Global GDP Growth 2007-2010
7.1 Ideas
7.1.1 CBDR – more common than differentiated?
Chapter 7.India vying to occupy centre stage with the USA & China: the fourth phase (2011–2015)
7 India vying to occupy centre stage with the USA & China: the fourth phase (2011–2015)
This phase includes the period of the evolution of the climate regime from the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in 2011 to the conclusion of “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” in Paris in 2015, as mandated by COP17. Figure 49 is a timeline of the phase, which includes all the most important milestones that will be discussed below in this chapter. As in previous timeline figures, international events are depicted above the date line and Indian events and data below it.
Figure 49: Fourth phase – negotiating the post-2020 agreement
Chapter 7.India vying to occupy centre stage with the USA & China: the fourth phase (2011–2015)
There is no mention in the ADP text of Annexes, CBDR, equity or historical responsibility - unlike in the Copenhagen Accord and Cancún Agreements texts - omissions that further underline the move toward legal symmetry (Aldy & Stavins, 2012; Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012; Raghunandan, 2013) supported by the USA and the Umbrella Group of countries. India’s negotiating style and the political manoeuvring of other players led to its being regarded as reactive and becoming increasingly isolated during the Durban COP (Death, 2012; Sengupta, 2012b), but as one commentator asserted “India is reactive because it is trying to defend what it sees as the gains it made in the formulations of the Framework Convention; and the key point there is that the Framework Convention does not call for obligations on developing countries which are comparable to those that are required by the Annex 1 countries” (Desai, 2014). Thus it is not surprising that despite the absence of the words “equity” or CBDR etc. developing countries, India foremost among them, have been emphatic that as the ADP outcome would still be “under the Convention” it was still subject to the objectives and principles therein, implicitly therefore still including CBDR & RC.
The COP17 in 2011 was also notable for the apparent “fragility of emerging power coalitions” in the face of a trio of pressures - from the developed countries, from smaller developing countries and from internal differences (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012). The BASIC countries came under sustained and relatively unified pressure from developed countries as their ‘emerging power’ status undermined their calls for continued differentiation and created space for developed countries to argue that differentiation be “reinterpreted in the light of ‘contemporary economic realities’”
(Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012). The US in particular took a firm stance that it would only countenance a mandate to negotiate a legally binding treaty if that mandate was “symmetrical” i.e. that it applied to both developed and developing country Parties (Bodansky, 2012). The much-debated phrase
“applicable to all” anticipated greater symmetry of commitments and potentially also a “more nuanced model of differentiation” (Winkler & Rajamani, 2014) In addition, smaller developing countries - especially through the ad-hoc AOSIS, LDC alliance and the vocal SIDS - began to apply pressure on the emerging powers to take on more responsibility for the emissions caused by their development (Banerjee, 2012). This was most pithily encapsulated in one SIDS delegate’s exclaimation that “while they [India] develop, we die” (Black, 2011). This disjuncture between India and small developing countries was particularly troubling given that despite India’s growing material capabilities, its continuing developmental challenges meant it had at least as much in common with LDCs as with the emerging powers of the BASIC group.
Lastly, the coherence of BASIC was challenged by the differences of the countries. Whilst Brazil, China and South Africa were eventually willing to compromise on their initial positions in relation to
a legal binding treaty applicable to developing countries, India was not willing to countenance legally binding reductions for developing countries (Masters, 2012) and was thus isolated from BASIC (Banerjee, 2012; Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012). It is given this isolated and ultimately untenable position that India came to agree to the inclusion of the formulation “agreed outcome with legal force applicable to all” (UNFCCC, 2012a: decision 1/CP.17 para.2) which allowed the decision to be adopted and the COP to close, but simply delayed the debate over differentiation to the next COP and the ADP negotiations.
Despite what might be construed as a weakend position in relation to differentiation after the Durban decision, India very clearly still cleaved to the continued importance of CBDR & RC in its ADP submissions (discussed at length under 7.1.3 below) and in its intended nationally determined contribution (INDC), submitted pursuant to the ADP negotiations (discussed below under 7.3.1.2).
The INDC makes a strong statement of protest at the “tepid and inadequate response” of the developed countries that are historically responsible for the GHG accumulation causing climate change, even in light of the UNFCCC’s “delineation of obligations and responsibilities”.
Notwithstanding its belief in the origins of the problem, the INDC seeks to position India as “an active and constructive participant in the search for solutions” (Government of India, 2015a: 2) and while this might be read as a weakening of its stance on CBDR & RC, it is an echo of earlier statements at the UN regarding the continued applicability of CBDR as an organising principle of cooperative endeavour. One such statement held that CBDR’s main focus was actually on “common responsibility”, but that these must still “be differentiated due to our different starting points, historical footprints, and development levels” and that uniformity of applicability did not automatically follow from the universality of relevance (Government of India, 2015b). In September 2015, PM Modi stated succinctly that “the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is the bedrock of our collective enterprise” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015a), thereby quashing any doubt about India’s continued support for, and belief in the importance of, CBDR & RC.
Article two of the Paris Agreement includes the long-term temperature goal and the overall objectives of the Agreement (UNFCCC, 2016: Article 2.1) and goes on to state that it will be
“implemented to reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances” (UNFCCC, 2016: Article 2.2).
Whilst the inclusion of the reference to CBDR might have allayed some developing countries’ fears, the appending of the COP20 qualifier - “in light of national circumstances” - arguably alters the nature of the differentiation. Unlike the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol, the PA operationalises differentiation according to subject areas, not Parties. Thus differentiation has itself become
Chapter 7.India vying to occupy centre stage with the USA & China: the fourth phase (2011–2015)
become differentiated - modified in relation to the specificities of mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity- building and transparency (Rajamani, 2016).
In relation to finance, differentiation most closely resembles the pre-Paris dispensation. Whereas developed countries are called upon to provide finance (“shall provide”), developing countries merely are “encouraged” to do so (UNFCCC, 2016: Article 9.1 & 9.2). In relation to mitigation, however, some commentators argued that differentiation is dead, and symmetry has been achieved (Narain, 2015). This is one reading of the Article 3 text that “all Parties are to undertake and communicate ambitious efforts” in the form of NDCs (UNFCCC, 2016: Article 3). A more nuanced reading of the PA, however, suggests that some gradation of differentiation remains in relation to mitigation efforts as developed countries “should continue” undertaking “economy- wide absolute emission reduction targets”, whereas developing countries “should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts”. However, given that developing countries are “encouraged to move towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets” (UNFCCC, 2016: Article 4.4) it is apparent that the way is clear for symmetry between efforts to become more pronounced over time.