SERVICES
CHART 14. CHART 14. TYPES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL PROCESSING CENTERS
INSTALLA nON Induction
Stations
Reception Centers
Special Training Units
Replacement Training Centers Reassignment
Centers Redistribution
Stations Staging Areas
Disposition Centers
Reception Stations
Separation Centers Separation Points
Processing Centers
FUNCTIONS
To determine by examination whether regis- trants of the Selective Service System met physi- cal, mentol and moral standards of the Army and allocate personnel to Army and Navy.
To process inductees, including the issue of certain items of clothing and equipment, classification, preparation of personnel records, immunization, applications for Ijfe insurance, initial assignment, and transfer to new installa- tion, usually a training center or unit.
To train newly inducted illiterate, non-English speaking and 5th grade personnel, to bring the individual to a 4th grade level.
To provide basic training.
For the reassignment of personnel returned from overseas, battle casualties or surplus.
To provide a period of readjustment for over- seas veterans prior to reassignment.
For the assembly of units at installations con- venient to ports for shipment overseas.
Installations, usually at a staging area, to receive returnees for initial processing and transfer to a reception station.
To process returnees from overseas either to a separation center for discharge or to a reassign- ment or redistribution center or training center for reassignment. Ordinarily temporary duty at home was given between reception station and subsequent assignment.
To process personnel for release from the Service.
To discharge personnel locally in lieu of dis·
charge ot a separation center near a man's home.
Installations, convenient to ports, to which were sent individuals absent without leave imme- diately prior to shipment overseas for subsequent shipment overseas.
indi"idual basic military, technical, and team training. During the latter stages of their teclulical training, men were selected for filling specified units scheduled for activation. This systcm had several advantages. It gave full emphasis to indi vidual training. It brought men together before the unit was actually established, thlls reducing the personal adjust.ments required when the men were organized as units. It permitted better unit training designed for meeting field conditions. Substantial savings in training personnel and training equipment were also accomplished.
Shortages of manpower and the shifting requirements of oversea commanders throughout the war made it difficult to plan fur enough in advance for the types of units that had to be activated and trained.
Despite these difficulties, however, generally a high standard of in- dividual and unit training was achieved. Arrangements permitted reasonable interchangeability among the technical agencies and major commands, and the demands of active Theaters were usually met satis factol·i Iy.
Information and Education
The Information and Education Program was designed to inform the ~\merican soldier of the causes and background of the war, to keep him in touch with its progress, and to provide instruction in a wide variety of educational subjects by means of correspondence courses.
Information and education officers were utilized at a11 echelons of command. Printed materials were supplied for discussion groups;
"Newsmaps" were distributed; soldier publications such as "Stars and Stripes," "Yank," and camp lle.wspapers were established; radio programs were broadcast to oversea troops. The Armed Forces In- stitute, an officially sponsored correspondence school, enabled military personnel to continue their education during ofT-duty hOUl'S and to prepare themselves for return to civilian life.
Originally, responsibility for the Information and Education Pro- gram was combined organizationally with that for managing post exchanges, the Army ~Iotion Picture Service, alld recreational and athletic activities. This proved to be unsatisfactory. Informational and educational activities were closely related to the whole scheme of military training, because their major objecti\'e was to inform the individual soldier of his stake in the defeat of the Axis. More- over, the American soldier, like the A .. merican citizen, expected that he would be kept fully informed about developments in public policy and general events at home and around the world. Such a task re- quired special personnel and a special approach to the problems in- volved. For the duration of the war, the Army Ground Forces, the
Army Ail' Forces, and oversea commanders established information and education officers in their headquarters and in subordinate com- mands. The Army Service Forces provided the materials and services necessary to the various programs. There was some question as to whether this type of central service was logically assigned. The Army Service Forces recommended on several occasions that the work be transferred to the War Department General Staff. After the conclusion of the war, the Information and Education Division was made a separate staff agency under the supervision of n Chief of Information reporting to the Deputy Chief '1f Staff.
Special Services
A part of the good morale of the soldier was attributed to the various special services provided by the Army, which included post exchanges, motion picture theaters, athletics, and other recreation. The Army Service Forces was charged with providing these services. Early in the war some quarters viewed these special services as frills, but their enthusiastic reception among the soldiers, and observation by com- manders of their salutary effect on mora 1e, brought general recognition of their importance.
