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in Australia and in bases at a considerable distance from the combat fronts. This difference in part can be attributed to the peculiar com- bat condition in the Southwest Pacific.
No Theater worked out a satisfactory solution to the problem of the organizational location and responsibilities of its Technical Service officers. In the Zone of the Interior, the Surgeon General was also Surgeon General of the Army; the Chief of Ordnance was Chief of Ordnance for the whole Army. In this capacity they had responsibilities that were Army-wide in scope. On the other hand, Theater Commanders were apparently reluctant to recognize the soundness and practicability of such an arrangement. The Special Stoff of the Communications Zone was also the Special Staff of the American Army in Europe in February 1945. After VE-day, how- ever, this was changed and separate Special Staffs appeared for the Theater and for the Theater service force. In the North African and Mediterranean Theaters there were separate Technical Service st.~ffs
in the SeI'vices of Supply and in Theater Headquarters. When the Services of Supply was eliminated in 1944, a single Special Staff served the Theater as a whole. In the Southwest Pocific there were Special Staffs for the American Command and for the Services of Supply.
As was to be expected, such duplications of Special Stoffs resulted in uncertainty respecting authority and responsibility, and in large headquarters having overlapping functions.
The luck of uniformity in the functions assigned to service forces in the Theaters was evident in several instances. In the Southwest Pacific the control of shipping and the determination of priorities waS vested in General Headquarters. All control of cargo shipping in the European Theater was the responsibility of the Chief of Trans- pOitation of the Communications Zone. Signal communications throughout the Southwest Pacific were handled by the Chief Signal Officer of General Headquarters, but in the European Theater the operating of the communications network was a responsibility of the Signal Officer of the Communications Zone. In the Mediterranean Theater, military rail service was under the direct supervision of the Theoter Commander, but in the European Theater it was a Communi- cations Zone activity. In North Africa the Services of Supply operated the replacement system. In France it did not. Army com- manders in the Pacific operated extensi"e supply services of tbeir own, with the Services of Supply far separated geographically from the Army areas. In southem France the Communications Zone operated all installations within a few miles of the combat forces. The combat commander in the latter case depended upon the Communications Zone for the closest possible support of his forces.
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These differences in organization anel function were evidence of a lack of standard doctrine governing logistic activities in Theaters of Operations. They created many complications in Theater relation- ships with the Army Service Forces. They made the training of supply officers for oversea duty a difficult task. No one could pre,lict what functions these officers might be called upon to perform. A standard concept of the role of service forces and their organization in relatioll to the Theater and to the combat forces was greatly needed.
Adequate oversea port facilities were indispensable to military operations. Because of the lack of such facilities, Commanders in both the European Theater and the Southwest Pacific relied upon cargo vessels from the United States as floating depots. A lack of storage facilities and congested unloading facilities made such practices in- evitable. They necessarily interfered with the orderly shipment of supplies from the United States and with the best utilization of om limited shipping resources. In Emope, as the armies hastened across France in the summer and autumn of 1944, intermediate depots, where supplies could be sorted and subsequently shipped forward as re- quired by the combat troops, were badly needed. This deficiency had to be rectified before orderly supply became possible. J n the Pacific, supplies were scattered from island to island. Supplies and facilities werB not moved forward as rapidly as combat troops advanced into new areas. This resulted in the wasteful use of supplies, facilities, and service troops.
In the latter days of the New Guinea Campaign, loaded ships moved directly from the west coast to the invasion forces. Cargo yessels were on the way to Hollandia before American troops landed there.
In the meantime, supplies were left at bases rar to the rear. The same problem had occurred in North Africa after the fighting front shifted to Italy. A vigorous "roll-up" of bases no longer close to the fighting front should have been standing logistic procedure.
PerI",ps the greatest single deficiency in oversea supply systems was the lack of adequate stock control. Orderly supply operations de- pended upon detailed knowledge of the quantities of supplies on hand and their exact location. The Army Seryice Forces endeavored to maintain stated inventories in the Theaters equal to 50 to 120 days supply. Such stock levels were almost meaningless without accurate consumption and inventory records. There wus no uniformity hetween Theaters, or even between Technical Services within a Thea- ter, in maintaining records of supply levels, or of using these records in the preparation of the requisitions. The supply information trans- mitted to the United States often contained many important errors.
The critical cigarette shortage in the United States in late 1944 IUl'gely
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resulted frolll requisitioning that had failed to include considera- tion of quantities en route or held in ships. 'rhere were occasions when duplicate requisitions were sent to the United States for sup- plies that, according to Army Service Forces records, had been deliv- ered to a Theater some time previously. Shortly after D-day, the European Theater found that it could get supplies morc quickly from New York than from the British Isles. This was because con- fusion existed regarding the locations of stocks in Britain. Even at the end of the war there was not a single Theater that had a com- pletely adequate stock control system in operation.
The great complexity of oversea supply and service operations had its effect upon service troop requirements. Seldom did Theaters find that they had an adequate number of service tl'OOps. For example, General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific, gave priority in 1M2 and early 1943 to the shipment of combat forces from the United States.
Then suddenly in September 1943 the Southewest Pacific askeel for an additional 29,000 service troops by June 1944. These could be supplied only at the expense of Army Service Forces tmining in the Zone of the Interio,·. Part of the service job in the Theaters was performed by native ci"ilians. In North Africa, Sicily, and Italy they werc employed extensively under trained supervisors provided by the Army. The acquisition of large numbers of German prisoners of war helped meet the manpower situation in France. In Aus- tralia only a limited number of civilian workers were available. In New Guinea. natives were employed as extensively as possible. Every Theater was constantly confronted with shortages of manpower in performing its supply and service functions.
The Army Air Forces operated its own supply and administrative services in the several Theaters during Wodd Wa,' II. Ail' Service Commands in each Theater duplicated the work performed by the Communications Zones to a considerable extent. There were sound reasons for Army Ail' Forces' performance of those special supply and service functions that \\'ere directly related to its combat mission.
On the other hand, there was less reason for the duplication of base depots, construction troops, and transportation facilities. This was wasteful of both supplies and manpower.
Inadequate advance planning, shortages of supply and service troops, and organizational confusion further compounded the already intricate and complex logistic task in Theaters of Operations. Over- all performance of the oversea logistic mission was magnificent, de- spite the absence of adequate precedent. Lessons have been learned that are of great significance. To ignore these lessons would be peri lous.