Regional Interests in Korean Unification
II. Regional Powers’ Conflicting Interests and Views on Unification
4. Human Rights Boon
ping lanes could also be avoided.18
This only scratches the surface of the potential economic opportu- nities for the region from Korean unification. Overall, Korean uni- fication will lead to increased regional economic cooperation and development as well as increased trade between Asia and Europe through transportation network linkages in Eurasia. In the fields of manufacturing, logistics, and energy, there is a possibility of creating enormous synergy. There will also be more business opportunities for the region, as the region works together to rebuild underdevel- oped North Korea. There are potential investment opportunities for reconstruction and expansion of infrastructure such as energy, trans- portation, and telecommunication networks, as well as opportuni- ties related to steel manufacturing and the shipbuilding industry.
other benefits of modern capitalism. Most of the North’s 80,000 to 120,000 prisoners could leave the government’s slave-labor camps, where most have been consigned for political, rather than criminal, offenses. Like apartheid South Africa, North Korea is a moral abom- ination. North Korean human rights abuses constitute a core threat not just to the people of the North but also the region’s stability and prosperity, and this threat is as severe as that posed by the regime’s nuclear weapons programs. Because the current character and sys- tem of the Kim regime—and its cult of personality leadership—lie at the core of the human rights abuses in the North, only the unifi- cation of the Korean Peninsula will resolve the dismal humanitarian situation in the North.
IV. Conclusion
Miscommunication, misunderstanding, and competing strategic interests between the United States, South Korea, and the regional powers could complicate a coordinated multilateral response to Korean unification. If sufficiently severe, misunderstandings could even lead to an inadvertent conflict between the powers (for exam- ple, the United States and China) in attempting to intervene on the Korean Peninsula, particularly in a sudden and dramatic North Korean contingency.
To prevent miscalculation, Seoul and Washington should work together to prepare for different unification scenarios. Only with detailed preparation, planning, and close coordination between South Korea, the United States, and other key regional powers can
various challenges of unification be mitigated. The financial cost and social challenges of unification will be far less if proper preparation is made for unification.
South Korea has already launched an internal campaign and an external, diplomatic initiative aimed at preparing for unification and contingency scenarios. This effort must continue at an acceler- ated pace, even after President Park Geun-hye leaves office in Feb- ruary 2018. Korean unification could come about suddenly. As it was largely impossible to predict the East German collapse at the end of the Cold War, so it is impossible to predict the timing of a North Korean government collapse other than to say it could hap- pen, perhaps even in the next few years, before unification prepa- ration is complete.
The time is now for the United States and South Korea to aug- ment their joint military planning by crafting a comprehensive and detailed political, diplomatic, economic, legal, and social strategy for unification. Once a common bilateral vision is developed between Seoul and Washington, the United States and South Korea should then actively encourage first Tokyo and then Beijing and Moscow to participate in multilateral talks.
Undertaking a unification dialogue will not be easy with Beijing, but if the message is delivered patiently and persuasively, over time it may start to sink in with the Chinese Politburo. Chinese receptivity to such a message may have increased because of the growing strains between Beijing and Pyongyang. Instead of standing by, hoping that China will change its policy toward the North on its own, Washing- ton and Seoul should be working hard in behind-the-scenes talks to make China understand that a unified Korea could be in its interest
as well, and that continuing to provide the Kim family dynasty with a virtual blank check is a strategic liability for China. Even if such talks don’t succeed in the short term, simply the process of initiating them and continuing them over a long period could increase China’s comfort level with the unification of the Korean Peninsula. And that, in turn, could be the key to ensuring that Korean unification, when it eventually occurs, occurs in as orderly a manner as possible while avoiding some of the worst-case scenarios associated with this mas- sive geopolitical shift.
It is imperative that such efforts to smooth the way for Korean uni- fication begin today. Unless South Korea can attest that all of the regional stakeholders will play a constructive role in unification, the process could become more messy, protracted, and costly than it would be otherwise. By contrast, if South Korea can succeed today in getting the support of its neighbors for a variety of unification sce- narios, it can ensure that the creation of a unified Korean state, while still expensive, will be as smooth as possible under these extremely challenging circumstances. The beneficiaries under such a scenario will be not only the people of the Korean Peninsula but also the people of the neighboring states and indeed the people of Asia and the world. All would experience great benefits from the merger of North Korea into a new and unified Korean state with free markets and free elections.
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