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water35. Most importantly sub-catchment councils also serve as a platform for local level participation in water management.
Despite the nuanced role of the Water Act of 1998 regarding decentralisation of water management, a closer scrutiny will reveal major weaknesses. The process of drafting the 1998 Water Act was mainly top-down as it emanated from central government (see Kujinga &
Jonker, 2006; Dube & Swatuk, 2002). Derman et al. (2000, p. 15) argued that the government appears to have “assumed the role of speaking for the ‘disadvantaged’” in terms of water access. This paternalistic style of management ensures the government speaks for ‘the people’.
From a survey around Zimbabwe, Nare, Odiyo, Francis and Potgieter (2006) found that 98%
of people did not know there had been water sector reforms. Kujinga and Jonker (2006) asserted that the limited knowledge by local water users limits their participation. The above arguments show that knowledge and information about water governance bequeath to all stakeholders (water users in particular) confidence and capacity to participate in water resources management. This is an essential ingredient towards transforming relations from a fundamentally conflictual towards confident positive outlooks. Interviews with participants in Village One revealed that all the respondents did not know about the Water Act or any other related water instrument. Neither did they know about Catchment Councils, sub-catchment councils nor of any individual involved in any of these councils. Only key informants reflecting the technocratic and leadership side of Mhondoro-Ngezi are aware of the existence of such instruments.
Haessly (2011) argued that structural violence can take place at the micro level, which means within a smaller unit like a village when certain poor people may be excluded from decision making. Cleaver (1998, p 100) argued that water decisions were, “only successfully enforced in those communities where the decisions were taken at a meeting of the whole community rather than by a water point committee alone”. In Zimbabwe in most cases, water committees are arenas of political contestation, so when a certain party dominates then it means automatic exclusion of individuals from the other political groupings.
35 Zimbabwe National Water Act Chapter 20:24. Retrieved from faolex.fao.org>docs>pdf26168
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Manzungu (2001, p.116) argued that it is cause for concern that the Minister has, as contained in section 20 of the Water Act, absolute power in many aspects such as drawing the boundary, stipulating the number of members and assigning the Catchment Council a name. The section stipulates that:36
The Minister may, by statutory instrument — (a) abolish a catchment council; or
(b)(…) alter the area of jurisdiction of a catchment council; or (c) alter the membership or the name of a catchment council.
This means the participatory mechanisms mean nothing, if one individual is given the ultimate power. It shows inequitable distribution of power, which is heavily tilted in favour of the ‘top dogs’. There are no specified circumstances in the above scenarios where the Minister carries out the decisions which raises the potential for arbitrary dismissals.
The Catchment manager, who is a government appointee, can act as a Catchment Council under sections 21(2) of the Water Act:
The Minister may, by written notice to a Catchment Council, confer all or any of the powers of officers upon a catchment manager or on all or any of the members of a catchment council, and may at any time amend or revoke any such notice.37
The Catchment manager also has power in terms of section 29[1(v)] of the Water Act to award servitudes (permission for water related development to take place), without consulting the rural district councils and the local communities. In this case users of water are deprived of input as to how they want to draw water, for instance, or where water related development (such as dam construction) should take place, or the amount that should be levied for abstraction.
Manzungu (2001, p. 117) criticised the Act on the basis that it formed the sub-catchment councils as the lowest user organisation, some of which cover 2000 km2 and are far too big for any practical programme. Existing institutions are not catered for in the law. By claiming expertise, the central government as an ‘outsider’ in ‘common pool resource’ use locked local institutions (insiders) in the informal sector out of water governance; an opportunity for genuine local management was lost. The Water and Zimbabwe National Water Authority
36 ibid.
37 Zimbabwe National Water Act Chapter 20:24. Retrieved from faolex.fao.org>docs>pdf26168
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(ZINWA) Acts created new institutions rather than strengthening the existing ones. In a study of Lower Save East Sub-Catchment Council (LSESC), Mtisi (2011) discovered that the politicisation of water has alienated the majority of water users who now abstain from participating in sub-catchment council meetings. The sub-catchment chairperson increasingly politicised discussions on water management. A group of water users, highly differentiated along political lines, is rarely organised around water issues.
The Constitution of Zimbabwe Chapter 14 Part 1(264), prescribes the government devolution of power to local authorities.38 This ensures ‘participation’, ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’
and ‘fostering national peace and unity’. Further, it is aimed at enhancing the “capacity of communities to manage their own affairs to further their own development”. However, decentralised water institutions do not necessarily mean greater representation and participation of all stakeholders as this can be limited by the political complexity and messy nature of decentralised institutions. Evidence from a study by Mtisi and Nicol (2003) of Budzi and Lower Save sub-catchment councils in Zimbabwe strongly suggested that participation of new stakeholders, mainly small-scale, communal and resettled farmers in decentralised water institutions, is still peripheral. High transactional costs limit participation to stakeholders who can afford to pay the cost of traveling to attend meetings, as well as those who can communicate and articulate effectively. Consequently, the concerns and consensus that emerge from catchment and sub-catchment councils reflect the distorted nature of participation. People with disabilities also have a clear voice regarding their concerns around water access. The National Action Committee, in its WASH Newsletter of January 2016, quoted Ishmael Zhou, Federation of Disabled People of Zimbabwe:
There are gaps in the inclusion of people with disabilities in [water supply]. At a village committee level, there needs to be a representative with a disability so that they can highlight those issues. We have policies in place at a national… but disability is not mentioned. My request to decision makers is to please include people with disabilities from the water point, to the village, to the district and right through to the national level. No-one is representing the aspirations of people with disabilities and [water supply] must cater for everyone.
38 Zimbabwean Constitution Chapter 14. Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org>dyn>Electronic
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The Rural District Councils Act (Chapter 29:13), Part VII section 50 stipulates the rules of participation:
For each ward of a council area there [is] a committee, (…) known as a ward development committee [WADCO], consisting of: (a) the councillor [who is] the chairman of the committee; and (b) the chairman and secretary of every village development committee.39
The above section is an indication of the gendered nature of participation. It gives provision for the chairman, instead of a gender neutral term, for example, chairperson. This shows structural violence of discrimination against women. In cases where there is a non-existent Village Development Committee (VIDCO), “the Minister shall appoint persons to the ward development committee from a list of names prepared by the councillor for the ward”. If there is no WADCO, “the Minister may appoint such persons as he thinks fit to constitute the committee”.
It is important to note that structures for water provision in any jurisdiction of RDCs follow the WADCO/VIDCO channels. However, the centralised nature of the system indicates structural violence of exclusion, where the ‘top dog’ is symbolised by the minister’s right to appoint people who participate in the ward assembly from a list prepared by the councillor. This is prone to abuse, as the councillors may resort to favouritism. This reflects the interference into structures reserved for ‘underdogs’ from the top echelons of society.
While physical attendance is one aspect of participation, there is a need to move beyond the mere headcount to consider and analyse the actual discussions of water issues at the sub- catchment council. Mtisi and Nicol (2003, p. 263) contended that the extent to which the ‘new water users’ are representing and vocalising their interests and livelihood concerns is still controversial. This is largely because the ‘new water users’ do not have adequate information about the water reform, are not well organised as interest groups, lack the experience in debating and articulating water issues, and are incapacitated by the use of English in the conduct of water issues.
39 Rural District Councils Act (Chapter 29:13)
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