SERVICES
CHART 20. CHART 20. ARMY CARGO SHIPPED OVERSEAS
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard shipments were later included. By the end of the war more than 2 million tons of freight had been handled in this manner at an estimated saving of more than 13 million dollars.
Army freight rates were kept as low as possible. One of the most ambitious projects undertaken in this field, that ot translating hun- dreds of thousands of items of Army freight, many of them new to commerce, into the classification ratings contained in ntil carriers' guides, was responsible for vast savings in freight charges. Nego- tiations with the Association of American Railroads yielded other lal'ge savings in the form of rate adjustments.
The Office of the Chief of Transportation routed ali Army passenger movements of groups of 40 01' more persons. lWquests for such move- Inents were conveyed to the Association of Amcl'jcan Railroads, which assembled the necessary rolling stock and established time schedules.
The Defense Plant Corporation financed the construction of addi- tional special troop sleepers and impro\'ed kitchen cars designed by t he Transportation Corps. Rail transport was handled so efficiently that it was only when large numbers of troops returned from Europe after VE-day that American railroads encountered serious difficulty in meeting military personnel transportation requirements. Even this difficult problem was soh'cd by means of joint coopcl'ation among the Office of Defense Transportation, the raill'Oads, and the Army Service Forces. The Army agreed to take coaches within 48 hours when Pullmans were not available for movements. At the same time the Oflice of Defense Transportation eliminated Pullmans for general traffic on runs of less than 450 miles.
The best possible utilization of rail equipment required some leeway in carrying out troop movement orders. As issued by the 'Val' De- partment 01' troop commanders, these orders specified only an approxi- mate date of movement and left the precise day nnd time to be fixed by the Transportation Corps. This practice permitted transportation authorities to schedule movements in and out of military reservations in a way that assured almost continuous use of the same equipment.
The shul1ting of empty equipment for great distances was thereby avoided.
Troop movements into and through Ports of Embarkation were highly specialized operations. Troops were fitosl routed to staging areas in proximity to the ports. There they came under the jurisdic- tion of the Port Commander for processing unci loading. Final physical examinations were given, shortages or defects in equipment were corrected, and pay accounts and personal affairs were settled, within a very short period. The ports designated transports for the movement, and assigned units to individual vessels, while troops were being processed. Every unit and every man was assigned defi-
nite space. When the time came for embarkation, trains carried men from the staging areas to ferries or directly to the dock in loading order. SolCliers weut aboard and to their designated places without delay. Fifteen thousand men were frequently embarked on the Queen Mary or the Queen Elizabeth in less than three hours. From December 1943 until the end of the war in Europe, the number of troops and other passengers embarking for oversea destinations exceeded 200,000 a month. The peak month was January 1945, when some 295,000 troops were sent overseas. Usually about 66 percent of the passengers were dispatched to Atlantic destinations, and the other one·third to the Pacific. Two-thirds of all embarkations on the East Coast were made at the New York Port. Boston handled approximately 18 percent and Hampton Roads 15 percent. On the 'West Coast 68 percent of all embarkations were handled at San Francisco. Seattle handled 24 percent, and Los Angeles approximately 8 percent.
Combat loading introduced special complications in transporta- tion operations. The Western Task Force for the invasion of North Africa proceeded from the United States to the western coast of Af"ica for the assault ncar Casablanca. Considerable confusion attended this operation, largely because it was a first operation and because of the inexperience of personllel engaged in the undertaking. The task force commander was gi"en the responsibility for the combat loading. The Army Service Forces assembled the ships and assisted in the loading at Hampton Roads. Supplies and equipment were loaded for ready discharge upon arrival overseas and in the oreler in which they would be needed on shore. When the cOln-oy finally departed, it consisted of 28 ships carrying 38,000 men, 728 tracked vehicles, over 5,000 wheeled vehicles, and some 90,000 measurement tons of cargo.
In May 1943 the reinforced 45th Division was loaded at Hampton Roads for the assault upon Sicily. This operation proceeded much more smoothly. The Army Service Forces prepared the movement orders; the port commander was given greater responsibility for the loading operation; the division was collected at the new staging area which had been constructed in the vicinity of the port; and cargo was more carefully identified. The task force consisted of 23,000 men and 45,000 measurement tons of cargo loaded on 26 ships.
Combat loading required transports that were armed for defense and equipped to unload their own heavy cargo. This type of loading was wasteful of cargo space, because the needs of combat rather than full utilization of space was the governing factor. Actually only 50 to 65 percent of the cargo space was util ized. 1\1oreover, men and supplies were loaded on the same vessels. It was necessary for the Transportation Corps to supervise combat loading, because of the lack of training and experience of troop commanders in such a highly