Global GDP Growth 2007-2010
6.4 Configuration of forces and influences in phase three
_________________________________________________ Chapter 6. India in the wings: the second phase (2005-2010)
the creation of the PMCCC, the Special Envoy and Chief Negotiator on Climate Change and the NAPCC can all be construed as India’s national-level institutional response to the evolution of the international regime and the growing certainty of the science. To varying degrees India also included the eight national missions of the NAPCC in its budgeting procedures for the 12th Five Year Plan, as seen in Table 6 above (line “K”); even so, the implementation of these missions has been subject to domestic criticism.
Figure 48: Visual representation of configuration of forces in phase 3.
Note: line indicates influence, arrow indicates directionality.
India’s continued emphasis on the need for differentiation and the concomitant avoidance of enforceable mitigation targets for developing countries put it at odds with the prevailing assessment of the science in IPCC’s AR4 (line “J”). In effect this could be seen as the contestation between an intersubjectively held idea (at international level) of addressing anthropogenic climate change and image of an appropriate response - an equitable response - held by a collective, in other words by India. The growing global necessity of making large-scale emission reductions as
_________________________________________________ Chapter 6. India in the wings: the second phase (2005-2010)
encapsulated by the AR4 (in particular Box 13.7 produced by the IPCC’s WGIII), had begun to undermine the argument in favour of differentiation – particularly as applied to larger emerging economies like India (line “L”).
In this phase, material resources at international level in general became scarcer owing to the global economic crisis that began in 2008. While in India national GDP did decline, the effect of the crisis was not as pronounced as it was in the developed countries. Thus India continued to become a relatively more powerful economic player at the international level, which in turn led to more concerted calls for India to take on mitigation commitments and play a role in the provision of the
“global good” of curbing climate change: in effect its growing economic prowess was a double- edged sword (see line “E” in
Figure 48 above). While this enhanced international status was welcome in some respects, in relation to the climate change regime it worked to undermine India’s insistence that it continue to be subject to differentiated responsibilities in the name of equity and CBDR & RC. In effect its growing economic prowess was a double-edged sword (see line “E” in Figure 48 above) ostensibly allowing it to create a better life for its citizens, but also imposing the constraints of an international role upon it. Despite its increased international leverage India was apparently still unable to further the differentiation agenda in its favour, and has been cast instead as a reactive player (Desai, 2014) as it holds steadfastly to the principles of CBDR and RC.
Its growing economy, pivotal in Delhi’s drive to be taken seriously as a major player, however, was not distributing benefits evenly and doing little to address the internal inequalities wrought by poverty and underdevelopment. In addition, the growing economy demanded increased energy inputs, outstripping demand and leading to increased dependence on imports of fossil fuel. Thus its changing material circumstances did not counter India’s longstanding intersubjective idea that it was not the cause of the problem (line “F”) and should be allowed space to develop to bring its people out of poverty. When combined with the observation that material resources from the regime or international level were slow in coming (despite the long-standing promises finance and technology transfer), India’s defence of the continued salience of equity and CBDR and determination to stave off taking quantified mitigation targets (a move toward symmetry) seem all the more warranted. In the latter part of this phase, however, India did ameliorate its stance somewhat, possibly in an attempt to be seen as proactive (under Ramesh) or in acknowledgement that the science was robust and therefore that acting – providing material resources – to curb climate change was inherently in its own domestic interests anyway (line “I”).
As the international institutional arrangements moved ever more in the direction of legal symmetry between developed and developing countries, so India countered with an offer of a voluntary
emissions-intensity goal, which would be subject to “international consultation and analysis” but not formal verification or review. This enabled India to be seen as part of the solution to the problem (line “F”). However, in their drive to have India redefined as an international player, Delhi’s decision makers created “a tension and a degree of unpredictability on India’s likely positions” going forward (Malone, 2011: 271–2). Positioning itself seemingly against its own existing self- identification as a developing country, India was criticised for abandoning other smaller developing countries (Rajamani, 2013; Krishnaswamy, 2014) in favour of the BASIC alliance and possible future alignment with the USA. India’s identity crisis was well underway.
Chapter 7.India vying to occupy centre stage with the USA & China: the fourth phase (2011–2015)
7 India vying to occupy centre stage with the USA & China: the fourth phase (2011–2015)
This phase includes the period of the evolution of the climate regime from the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in 2011 to the conclusion of “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties” in Paris in 2015, as mandated by COP17. Figure 49 is a timeline of the phase, which includes all the most important milestones that will be discussed below in this chapter. As in previous timeline figures, international events are depicted above the date line and Indian events and data below it.