Cox’s theory of historical structures is captured graphically below in Figure 3. It was his contention that the particular configuration of forces – i.e. of ideas, material capabilities and institutions – characterised periods of time. This configuration framed the possibilities of action or exercising agency as an application of pressure in the form of constraints to which those acting (both state and civil society actors) could either resist or surrender, but which could not be ignored (Cox, 1981). In this, Cox echoed Marx by asserting that historical structures create frameworks within which people make history, even though the framework might provide conditions that people themselves would not have chosen (Cox & Schechter, 2002).
As indicated by the double-headed arrows in Figure 3, the forces (or potentials) are mutually influential and do not exist in a hierarchy, although in any one historical period one kind of force may come to be dominant. The forces described below act on both the state and the broader civil society. The dominance of any particular force will be highlighted in the discussion of the forces in the chapters of section two of this dissertation.
Figure 3: Cox’s configuration of forces that characterise historical structures Source: Based on Cox (1981)
As depicted in Figure 3 above, ideas constitute a type of force that can be disaggregated into two different kinds: ideas formed by “intersubjective meanings” and ideas formed by “collective
images of social order” (Cox, 1981: 136). Intersubjective ideas are what form the prevailing picture of the nature of the world: the commonly held “common sense” of what reality looks like to a society. Cox considered them the “cumulative collective response by people to their conditions of existence” (Cox, 2001: 53). Intersubjectively formed ideas give people a sense of who they are in a society and what that society – be it local, national or international – looks like. They are historically conditioned (the idea of the existence of states, for example), and constitute the prevailing discourse, enduring over long periods. As such they tend to work to perpetuate habits, expectations and behaviours.
Conversely, ideas formed by collective images are contending ideas held by different groups of people. Different groups may, for instance, hold divergent views about issues of social order, such as the nature and legitimacy of the state, the primacy of the individual or the family, or the meaning of justice or equity (Cox, 1981; Moolakkattu, 2009). It is in the conflict between multiple and opposing collective images that the potential for alternative paths to the status quo may become apparent (Cox, 1981).
The dynamic created by the interplay of intersubjective ideas and collective-image ideas renders India the ideal case study. From the very beginning of the negotiations, India has consistently been a vocal proponent of the need for equity to guide the global response to climate change. The idea or image of equity cleaved to by India has not, however, been universally accepted, rendering it by definition a contending idea of a group or collective, instead of being an enduring, commonly held intersubjective idea.
The forces exerted by the material capabilities – also termed the material base – are understood less in terms of the explicitly economic Marxist conceptualisation and more as a broader range of concepts that are linked to material existence (Mittelman, 1998). Material capabilities include
“productive capacity, destructive capacity (military), natural resources, technology, industry and wealth (economic growth/development) as well as the technical and organisational capabilities of society and states” (Leysens, 2002). Capabilities exert both productive and destructive forces on the people living within the context they provide (Cox, 1981). India has experienced a noticeable and notable shift in its material capabilities in the two decades since the UNFCCC began – this makes it a potentially fascinating study of the effect of a change in material capabilities on the historical structure.
The third category of force suggested by Cox is the force exerted by institutions. These are often stabilising and perpetuating, and serve to reflect and reproduce the existing social order
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while buffering against competing ideas and institutions. Institutional forces work to entrench the status quo and effectively discourage collective images of social order that are inconsistent with the prevailing power relations at the historical point at which the institution was created (Cox, 1981). Over time institutions evolve to acquire a certain level of autonomy, sometimes going as far as to take on a “life of their own” and becoming self-perpetuating.
Institutions are furthermore, and to a significant extent, created and shaped by the state (or states) for whose benefit the hegemony that the institution helps to sustain operates. In this manner they mirror and reinforce the ideas and perspectives that favour those states and groups of people that dominate the institution (Leysens, 2008). Institutions in this Coxian sense are “particular amalgams of ideas and material power” (Cox, 1981: 137). In Cox’s view an institution would not need to wield any of its inherent force to quell resistance if the prevailing power relations were uncritically accepted as legitimate by those who are ruled. Understood in this manner, institutionalisation has similarities to Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony insofar as the exercise or expression of power in a hegemonic structure (power relations, authority) remains in the background of public consciousness, so much so that it is seen as the
“natural order” of things (Cox, 1981: 136; Schouten, 2009: 7).
