Government Policies for Unification and Future Policy Options in View
III. Review on ROK Government’s Policy for Unification
2. Kim Young Sam Administration
In addition, South Korea’s normalizing relations with North Korea’s allied countries were “a blow to North Korea’s prestige”20 and meant defeat in competition with the South. The Roh Administration suc- ceeded in establishing diplomatic relations with two close allies of North Korea—the Soviet Union in 1990 and China in 1992—and thus created a favorable external environment for its unification pol- icy. The normalization was a culmination of President Roh’s Nord- politik, a strategy to reach Pyongyang via Moscow and Beijing.
in the first phase. The planned second phase of the Korean com- monwealth would be similar to a confederative structure in which the two Koreas reached a wide range of agreements to augment a common sphere of living, and developed communities of economic, social, and cultural activities.
The Kim government set “democratic national consensus, coexis- tence and co-prosperity, and national well-being” as the three guid- ing principles in implementing the three-phased approach to a unification formula.
The Kim government took the initiative in promoting inter-Ko- rean reconciliation by deciding on March 11, 1993, to repatriate to North Korea Ri In Mo, who had spent 40 years in a South Korean jail as a political prisoner, unwilling to renounce his allegiance to the North. Pyongyang had persistently asked the South for the return of the old communist prisoner. In his inaugural address, President Kim stated, “Any allied country cannot be better than the same nation,” hinting that he would move forward with the North Koreans. Regrettably, however, on March 12, 1993—in a move apparently planned for many months—North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
It had refused to accept IAEA’s call for special inspection on “two undeclared facilities” in the North. Against this backdrop, Presi- dent Kim’s attitude toward the North Koreans turned sour as he stated at a press conference marking 100 days into his presidency in June 1993 that “he [could not] shake hands with those who have nuclear weapons.” North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT dealt a fatal blow to President Kim’s intention to promote reconciliation and cooperation with the North.
Working-level contacts for exchange of special envoys between North and South Korea to discuss the nuclear issue were held eight times from October 1993 to March 1994, but no agreement was reached. The vice minister–level contacts ended with the North Korean threat to “turn Seoul into sea of fire.” On the other hand, beginning in June 1993, the United States and North Korea held talks to resolve the nuclear issue, finally signing a historic “Agreed Framework” in Geneva in October 1994.
The North Korean nuclear issue was the source of a long-running dispute between Washington and Seoul. The liberal U.S. administra- tion under President Bill Clinton pursued a comprehensive package deal with North Korea, including normalization of relations. Presi- dent Kim opposed a direct deal between Washington and Pyong- yang, particularly while inter-Korean relations remained stalemated.
The United States felt it was crucial to negotiate with the North Koreans since it was in the United States’ interest to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, which would undercut the NPT regime. Concern with the NPT was especially compelling since a renewal conference was scheduled for April 1995 to review and extend the NPT.21 As a result, South Korea felt marginalized in the process of the nuclear deal between Wash- ington and Pyongyang, though U.S. delegates debriefed South Korean diplomats over the outcome of each day’s talks with the North Koreans. One of the reasons why President Kim did not
21 According to the UNODA, on May 11, 1995, the treaty was extended indef- initely. A total of 190 parties have joined the treaty, including the five nucle- ar-weapon states. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the treaty’s significance.
UNODA, Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), <http://www.un.org/disar- mament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml>. (Accessed on September 22, 2015).
appreciate the Agreed Framework was due to his wishful thinking about a possible collapse of the North Korean regime after the death of its founder Kim Il Sung in July 1994. In President Kim’s calcula- tion, “any American deal would help prop up a Pyongyang regime on the verge of collapsing, thus postponing reunification.”22
It is noteworthy that the Kim Young Sam government started prepar- ing for possible unification, largely influenced by German unifica- tion and Kim Il Sung’s death. From 1995 the Ministry of Unification (MOU) and related ministries defined specific scenarios for unifica- tion, ranging from gradual integration to radical German-type uni- fication. For this purpose, the MOU trained officials from a dozen ministries and state-run think tanks and sent them overseas to do case studies for the transformation and integration process. In addi- tion, all ministries designated a division that assumed responsibility for preparing for unification, although most of the ministries were not very active in fulfilling that mission.
