L I U M I N G is currently professor and executive director of the Institute of International Relations (IIRS) and director of the Center for Korea Studies of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS). He is currently supported by a fellowship from the Australian Research Council for a major study into Myanmar society 'in transition'. In 2011, he received D.Phil in Development Studies from the University of Oxford.
The Trust-building Process
- What is the Trust-building Process?
- Why South Korea Needs the Trust-Building Process
- Implementing the Trust-Building Process
- Challenges to Overcome
- Upgrading the Trust-building Process
However, North Korea's reactions were not positive and inter-Korean relations did not make much progress. The Trust Building Process must evolve to bring inter-Korean relations closer and call for changes in North Korea.
The Future of U.S. Alliances and Partnerships in Asia
The Future Strategic Context
This dynamic existed in varying degrees of intensity between the United States and its allies throughout the Cold War.5 At times, constrained defense budgets will challenge the United States' willingness and ability to absorb the vast majority of costs associated with .
Asia’s Changing Strategic Dynamics
What follows is a general discussion of the key challenges and trends the United States will face in the Asia-Pacific and how they will impact Washington's future relations with its allies and partners. The United States' ability to effectively implement its China strategy would be severely limited without the significant participation of its Asian allies and partners.
Adjusting to Changes in Alliance and Partnership Dynamics
37 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4 (accessed 8 August 2012). Asking too much is likely to breed resentment and mistrust, while threats to withdraw support will raise fears of abandonment.40 The United States therefore requires a nuanced understanding of the calculations affecting each of its allies and partners, what is possible and what is also a bridge away.
Looking Ahead
Diminished role: Isolationist sentiment in the United States could intensify, prompting Washington to limit the kinds of challenges it wants to face in the Asia-Pacific region. The likely result would be weakened confidence in the reliability of American commitments, reduced stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, a gradual fading of American leadership on several issues of strategic importance, and a weakened liberal international order.
Implications for the Korean Peninsula
How do South Korean leaders and strategists view China, and how does this affect their approach to the United States? How do South Korean leaders and strategists believe the United States is helping their country address or manage major security challenges. It will address the priority allies and partners give to top security challenges, as well as their perceptions of the benefits the United States offers.
This line of inquiry will explore these dynamics, and identify opportunities and challenges for the United States.
Implications for Trustpolitik
Chinese Perspectives on the
East Asian Security Environment and the Korean Peninsula
Chinese Policy on the Korean Peninsula
Of course, China will closely cooperate with South Korea in the joint action to force North Korea to come back to its original commitment made in the joint statement issued during the Six-Party Talks on September 19, 2005. So far, Xi Jinping has not allowed Kim Jong-un to visit China, showing his displeasure over North Korea's nuclear policy and development. In this regard, China wants to persuade South Korea to adopt a more flexible policy to encourage North Korea to rejoin the Six-Party Talks.
Another factor that may prompt China and South Korea to maintain contact with North Korea is its internal situation.
Trustpolitik on the Korean Peninsula
Whenever North Korea intensifies its nuclear tests and uranium program and launches more long-range missiles, it will certainly force many countries to take tougher actions in the UN, which will damage the atmosphere on the Korean Peninsula and disrupt all regular contacts and dialogues. . Under normal situation and development, North Korea will never give up nuclear weapons unless an urgent situation arises. More importantly, through the cooperation, South Korea should increase North Korea's expectations that continued cooperation in the near future will bring the latter more attractive benefits.
In general, unless North Korea voluntarily changes its policy from the top down through some significant revolution, it will not embrace this South Korean approach wholeheartedly.
China-South Korea Relationship
Fourth, the biggest obstacle in the relationship between China and South Korea is not in bilateral relations, but in the two external factors, North Korea and the US. Of course, regarding the North Korean problem, China and South Korea can work together. Historical nationalism cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future, but both China and South Korea must take a stand.
Finally, in Northeast Asia, another case could probably bring China and South Korea together with common interests, ie.
Changing Security Environment in Northeast Asia and the Trust-building
Changing Security Environment in Northeast Asia
With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the reform and opening of China, international relations in Northeast Asia were much less conflictual in the two decades 1990-2000, but have become more turbulent in the past few years. Although China's economic ascent is now slowing, it is still growing at about 8% a year, allowing Beijing to catch up with the U.S. by a conservative estimate before 2030. China's financial and technological resources have given it an advantage in providing public goods at a time when the U.S. in fiscal distress.
