The history of water policies in Zimbabwe is loaded with structural violence of exclusion of the rural communities from accessing water. Mtisi (2011, p. 6) demonstrated the point by giving an example of the 1976 Water Act, as a legal instrument used to deny the majority of Africans legal access to water for productive uses and excluding them from participating in decision making on water. She further states that water rights were tied to ownership of land and since the majority of Africans did not have title deeds, they could not apply for water rights.
Communal black farmers, living in the reserves of colonial Zimbabwe were effectively excluded from participating in water issues on River Boards because they did not have land and water rights. Boulding (1998), in Mtisi (2011, p. 6), stated that communal and resettlement farmers’ use of water was viewed as ‘wasteful’. Galtung claimed words such as ‘wasteful’ were a form of cultural violence as they legitimised deprivation of a certain group of people from access to water. This cultural violence was evident when the 1976 Water Act granted water rights in perpetuity on the basis of prior appropriation doctrine and in recognition of previous rights to water. Prior appropriation doctrine in this sense means that a user who settles first in an area, automatically enjoys more rights than those who arrives later. Van der Zaag (1998) in Mtisi (2011, p. 8) illustrated this point in a study of Nyachowa catchment, where he observed that a commercial farm, located on the upper end of Nyachowa valley, had a first call on water and thus drew the full amount stipulated in the water right. Yet by so doing, the commercial farmer left less water for communal irrigators, at the lower end of the valley with the effect that Nyachowa communal irrigators faced perpetual and severe water shortages.
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Generally, commercial areas of colonial Zimbabwe were exclusively for white settlers. The gaining of independence by the country led to some settlers selling their land to the government and black farmers were resettled in these areas. This led to serious conflicts as the white commercial farmers still referred to the Water Act of 1976 to claim more rights than the resettled black farmers. This created an untenable situation, since water is a common property resource and the government had to act. As aptly summarised by the National Water Policy29 (2013, p. 8):
White commercial farming areas comprised land with the best access to water.
Water rights were issued in perpetuity and endorsed on the title deeds, thereby enhancing the value of farms… it helped to accelerate water resources and irrigation development in commercial farms, while very little development took place in native lands, now known as communal lands. It was therefore necessary and inevitable that … water had to be re-distributed to improve access to … [the] resource by most Zimbabweans.
In an attempt to establish a more equitable sharing and just water system, the Zimbabwean government put in place the Water Act in 1998. According to Manzungu (2001, p. 101), this Act replaced that of 1976, and removed unfair clauses such as the priority date system and the granting of water rights in perpetuity. The reforms which ended in the passing of the 1998 Water Act can be used as a conflict transformation lens, which scrutinised historical conflictual behaviour patterns and sought to redress what was happening. Walker (2006) maintained that this Act gave high priority to the right to livelihood in terms of water for basic needs.
The reforms were undertaken primarily to redress the inequitable access to the country’s water resources that had been enshrined in the 1976 Water Act and to embrace key principles of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) on the basis of which the Water and ZINWA Acts of 1998 were developed. The Water Act 1998 vested all forms of water in the state … and replaced permanently held water rights with renewable water permits, thus replacing the legal concept of water rights with administrative water allocation system.
(National Water Policy 2013 p. 9)
According to the Zimbabwe Report (2010, p. 10), water is now treated water as an economic good. This resonates well with the Dublin principle 4 which stipulates that water has an
29 Zimbabwe National Water Policy, 2013
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economic value and should be recognised as an economic good.30 Walker (2006) argued that if water is provided freely, it will not be conserved and users will not maintain water infrastructure or facilities. Economic incentives need to be considered in order to stimulate the optimum use of water resources. However, the Dublin principles of 1992, which were developed at a conference of water specialists, posited that it is vital to recognise the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean water at an affordable price.31 These principles recognise the finite and vulnerable nature of water resources, the need for more participatory approaches to development and management, and the economic value of water.
The Water Act of 1998 introduced the polluter pays principle.32 This means the pollution of water is an offence, which is now punishable by a fine. Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe (2009) noted that this emerged after the realisation that water was being polluted by gold panning activities introducing mercury and cyanide, which are poisonous, into the country’s rivers. This removes structural violence in respect of nature. However, Keifer et al. (2008) disputed the above assertions, and argued that enforcement of the Water Act is weak. The control of discharge of wastewater has not always been enforced. Nhapi (2009, p. 100) gave the example of Lake Chivero, where nitrogen and phosphorus levels have risen to critical levels.
Keifer et al. (2008) further posited that monitoring and evaluation of the Water Act is almost non-existent. It has remained the preserve of government project officials, with little involvement of the local communities. This reveals lack of integration of multiple voices in water governance, described by Galtung (1990) as fragmentation. Musingafi (2013, p. 170) observed that the dearth of clear data has limited the effectiveness in the water sector advocacy.
He further stated that Zimbabwe has officially commissioned very few water sector studies and consequently there is a discrepancy in information. This assertion no longer holds, as the Zimbabwean government has embarked on compiling water sources for all districts in Zimbabwe, culminating in the Rural Information Management System (RWIMS) database, which provides details of all types of water sources (see Chapter Six). However, Derman et al.
(2005) maintained that no catchment in Zimbabwe knows the amount of primary water used because the catchment planning exercises, which would provide accurate measurements, are yet to be completed.
30 United Nations (1992). The Dublin Statement. Downloaded from www.cawater-info.net>library>d.
31 ibid.
32 Zimbabwe National Water Act Chapter 20:24. Downloaded from faolex.fao.org>docs>pdf26168.
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Statistics provided by the National Water Policy, 2013, revealed that since independence, the Zimbabwean government has given high priority to rural water supply and made significant progress, moving from 5% to 43% coverage from 1980 to 2009.33 Musemwa (2008, p. 6) argued that the aim was to bring development to previously marginalised people. This was due to political considerations, as rural voters are the backbone of the ZANU (PF) party. Therefore, although reforms were aimed at bringing positive peace of access to water, they also benefited the ‘top dogs’ i.e. the politicians in getting re-elected to office. However, rural water development has stagnated since 1990 (The Zimbabwean, 1 July 2013). Maintenance has virtually ceased as government failed to provide money for repairs, and development partner funding was not forthcoming. Many systems simply collapsed. The National Action Committee’s 2004 Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) inventory estimated that 75% of the 47 000 hand pumps were non-functional. An example of broken boreholes was also found in Village One of Mhondoro-Ngezi, the setting of this study, as shown in Figure 4.1. The borehole was drilled by the Ministry of Lands in 1983 (personal communication), but has since been neglected and is no longer functioning. Most of the parts, including pipes as well as the fence, have since been stolen.
Figure 4.1: A dilapidated borehole in Village one, Ward 11 of Mhondoro-Ngezi District (Photo by author)
33 Zimbabwe National Water Policy, 2013
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