The defection to Seoul in February 1997 of Hwang Jang Yup, a party secretary and architect of North Korea’s Juche ideology, fed the Kim government’s hopes for collapse of the Pyongyang regime. Hwang was the highest senior official to come over to the South. The Kim Administration legislated the Act on Protection and Settlement Sup- port for North Korean Defectors in mid-July 1997, as the number of defectors was rising largely due to economic difficulties, including serious famine, in North Korea.
Before Kim Il Sung died of a heart attack, the South Korean govern-
22 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading: Addison-Wes- ley, 1997), p. 358.
ment was excited over the prospect of progress made in its path toward unification at the upcoming inter-Korean summit meeting, the first of its kind since the division of the Korean Peninsula. The summit was arranged by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter during his meetings with Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang in mid-June 1994. The two Koreas agreed to hold summit talks between Kim Young Sam and Kim Il Sung on July 25~27, 1994. Former South Korean prime minister Lee Hong Koo, head of the South Korean delegation to the preparatory talks for the summit meeting, expressed his regret that
“Kim Il Sung’s death led to cancellation of the summit, which could have marked a significant milestone in the history of inter-Korean relations.”23 Lee’s analysis was that Kim Il Sung had intended to dra- matically improve relations with the South and change the North Korean system radically, while trying to gain its economic assistance and normalize relations with the United States in return for denucle- arizing the North. Negotiations over the terms of the summit meet- ing were very quickly concluded, and Kim Il Sung was supposedly making final preparations to entertain Kim Young Sam when he died. In other words, in June 1994 things had lurched back to a better place for North–South relations, and then lurched back again with Kim Il Sung’s death.
After Kim Il Sung’s death, inter-Korean relations went into a deep freeze due to North Korea’s strong resentment that the South Korean government refused to express condolences or allow South Koreans to pay tribute to the late Kim Il Sung. The issue of pay- ing tribute ignited controversy and division among South Korean
23 Lee Hong Koo, “South–North Summit Meeting: Regret and Wish,” JoongAng Daily, July 14, 2014.
political circles and public opinion. The conservative government succumbed to the temptation to assume that Kim Il Sung’s death and the North’s economic collapse—exacerbated by a disastrous famine—had created a real opportunity for unification. Seoul either did not know or underestimated the fact that Kim Jong Il had already been appointed heir apparent in the early 1970s and had been deeply involved in running the affairs of the state for almost two decades.
President Kim’s policy for North Korea and unification was inconsis- tent and sometimes ambiguous. “President Kim was strongly willing not to isolate North Korea in the beginning,” and it was possible that South Korea could have helped North Korea improve its relations with the United States and Japan.24 Although North Korea’s with- drawal from the NPT swept away such desire from President Kim, he nevertheless was opposed to military action, a conviction he demonstrated when he opposed U.S. preparations in early June for a surgical strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities.
Kim was reluctant to provide food assistance for the famine-stricken North Korea but suddenly decided to deliver 150,000 tons of rice without sufficient preparation in June 1995. He took a very nation- alistic stance by insisting that South Korean food deliveries precede those from Japan. Yet when the international community began delivering food assistance to the North, which was hit by floods in 1995 and drought in 1996, Kim turned stingy. In early 1996, his government decided to donate only USD 3 million to the World Food Programme appeal for humanitarian aid to North Korea.
24 Han Wan-Sang, The Korean Peninsula Is Sick: Tragedy of Hostile Coexistence (Seoul:
Hanul, 2013), pp. 81~82.
Washington asked Seoul to give more, and it agreed to give addi- tional food assistance worth USD 10 million through WFP in 1997.
On April 16, 1996, as a result of Seoul’s concerns about appearing sidelined due to the U.S.–DPRK Agreed Framework, and the possi- bility of additional U.S.–DPRK bilateral discussions over the future of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, U.S. President Clinton and President Kim jointly proposed the four parties—South Korea, North Korea, United States, and China—hold talks to discuss a peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula. The South Korean gov- ernment considered the timing for this proposal favorable for the ruling party in the coming parliamentary election.25 It wanted to demonstrate to the Korean voters that U.S.–ROK relations had improved after a rough patch.