In this spirit, the rise of China and its future direction has attracted much attention from the Obama administration, and therefore the White House has put forward its new security strategy to restore balance in the Asia-Pacific, especially in East Asia.
Trust-building Process on the Korean Peninsula
Currently, China has had little interest in hiding its displeasure with North Korea's nuclear weapons development. This has often been manifested by North Korea's surprise moves without prior consultation with China. As such, reducing China's influence in North Korea does little to promote the confidence-building process on the Korean Peninsula.
Since China and the US have a large trust deficit, they tend to treat the Korean Peninsula as part of their geostrategic competition, traditionally with US-South Korea on one side and China-North Korea on the other.
Thoughts on the Future of Myanmar’s Transition
Resolving Ethnic Conflict
Ceasefire agreements with more than a dozen different armed groups led to somewhat more peaceful interaction and yet the government struggled to turn these into final peace agreements (Rajah, 1998). Instead, much of the truce fell unevenly between peace and war, with sporadic clashes, persistent tensions, and permanent mistrust defining interactions between the government and those it sought to govern. As Egreteau suggests, "with the current military/civilian transition, envisioned by a 7-step road map announced in 2003, a new road map is needed to address Myanmar's ethnic problem." For the government of Myanmar, there is probably no greater challenge.
The government led by President Thein Sein has now brokered agreements with all the major armed groups, including the Karen National Union, which had been fighting the government since 1949 (Farrelly, 2013c).
Re-prioritising the Myanmar Armed Forces
Arguably, a more pervasive influence derives from the various ways in which the armed forces have infiltrated all elements of the decision-making apparatus of the state. It will likely be generations before the powerful role of the armed forces and their personnel is significantly diminished. Motivating the armed forces to play a constructive role in Myanmar's transition is therefore crucial for the future of the entire process.
The efforts of the United States to restore its relations with Myanmar's armed forces are also noteworthy in this regard.
Expanding Economic Opportunities
This will require a significantly larger population, many of whom will come from Myanmar's poor rural society. The fundamental risks that will emerge relate to equality, especially given the low levels of education (Hayden and Martin, 2013) and healthcare (Risso-Gill, et al, 2013) that most Myanmar residents face today . The challenge for Myanmar's leaders is to establish economically viable, socially informed and politically appropriate mechanisms for attracting investment.
The challenge, however, is to manage this new situation for the benefit of the people of Myanmar.
Minimising Political Violence
Perhaps, one of the most devastating scenarios would see conflict between Myanmar's Chinese and non-Chinese populations. The next steps in Myanmar's reform process will benefit greatly from the lessons learned in recent years. Even the paranoid have enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar's fear of invasion. Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs30(3): p.
Known Knowns and Known Unknowns: Measuring Myanmar's Military Capabilities.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: Journal of International and Strategic Affairs31(2): p.
Historical and Comparative Commentary on (Partly) Previous Burmese Regimes,
Glimpses of Political Freedoms in Burma in the Late 1940s, Early 1950s and under Current Reforms
Some CPB sympathizers distributed leaflets above ground that (in translation) referred to Prime Minister Thakin Nu as a “fascist murderer.” The local executive authority and police arrested the leaflet distributors under the Public Order Preservation Act of 1947 .The past is a Foreign: stark contrast between the late Burmese Supreme Court and the Myanmar Supreme Court under the military regimes, involving Prime Minister U Nu's 'case'. 8 “Request submitted in open letter dated October 10, 2011 by members of the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission to the President of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar” (in English translation) on the Myanmar Human Rights Commission website.
Commission Chairman U Win Mra again used the same phrase “what are called 'prisoners of conscience'” (in paragraph 4 of the letter) http://mnhrc.org.mm/en/statements-2/open-letter -to-the-president- of-the-republic-of-the-union-of-myanmar-by-the-myanmar-national-human-rights-commission.
Im)possible Applications for North Korea of Current Burmese/Myanmar Reforms
Neither version states that the Burmese government withdrew recognition of the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The 'peer' in terms of the longevity of the Burmese military dictatorship dominated by one person is, in the author's opinion, Alfredo Stroessner's dictatorship from Paraguay. To the credit of the present administration, such an expression of public demand would not have been possible, e.g. even in the year 2010 in Burma.
Sein's reforms in the same newspaper with an (at best) ambiguous analysis of the new North Korean leader35, who has consolidated his power since the report.
Trust-building The Process
Korean and
Unification