This trilectic – of ideas, institutions and material capabilities – forms a heuristic device to understand the character of the abstract concept that is the historical structure. Two elements of this trilectic – ideas and institutions – overlap to a significant extent. This overlap can be partially attributed to Cox’s definition of institutions as “particular amalgams of ideas and material capabilities” (Cox, 1981: 137); institutions are partially constructions of ideas, making it difficult at times to distinguish between ideas and that what might be construed as institutions in the broader sense of norms or thought patterns. Distinguishing between an idea and institution (in this broader sense) can be challenging due to the intangible, and sometimes ephemeral, nature of both. Thus, for the purpose of this dissertation, the dividing line between ideas and institutions has been drawn where material resources are dedicated to implementing an idea or where an organisational structure has been formed; ideas have been conceptualised as largely abstract, “broader picture” constructs. Cox’s definition of institutions also indicates an overlap of institutions and material capabilities. As discussed above, Cox’s material conditions include, for instance, natural resource endowments, technology and wealth to acquire or alter these. As such material capabililites are easier to distinguish from institutions when employing Cox’s heuristic device.
In 1981, Cox’s insistence on the inefficacy of theories that constrained analysis to only the actions between states positioned him outside the then-dominant neorealist tradition in International Relations theory. Instead he suggested that civil society actors were as important in the understanding of international relations as the state, going so far as to state that “state and civil society are so interpenetrated that the concepts have become almost purely analytical”
(Cox, 1981: 127 ). He went on to propose that thinking instead about the state/society complex as the basic unit of analysis in international relations was both necessary and useful. He elaborated that he was not advocating that the role of states be underestimated, but rather that due cognisance be given to the role social forces exert on the development of states and thus also on the development of world orders (Cox, 1981).
2.4.1 The configuration of forces at different levels
As this method – understanding the configuration of the forces of ideas, institutions and material capabilities – is a heuristic device, it can also be applied to understanding hegemonic structures at different levels of organisation: the micro level of social forces, particularly related to the social forces brought about by the production processes; the meso level of forms of states; and the macro level of world order. These levels are interrelated and mutually influential (Cox, 1981), as depicted in Figure 4. For instance, changes in production (i.e. a social force) influence the forms that states take, and the world order is influenced by changing forms of production and also influences decisions made by states (Cox, 1981).
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Figure 4: Configuration of forces at multiple levels and interaction between them
To flesh out this heuristic model with a brief overview of the Indian context, it is notable that in the decades since the UNFCCC was signed (1992) and came into force (1994), the relative economic strength of India has altered dramatically, in part due to the effects of the 1991 economic reforms and the phenomenal growth in the IT and business-processes outsourcing sectors (Chandra, Mukherjee & Mukherjee, 2008). These significant changes in production capacity and economic emphasis have had a knock-on effect on the role of the Indian state (making it more “mercantilist” and less “developmental” for instance), which has both facilitated and benefited from the increase in GDP. The changes in these two forces – material capabilities and institutions – would have in turn, according to Cox’s model, influenced and been affected by the “idea” of India as an emerging power.
2.4.2 The limited totality that is addressing climate change
As conceived by Cox, a historical structure represents what he termed a “limited totality” or a particular, circumscribed sphere of activity contextualised by its historical moment/era (Cox, 1981: 137). This dissertation will be focusing on the limited totality that is the international effort to address climate change through the UNFCCC. Four phases in the evolution of the regime have been identified for the purposes of analysis and used as a structuring device. The first phase revolves around the emerging consensus on the need to address climate change and the establishment of the Framework Convention, and runs from 1988 to 1994. The second
phase encompasses the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakech Accords establishing specific rules for it. The ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 initiated the third phase, which includes the negotiations leading up to the second commitment period of the KP.
The fourth phase runs from 2011 and the agreement of the Durban Platform at COP17 and covers the Durban Platform (ADP) negotiations towards a 2015 agreement to supersede the Kyoto Protocol after 2020.