form of the old tributary system it main- tained with the Korean Peninsula for hundreds of years—Korea is too rich and powerful now to make that possible—Beijing could seek to create an asymmetrical patron-client relationship of the kind that it currently has with Pyongyang. If those efforts don’t succeed,
15 As China scholars Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell have noted in China’s Search for Security, Beijing appears to think of national security in terms of four concentric “rings”: the first ring is a domestic one that relates to internal secu- rity with the territory China administers (i.e., Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang); the second consists of a ring directly proximate to Chinese territory, which includes countries adjacent to China; the third ring is more expansive, encompassing China’s wider Asia-Pacific neighborhood; and the fourth ring encompasses the rest of the world. The Korean Peninsula firmly belongs in the second ring and is perhaps the most important of these neighboring states because of its inti- mate proximity to China’s political and economic center. See Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), especially chapter 5.
China’s more realistic hope would be that a unified Korea would not be a U.S. ally and that it would be deferential to China. To this end, Beijing will lobby hard for unified Korea to remove any U.S. military footprint from the peninsula.
The Japanese, too, have long regarded the Korean Peninsula as vitally important to their national security—so much so, indeed, that Tokyo fought two wars in one decade near the turn of the 20th century to keep it out of Chinese or Russian hands. After the unifi- cation of the Korean Peninsula, Japan will work hard, along with the United States, to reduce the likelihood of Korea aligning with China.
Japan would like to see that Korea-U.S. alliance commitments are kept post-unification, because a continued alliance between unified Korea and the United States will assure Japan that a unified Korean state will be neither hostile to it nor allied with countries unfriendly to Japan (especially China).
As for the United States, the optimal scenario would be a continued alliance with a unified Korea and continued deployment of U.S.
troops on the Korean Peninsula in hope that this would forestall a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia, dampen the hostility between Japan and Korea, and project American power in the region. As a result, Washington would likely to do what it can to preserve the special relationship between the two governments and militaries, facilitate coordination of regional strategy, and serve as a deter- rent to others seeking advantage on the peninsula. A unified Korea allied with the United States will also receive more respect from Beijing, which might otherwise be high handed in its dealings with a Korean state that, even united, will be only a fraction of China’s size and power.
However, after unification, a continued alliance with the United States will not necessarily mean the continuation of the status quo.
If the U.S. realizes it would not be possible to maintain a continuing U.S. troop presence (save perhaps for occasional deployments for joint exercises and training), it would still maneuver to make it pos- sible to maintain an alliance in a more attenuated form. While the U.S. government would not have the power to dictate the policy of a unified Korea any more than it does today, Washington is likely to take active steps to ensure that a unified Korean state continues to align closely with the United States.
Already, since the Joint Vision Statement of 2009 and the Joint Dec- laration of 2013, which promised to strengthen and globalize future cooperation, the two sides have accelerated steps to transform the alliance, broadening it from the original purpose of deterring and defending against a North Korean attack to a regional and global partnership that includes political, economic, diplomatic, and cul- tural cooperation. The two sides are likely to continue to expand the alliance’s agenda to include issues beyond the Korean Penin- sula, including peacekeeping, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, counter-narcotics, cybersecurity, space, missile defense, nuclear safety, climate change, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.
Washington’s rationale is that the more the alliance expands beyond its original threat-based rationale to an alliance based on common values, such as democracy, human rights, and free markets, the more difficult it would be for a unified Korea to jettison the alliance.
It is impossible to predict which way the unified Korean state will lean—although the best bet is that it will keep some version of its existing alliance with the United States because that is the path of
least resistance. The U.S.-ROK alliance has underpinned South Korea’s political and economic development and will likely be seen as a boon for a unified Korean state as well.
In reality, despite the apprehensions that will accompany Korean unification and the inevitable jockeying for power among regional powers once it occurs, unification will be a boon not only for Koreans but also for the entire world.