The Future of U.S. Alliances and Partnerships in Asia
V. Implications for the Korean Peninsula
The most significant divergence between Seoul and Washington in terms of prioritization will likely stem from preferences in addressing the tremendous security challenges posed by North Korea. The immediacy of the North Korean threat, combined with the reality of finite resources that Seoul will devote to its military and national security capabilities, will likely force Seoul to focus its strategic attention, shape its priorities, and drive its military investments and national security policies around the North Korean threat. While certainly justified and understandable, this would necessarily limit South Korea’s ability to play the regional role that Washington may envision for Seoul.
Though previous ROK President Lee Myung-bak as well as several American scholars and officials often talked about a “Global Korea,”42 recently intensifying belligerence from North Korea under Kim Jong- un suggests that such ambitions may be somewhat beyond the ROK’s capabilities. This is especially true in the military realm, where significant investments to meet the North Korean missile threat — such as ground military forces, unmanned ISR over the DMZ, and medium-range missiles — will have little applicability beyond Northeast Asia.
Yet South Korea’s focus on North Korea, combined with the policy and capability shifts related to the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to Seoul, presents an opportunity for South Korea to play an important role in the region and thus enable the shift in American strategy described above. Put simply, should South Korea
42See Dr. Victor Cha, Lindsey Ford, Nirav Patel, Randy Schriver, Vikram J. Singh, Kazuyo Kato, Going Global: The Future of the U.S.-South Korea Alliance, Center for a New American Security, February 23, 2009.
substantially enhance its ability to defend itself from North Korean attack, U.S. forces could theoretically be reoriented toward other regional challenges while maintaining its extended deterrence commitment.
The primary challenge to this approach would be to sustain Seoul’s confidence in American extended deterrence guarantees. While serious, these challenges are not insurmountable. U.S. forces stationed in South Korea have been reduced over time, yet South Korean confidence in the United States has persisted. The key will be to first ensure that the ROK military’s capabilities have sufficiently improved to enable a more significant role in the defense of the South, maintain American leadership and support through the continued provisioning of enduring capabilities that only the United States can provide, and most importantly to work with the South Korean public to buttress public confidence in the changing alliance arrangement.
Such an initiative would be a long-term effort that both sides fully endorse, and should begin with an open, frank dialogue between the U.S. and ROK governments and militaries to discuss fundamental questions related to how both sides view the regional security environment, and the roles they seek to play in peninsular security and regional stability. This dialogue should gradually transition to the development of a roadmap detailing necessary investments, policy changes, and posture shifts. Following are several provisional questions to begin such a dialogue:
• How do South Korean leaders and strategists view China, and how does that affect their approach to the United States? Many allies and partners are wary of giving Beijing the impression that they
are working with Washington to contain or encircle China. This line of questioning will explore how allies and partners weigh these calculations, which will directly inform their willingness to play a greater regional security role.
• How do South Korean leaders and strategists believe the United States helps their country address or manage major security challenges? This will address the priority allies and partners give to top security challenges, as well as their perceptions of the benefits the United States provides. This analysis will be essential to understanding the benefits they see in their relationship with the United States.
• What would be the strategic implications of the United States abdicating responsibility for a major regional security issue, such as disaster relief, the defense of Taiwan, or the protection of the maritime commons? This will help identify the role United States plays in the region, and the consequences of a decreased commitment.
It will also help prioritize issues, roles, and missions and identity areas where the United States could try to convince allies and partners to play a larger role.
• What are the domestic political and economic dynamics that will affect South Korea’s willingness to play an expanded regional security role, or in the defense of South Korea itself? A nuanced understanding of a country’s domestic political calculations will, for reasons described above, be vital to adjusting U.S. alliance and partnership arrangements. This line of inquiry will explore these dynamics, and identify opportunities and challenges for the United States.
• How would the continued rise of Chinese power, combined with persistent economic problems in the United States, affect Seoul’s strategic calculations? The perceived credibility of American power, as well as perceptions of changes in the overall balance of power between China and the United States, will have a significant effect on allied and partner strategic calculations. This area of investigation will reveal regional views on these dynamics, as well as their underlying assumptions about the resiliency and reliability of American and Chinese power.