Thoughts on the Future of Myanmar’s Transition
I. Resolving Ethnic Conflict
The most pressing issue that needs attention is Myanmar’s long-term ethnic conflict. There is no greater threat to the positive trajectory of change in the country today. The persistent challenge for Myanmar governments is to integrate the country’s various ethnic political and military organisations into a single set of national regulations and legal mechanisms. Since the State Law and Order Restoration Council took control of the country in September 1988, the Myanmar leadership has struggled to develop popular consensus around its management of ethnic affairs (see South, 2003; Lintner, 1994). Ceasefire agreements with more than a dozen different armed groups led to a modicum of more peaceful interaction and yet the government struggled to bend these into final peace deals (Rajah, 1998). Instead, many of the ceasefires fell unevenly between peace and war, with sporadic clashes, persistent tension and permanent distrust defining interactions between the government and those they sought to govern. It was often only through lucrative economic concessions, usually centred on extractive development projects like mining or logging, that the previously warring parties could embrace their mutual interests. In general, the ceasefires that were agreed after the collapse of the Communist Party of Burma in 1989 also served to limit the political coherence of ethnic resistance movements. (This is a change from the period when the Communist Party was a single political vehicle). As some groups and individuals prospered, and as other struggled to
continue their resistance to Myanmar government rule, the fractures in ethnic forces became ever more apparent. Some groups, like the United Wa State Army, prospered out of all proportion and received the peace dividend they had craved (Kramer, 2007). It was, however, the inconsistency of ceasefire experiences that is most relevant to any discussion of resolving ethnic conflict.
The specific and often exceptional arrangements enjoyed by particular ethnic groups or political movements are now being tested by revived efforts for a grand negotiation. For instance, as Walton (2013: 22) argues ‘adopting a perspective that is sensitive to Burman privilege puts the focus squarely on Burmans as the only group in a position to challenge structures of Burman privilege.’ At this stage, the government is captured by such ‘privilege’ and insists that Myanmar’s national-level legislature (the Pyindaungsu Hluttaw) is the appropriate forum for the resolution of ethnic conflict. They hope to encourage armed ethnic groups to demobilise their forces, or co-opt them to government militias, as a mechanism for increasing trust. Ethnic leaders have stated their reluctance to accept these terms and fear that the emasculation of the ethnic resistance will lead to unsatisfactory and unjust political outcomes. Instead, they call for a national conversation, culminating in a grand compromise, which generates a new constitutional framework founded in principles of equality, democracy and self-determination. Advocates for ethnic rights may eventually get their way, but only after being subjected to a process of de-politicisation. As Egreteau (2012: 313) suggests, ‘[a]swith the current military/civil transition, which was envisioned by a 7-Step road map announced in 2003, a new road map is needed to address Myanmar’s ethnic conundrum.’ For the government of Myanmar, there is arguably no greater challenge. It comes with risks in many directions.
What are those risks? First, while it is true that the situation in ethnic areas is, in general, calmer than it has been for years (Ball and Farrelly, 2013) there remains a chance that flare-ups will lead to further major conflict. There is a recent example from northern Myanmar where from June 2011 to May 2013 a tense local political situation generated wide-spread fighting (Farrelly, 2012). Thousands were killed, with very heavy casualties on the government side. Since a new and tentative ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Army and the government, this region has seen only occasional fire- fights. On the frontlines, these sporadic clashes between the two sides indicate that there is a lack of trust and a real possibility of future escalation. Elsewhere, particularly in the Shan State, tensions remain high. What this means, crudely, is that if the government or an ethnic group misjudge the situation, then further conflict may ignite. For a government that is managing an already difficult political situation in Myanmar’s major cities — Yangon, Mandalay and Naypyitaw — the difficulty of new ethnic wars is all too apparent.
Second, the Myanmar government faces a variety of risks when managing sentiments among the country’s majority population, the Bamar, who are likely to see the erosion of their special status. As almost two-thirds of Myanmar’s people, in the official count, the Bamar majority have enjoyed special ‘privileges’ (as discussed in Walton, 2013). As the direct result of the former system of military rule, it cannot be assumed that such privilege will be maintained after the country’s political reforms are fully implemented. At the same time, the demarcation of boundaries for powerful lower house constituencies in the People’s Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) suggests that ethnic populations are, at least by population, over-represented in the legislature (Chit Win, 2013). The interaction of these different
dynamics, in a context where the government seeks to finalise peace agreements with ethnic groups, is potentially explosive.
Nonetheless, the overall trend towards greater negotiation is one for which the current Myanmar government deserves credit, and there is every chance that future governments will follow a similar path. The government headed by President Thein Sein has now brokered deals with all of the major armed groups, including the Karen National Union, which had fought against the government since 1949 (Farrelly, 2013c). The recent pause in that decades-long conflict, the establishment of liaison offices in government-controlled Myanmar, and the intention to integrate the Karen leadership into future peace negotiations is part of steady effort to end the country’s civil conflicts.
Former generals spearhead these efforts, most notably Aung Min, who as President’s Office Minister takes central control of the peace- making effort. His gregarious manner and years-long tasking has provided plenty of opportunity for ethnic leaders to become more comfortable with his presence (Egreteau, 2012: 312). Yet, concerns remain about how to best organise the management of this diverse terrain (Dean, 2012), with many wondering whether the Myanmar armed forces are finally prepared to negotiate with those they have considered enemies. The future of Myanmar’s transition likely rests on the relationship between ethnic conflict and the role of the Myanmar armed forces.