ment Film Library for training, intelligence, informational, and l11s- torical purposes. At the end of the war, communications and photo- graphic facilities permitted the transmission of color photographs of the Potsdam conference by radio for the first time.
Maps
The Army Map Service in the Corps of Engineers was established to collect, evaluate, and disseminate terrain intelligence. Without maps an army cannot travel or fight. The task of mapping various areas was divided among the United States and its Allies. International conferences established mapping policies, insured uniformity of map design, and coordinated map production and distribution. Advance programming was essential', because it took about 8 monlhs to convert an aerial photograph of an operational area into a usable map for de- livery into the hands of troops. Maps were produced and distributed in a shorte,' period than this, but at the expense of quality and de- taiL A war of movement required an astronomical number of maps.
The Army Map Service throughout the war supplied 488 million copies of over 65,000 different maps for operations overseas.
the permanentfacilities of a post for the ground troops in training. In reality, the post commander was the business mannger of the installa- tion. Some services of the types enumerated above were rendered to the Army Air Forces, although to a lesser extent.
The management task was a large one. It involved the proviclil1g of all the services in the most econornical and efficient manner possible. It required the assembling of many different professional and technical specialists in order to provide the needed services. It was tbe post commander's job to insure that common facilities were utilized to the fullest extent, that common labor was shifted from one activity to another to meet peak loads, and that each service was adequate. Such responsibilities called "for administrative talents of a very high order.
Posts were grouped under the nine Service Commands for super- visory purposes. The Service Commander and his staff insured that operations at each post were performed satisfactorily. The Service Command Staff included many professional and technical specialists who assisted in coordinating all phases of post management.
The system of post management introduced no new principle of military organization, but it did represent a departure from previous practice. Corps Area Commanders and post commanders in the 1920's and 1930's theoretically possessed the authority and responsi- bility for the economical management of military installations. In practice, however, the trend during these years was to give greater freedom of action to technical and professional specialists. Corps Area Commanders, and even post commanders, received sepa.rate al- lotments of funds from the Chiefs of Services in Washington. Each Chief of Service communicated directly with his counterpart in the field and, in effect, governed his activities directly. Corps Area Com- manders by 1942 had, to all practicable purposes, become figureheads.
This was changed after the organization of the Army Service Forces.
Single allotments of funds and bulk personnel authorizations were made directly by the Commanding General, ASF, to the Command- ing Generals of the Service Commands. They in turn made allot- ments as they saw fit to post commanders. All official instructions were issued in the name of the Commanding General, ASF, to Service Commanders. Informal consultation between technical specialists at all echelons was encouraged, but the chain of command was carefully preserved. This was essential in order to insure the most economical and efficient performance of many different services. It created a single, well-understood organization for operating an-d supervising services in the Zone of the Interior. The Service Commander was the recognized agent of the Army Service Forces for carrying out ac- tivities other than procurement, depot stol'agp.. construction, and trans-
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CHART 23. TYPICAL ASF INSTALLATIONS IN A CAMP
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Insiallutlons In a Camp
ASF Tnsralluions Jre ill l'cfspe"tive: .111 other in plan.
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portalion within his area. A well-organized and efficient hierarchy of supervision was thus established. Each Service Commander and post comlliander, within the limits of gcneral policies established by Headquarters, ASF, was expected to adjust programs and activities to meet local situations. As much discretion as possible was vested in these officers. This did much to prevent excessive centralization of authority and activity in 'Vashington.
There were two complications in the system of post management.
There were certain installations over which the Chiefs of Technical Services had exercised complete authorit.y prior to 1942. These in·
eluded such installations as depots, proving grounds, schools, general hospitals, and certain training centers. The fault in this arl'ange- ment was that the Surgeon General, for example, was thus responsible for more than just medical service at general hospitals. He was also responsible for snpply activities, personnel activities, repairs and utili·
ties, and other operations needed in maintaining such large military installations. The Chief of Engineers was simihu·ly concerned with more than purely engineering activities. Nominally, at least, he was expected to supervise medical service, fiscal service, and other 11011-
ellg'ineel' activities at stations under his command. In order to avoid this anomalous and duplicating situation, these posts were designated as Class IV installations. The commander of such an installation was responsible to the Service Commander for all common services, and to the Chief of each TeclUlical Service in matters im·olving that particu- lar Service. This arrangement had the advantage of recognizing a single, common, supervisory organization for the broad range of service duties at any large military post, and of preventing the duplication of these s~rvices in the Office of each Chief of a Technical Service.
The second complication involved relations with the Army Air Forces. The Army Air Forces directly operated all services at air- fields and other posts under its jurisdiction. The Air Surgeon super- vised medical service at airfields; the Surgeon General supervised medical activities at all other military posts. The Air Provost Mar·
shal supervised internal security and police matters; the Provost Marshal General supervised these activities for other installations.
The Air Quartermaster supervised quartermaster supply activities at airfields; the Quartermaster General was the top supervisory authority for all other installations. Thus the supervisory hierarchy within the Army in the Zone of the Interior was duplicated.
Decentralization of authority and responsibility, a single well·
recognized supervisory hierarchy for post services, the efficient and economical management of all common services-these were the essen- tial elements and objectives of the system governing the administration of military posts by the Army Service Forces.