3.5 Theoretical Framework
3.5.2 Common Property Resource Management Theory
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will analyse various positive peace indicators that are: recognition of rights, universal access, participation, protection of the environment development and sustenance.
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One of the suggestions made by CPRM theory is that the minimum condition for functioning CPRs is clearly defined boundaries for water resources and its users (see Dietz et al., 2003).
The logic behind this suggestion is that the clear definition of users and non-users, facilitates better regulation of who should, and should not, access water, and so helps in defining who should contribute to the management of the water resources. Bruns (2005, p. 6) observed that CPRM theory also suggests that effective water resource management is more likely to occur where there are clearly defined rules and enforcement mechanisms.
Turner (2007, p. 3) claimed that more successful water management includes “well-defined social group with rights to a clearly-defined [water] resource area, [and has the] ability to exclude others from using the [water] resource, set of use rules that limit the ways in which the water is extracted by individuals, capacity to monitor use and enforce rules”. Bruns (2005, p. 5) disputed Turner’s claim and argued that as water resources become depleted and augmentation of supplies become more difficult, “competition between users increases, giving rise to the need for and potential benefits from coordination among users sharing a common resource”.
Consequently, water scarcity may bring positive peace in the sense of co-operation to overcome increasing challenges. Dietz et al. (2003, p. 10) pointed out that within the rural areas, “access to shared water infrastructure for communal use is usually tied to obligations to contribute to investment and maintenance”. Bruns (2005, p. 6) further stated that, “from a CPRM perspective, arrangements that accommodate existing local practices, such as equitable sharing of shortages and measurement by time rather than volume, are preferable”.
A group holds secure and exclusive collective rights to own, manage and/or use water, referred to as common pool resources, including wetlands or irrigation water (see Andersen, 2011, p. 3).
A review of existing studies of common-pool resources by Agrawal (2001) suggested that many have focused on local institutions to show that common property arrangements can result in efficient use, equitable allocation and sustainable conservation. Ratner et al. (2013, p. 184) reiterated that, in addition to recognising the importance of water’s contribution to the reduction of poverty and building rural people’s assets, there is also an awareness that there is positive potential that cooperation around water resources challenges can reduce the risk of broader social conflict and violence.
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Agrawal (2001, p. 10) argued that the authority that the social group actually holds over water resources it manages is contingent on its relations with outside stakeholders, who may wield significant control over management decisions. Claims of political neutrality or scientific expertise may increase outsider control. The ‘top dogs’, as argued by Galtung (1990), may use their power to influence management and allocation of water resources. Taxation, regulation or market power may allow outside groups to control a significant portion of the benefits generated by water. Thus, formal policies and informal practices to water intersect in rural areas. The extent and nature of implementation determines the level of benefits realised by the local communities.
According to Turner (2007, p. 4), local communities often are fractured politically, with multiple sub-groups holding rights to the same water resource. Existing governance structures may not incorporate all those who hold rights to water. Moreover, local authorities making decisions on water may not be accountable to the group(s) they represent. Bruns (2005, p. 6) emphasised that, as outsiders, development agencies must work through local elites but also should seek, through an infusion of outside resources, to widen access to water-derived benefits for the less powerful — especially where equitable water access is a priority goal. Local and external specialists may aid to provide information on water issues, refining the ability of societies to create and supervise arrangements.
Communal tenure, widely used in Africa is customary and age-old, its rules relying on community decisions, or it can be newly designed for a specific purpose. In common property or common pool resources theory, communal tenure can be defined as self-governing forms of collective action by a group of people, often a village. Common-property resources (CPRs) are subject to collectively held rights in a resource system, such as water resources, which provide products that villagers can use. Andersen (2011, p. 4)noted that common property resource theory addressed five kinds of rights in relation to water, namely access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. Access pertains to the right to enter a defined physical area and enjoy benefits. Withdrawal is the right to harvest resource units or products of a water system. Management is the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the water resource by making improvements. Exclusion refers to the right to determine who has access and withdrawal rights, and how those rights may be transferred. Finally, alienation concerns the right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights. Ratner (2013, p. 195) further pointed out that the level of trust that stakeholders have in institutions to mediate water competition
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relates to the degree each has internalised shared norms and values. When shared norms are not internalised, greater levels of external enforcement are required (see Baland & Platteau, 1996, in Ratner, 2013 p. 195). Bruns (2005, p. 6) noted that rights are useless when there are no means to enforce them. If thorough conflict resolution mechanisms and sanctions are absent, then problems such as unchecked upstream abstraction and mining of aquifers are inevitable.
Vincent and Elinor in Turner (2007, p. 4) argued for use of the term ‘common pool’ rather than
‘common property’ for that class of resources that are particularly problematic to human institutions because of the difficulties of bounding or dividing them, excluding or controlling the activities of potential users. Canal water is a common pool resource: it can be used jointly, because of the high cost of excluding a landowner with commendable land; and its consumption is subtractive in the sense that water applied to A’s land is not simultaneously available for B’s. So, when water is scarce, congestion is likely, manifested in conflict, hoarding, and yield reductions where water arrives too late. When water management institutions are unable to address resource competition, their credibility and legitimacy are reduced in the eyes of the stakeholders (see Ratner et al., 2013, p. 195). This undermines shared values among local actors and lead to resource claims by external actors that disregard local institutions. Groundwater fulfils the same common pool criteria. Water forms vital parts of the livelihoods of large sections of the population in developing countries, and the issue of how to prevent their over-exploitation as population grows is of great importance for development policy.