East Asian Security Environment and the Korean Peninsula
II. Chinese Policy on the Korean Peninsula
Balance and Denuclearization
On the whole, China’s policy towards the Korean Peninsula is to develop cooperative and reciprocal relations with both North and South Korea. Stability, peace and nuclear-free Peninsula are the three basic goals for China. It has been China’s long policy that they pursue a parallel and balanced relations with both Koreas. North and South Korea are still in the status of “no war and no peace,” and from time to time, they have been engaged in confrontations. Therefore, over the past twenty years, China has tried to avoid siding with one side on any conflict or crisis, lest that it should lead to the rupture of Sino-DPRK relations. Even on the nuclear issue, though Beijing strongly dislikes Pyongyang’s plan, behavior and attitude of ignoring the international community’s appeal for denuclearization, it seldom openly made condemnation of their deeds, nor stopped regular contacts and mutual visits with the DPRK.
China and North Korea have a long traditional friendship, but China doesn’t accept and support North Korean policy on nuclear development and military provocation towards South Korea. Because of the inherited special relations with the North, Beijing maintains high-level reciprocal visits with Pyongyang and treats North Korea’s top leader respectfully, though this relationship lacks substantial content or ideological consensus. In addition to maintaining the stability of this regime, the
essence of China’s DPRK policy is to lure it to denuclearize and to restrain its recalcitrant posture and behavior against South Korea.
For China’s South Korea policy, it wants to develop a comprehensive and substantial relationship with the ROK. The focal point of this policy is to deepen bilateral economic cooperation and build close consultative relations on the regional as well as on the global issues.
Of course, China will closely cooperate with South Korea on the joint action to push North Korea to come back to its original commitment made in the joint statement issued at the Six-Party Talks on September 19, 2005. Beijing is also increasingly interested in strategic coordination for safeguarding stability in Northeast Asia and playing a constructive role in the regional integration mechanisms.
Because Pyongyang does not want to stop developing its nuclear weapons and may continue to conduct nuclear tests and make vocal threats to Seoul, China will have to keep at arm’s length with North Korea, particularly in the years of Xi Jinping’s leadership. President Xi has expressed his clear-cut position when President Park visited in Beijing and in the APEC meeting last October. So far, Xi Jinping hasn’t allowed Kim Jong-un to visit China, which displays his displeasure over North Korea’s nuclear policy and development.
The purge of Jang Sung-taek and his followers has further precipitated the distrust relations between China and the North Korea. If North Korea continues with more nuclear tests and missile firing, China definitely will side with the US-South Korea line and impose more tough sanction against Pyongyang. Before Kim Jong-un commits himself to Chinese leader about denuclearization, the Chinese leader may not
welcome this belligerent leader visiting China. This psychological trial of strength will last for a long time.
In the past, Chinese leaders would reluctantly use a coercive approach to press North Korea to stop nuclear development, but nowadays, China is more willing to wield the sticks to show its resolute position.
Beijing’s new leaders don’t want to appease or indulge this young North Korean leader too much. The tough policies and measures may not inevitably lead to the demise of the regime, which is believed to have much stronger survivability than outsiders usually expect.
In comparison with the previous Chinese leader, the current leader will have a more distinctive attitude to condemn the DPRK if Pyongyang violates the Armistice Agreement again by assaulting the South Korean people or facilities without any legal reason. Xi Jinping’s North Korea policy is based upon his bottom-line principle, wherever and whenever North Korea does something significantly damaging to the stability and denuclearization prospects on the Korean Peninsula, China will explicitly express its opposition. Peace, stability and denuclearization are regarded as the core interests for China, if the DPRK makes more trouble on the Peninsula and does not take China’s interests into account, Beijing will no longer tolerate this wrong behavior.
Kim Jong-un’s power base is not as solid as his father’s. Therefore, he must do his best to seek trust and get assurance of support from China. Warming personal relations with Chinese President Xi Jinping and pretending to listen to Chinese advice are his goals.
The North Korean leader doesn’t intend to completely drop its nuclear weapons, for one reason they will rely on the bombs for securing the regime and prolonging the rule. Libya CVID’s model has reminded them of the final fate for discarding the nuke. In terms of this obstinate position, the goal of the denuclearization seems to be very difficult to be realized in the near future, which could be an unresolved issue over the long term.
In this regard, China wants to persuade South Korea to take a more flexible policy to encourage North Korea re-join the Six-party Talks. On the issue of North Korea re-pledging its sincerity to the denuclearization before resumption of the Six-Party Talk, China and South Korea, in fact, see eye-to-eye because of both having distrust of North Korea based on its bad record. However, they differ from each other in the tactical goal of the multilateral talks. Beijing may hold the resumption of and maintenance of the talks as more pressing than the goal of denuclearization itself, because the talks could, at least, halt North Korea’s uranium enrichment program at the Yongbyon Nuclear Plant, and suspend its nuclear and long-range missile tests.
Of course, DPRK suspension of its covert nuclear activities in other sites cannot be guaranteed.
Another factor that may urge China and South Korea to maintain contacts with North Korea is its internal situation. The most important and imminent goal for North Korea is to maintain a stable situation within its leadership after Kim Jong-un dismissed and executed his uncle, North Korea’s No. 2 man, Jang Sung-taek. One option for the leader is to distract his people’s attention from the tense power struggle to outside confrontation with the South, which could be realized through taking further provocative actions and creating a crisis.
Another option is to seek ways to improve relations with Seoul, building trust with President Park Geun-hye and obtaining more investments and projects from the South to revitalize North Korea’s stagnant economy, which is in their best interest.7For China, it needs to avoid having the first option, and try our best to lure North Korea to adopt the second option.
It is China’s basic position that it supports inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, and ultimately, the unification of the Korean Peninsula. In the near future, we are unable to expect that the two Koreas could develop a kind of relations like one in the era of President Kim Dae-jung and President Roh Moo-hyun. Under this circumstance, China will take every chance to persuade both Koreas leaders to improve their relations and reduce tension on the Peninsula. And Beijing is willing to play a role in bridging the gap between two Koreas, if South Korea requests China to do so, while China judges it has the feasibility of conducting that role.
As for the unification, in principle, China is only concerned that the best possible means must exclude military force or unilaterally coercive action. There are many scenarios of unification, but at least in one of the scenarios, China might not immediately support South Korea to dispatch its forces to take over North Korea, when it is in the early stage of chaos. In the case of contingency situation, China, South Korea, and the US should keep consultations about any kind of intervention and explore common interests and maintain strategic trust, trying to avoid any unilateral action on the Peninsula.
7Kim Jong-un’s New Year message discloses that this leader now wants to improve the relations with the south, which may coincide with the second option the above text mentions.
China’s ultimate position and policy on North Korean domestic change will be based upon the real situation trend that ‘will carry the North to go.’ If the government is toppled down and no party could maintain an order, then, China would think South Korea could play a leading role in restoring the order and arrange a process of unification with the consent of the UN.