SERVICES
CHART 17. CHART 17. THE ARMY COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, WORLD WAR II
\ o
n ()
Communications
At the stnrt of the war the communications system was designed to meet the needs of an Army of 1.6 million, opel'llting largely within the continental limits of the United St.,tes. The Army in 1940 had fairly simple t~lephone systems at posts, camps, and stations and a manually operated radio circuit. These facilities were grossly inade- quat.e for handling war traffic. To serve the larger wartime Army, communications facilities had to be expanded in the United States and established throughout the world. The first step involved the acquisition of domest.ic radio circuits so as to make their frequencies available for oversea communication activities. The Army trans- fen'eel 44 telephone systems to comlncrcial companies for operation and mnintennnce eurly in 1042 in order to relieve itself of these responsibilities.
What eventually bccame the Army Command and Administrati"e Network was started in June 1942, when n radio net was established between Australia. Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. The network was furt.her ext.ended by establishing a high-power slation at Karachi, India. Installations were made by 14 task force radio detachments that were ncLinlted at Fort :hlonmouth and sent over- seas with the rnateriel required for erecting the necessary facilities.
A teletypewriter neb,-ork later replaced the r"dio net within the con- tinental United States. The Chief Signal Officer controlled this net- work, eliminated unnecessary circuits, leased new facilities, nnd consolidated independent networks.
Research during the war resulted in major improvements in com- munications engineering. Teletypewriter transmission wus coordi- nated between lund linesancll'ac1io. Transmission speed was increased from GO words a minute lo 100 words a minute. Two-wny direct con·
ference teletypewriter service was developed. New equipment made it possible to establish a "belt line" route that pcrmitted the sending of a message from 'Vashington completely around the world in three and one-half minutes, relayed automatically at Asmara, New Delhi, Brisbane, and San Francisco. The communications system was ex- panded until it handled traffic that reached a peak of more than 50 million words a day, 01' as Illany as are found in 500 novels. Because of the need for speed, mechanization supplanted manual operation wherever possible. Automatic devices were developed to decipher messages. The use of security sCl'amblers was also .tn important development.
The Army Airways Communications System included both radio communication and navigational aids. Signal networks were needed wherever air transport routes were established. In 1042 signal troops
lYere organized and assigned to foul' sector hendquarters of the Army Airways Communications System. Teams from these sector head- quarters were sent to any part of the world where airways signal construction work was needed.
Important communications services were provided at the confer- ences of Allied leaders at Quebec, Cairo, Teheran, Malta, Yalta, and Potsclam. At each conference clirect teletypewriter channels 'to the War, Navy, and State Departments and to the White House were in- stalled. For example, the signal facilities for the Yalta conference required 250 tons of equipment, 20 tons of it being transported by ail' from the United States. This equipment was placed in operation
·,,·ithin nine days. The system worked so efficiently that a message sent from Yalta to Washington required less than one hour for filing, cryp- tographing, transmission, decoding, and delivery.
In wartime the security of communications transcends other prob- lems of military security. This was the responsibility of the Signal Security Agency. Fast, secret communication was provided hy chang- ing from manual to machine systems. There were I11nny significant Eecret developments in this field during the war.
The volume of messages transmitled by wire and radio became greater and greater as the war continued. Because the volume threatened to overload existing facilities, special efforts were made to reduce the load. Upon the recommendation of the Army Service Forces, the War Department issued instructions designed to eliminate verbiage from messages and to prevent the use of radio communica- tions when airmail would serve equally well. Signal personnel scru- tinized messages carefully and, where appropriate, questioned the need for radio transmission. These measures reduced ihe volume of trRffic.
Transportation
The Army Service Forces transportation mISSIOn, which did not include air transport, was to assure sufficient land transportation, lo- cate adequate water shipping for Army needs, and operate Ports of Embarkation.
The Army Service Forces established a Transportation Corps in 10+2 in order to handle the major task of moving men and supplies promptly within the United States and to oversea Theaters. Trans- portation played a decisive role throughout the war, affecting virtually every phase of the Army's activities in the Zone of the Interior and in oversea arens. The successful accomplishment of the mission may be largely attributed to the consolidation of tmnsportation functions within a single Service.
CHART 18. MERCHANT SHIP TONNAGE AVAILABLE FOR