Post exchanges were operated independently by posts, camps, and stations prior to the war. A special committee of 5 prominent mer- chandising executives in 1941 recommended the establishment of the A.l'my Exchange Service in order to provide uniformity in standards and practices and centralized supervision. The Service established policies, provided financing, set up uniform methods of merchandising and control, and operated a central buying service. Some 9GO price agreements were made with important suppliers of merchandise and equipment. The Defense Supplies Corporation lent G7 million dol- lars to supplement Army Exchange capital derived from fees and mer- chandising transactions. This money was loaned to post exchanges, at a low rate of interest, providing the latter with necessary capital.
The Army Exchange Service had made available 78 million dollars by 30 September 1944 for establishing post exchanges in the United States and overseas. A new method of determining the amount of funds available in excess of the working capital needs of domestic exchanges was put into effect during 1944 and 1945. The surplus was suflicient to liquidate the debt owed the Defense Supplies Corporation.
Subsequently, the Army Exchange Fund financed exchange operations, both domestic and oversea, without further borrowing.
The Quartermaster General procUl'ed and shipped to the Theaters the majority of the mass sales items, which in turn were resold to Theater exchanges. As merchandise became more diflicult to procure,
the Army Service Forces decided that it was unwise to permit domestic exchanges to use priorities in obtaining scarce items. The Quarter- master General accordingly procured certain scarce merchandise for resale through post exchanges in the Zone of the Interior. In order to prevent abuses, exchanges were restricted to the sale of articles of convenience and necessity to the soldiers.
The Army Motion Picture Service also operated with nonappropri- ated funds within the United States, and provided entertainment at the nominal charge of 15 cents. Motion pictures for oversea showing were supplied free of charge during the period of hostilities through the War Activities Committee of the Motion Picture Industry. The Army purchased and distributed projectors and other equipment;
shortages were Q\'et'come with the assistance of the motion picture industry.
'Within the United States each post operated recreational activities for the troops stationed there_ The Quartermaster Corps purchased
SOIllO 87 million dollars' worth of athletic equipment for use in oversea
areas. The Army was successful for the first time in obtaining Federal funds for the welfare of enlisted men. Appropriated funds were accordingly employed in establishing library service at posts, pro- moting the distribution of books and magazines, establishing a handi- craft and art program, and arranging various musical activities. Another important development was the establishment of special serv- ice companies, consisting of 109 enlisted men and five officers, which carried on recreational activities ill·Theaters of Operations. The Army Service Forces sent 40 slIch companies overseas during the war.
Chaplains
A most importnnt service to troops was provided by the chaplains.
There were 1,478 chaplains on duty on 7 December 1V41, consisting of 140 Regular Army chaplains; 298 from the National Guard; and 1,040 irom the Reserve. The peak reached during the war was' over 8,000.
In recruiting chaplains, a fair proportion among the various religious denominations was maintained. The Chief of Chaplains established a quota system based upon the religious census of the United States.
To obtain sufTicient chaplains, the maximum age for commissioning officers was advanced from 40 to 50, and to 55 for a brief period.
Chaplains were provided in the ratio of 1 to 1,000 troops. The Chap- lain School was established in February 1942 at Fort Benjamin Har- rison, and was later moved to Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. It trained approxi- mately 8,000 military chaplains during the war.
Some 1,500 standard Army cbapels were constructed, and hundreds of simpler buildings were used. More than eight million Army Testa-
menls were distributed. For oversea use, sets that consisted of a field desk, a field organ, and other appropriate items were provided.
Recordings of l'eligious services were made fol' use on transports and hospital ships.
Military personnel have testified to the "ital sen'ice performed by chaplains and the value of their spiritual and moral counsel in main- t a i n i ng mora Ie under all types of cond i tions.
Medical Services
Medical service was furnished with exceptionally good results to "
huge Army deployed over a vast geographic area. Had the Army deliberately selected the areas in which disease hazards would be the greatest and most varied, there would have been little deviation from the pattern cut out for us by the enemy. The Army was faced with the increased destructive power of modern weapons in addition to the hnz<\J'cls of disease. DeSl)ite the risks Lo which American troops were subjected, the death rates from disease were extremely low, and the record in saving the lives of the wounded was amazingly good. Deaths from disease were lower than in peacetime, lower than in the civilian male population of corresponding ages during the war period, and less than one twenty-fifth of the rate of 'Vorld 'Val' I. The fatality rate for men wounded in combat fell to one-half of the rate obtaining in the last wal', 4 percent as compared to 8 percent.
The Medical Depart.ment encountered difliculty in the procurement of an adequate number of doctors. IL was estimated early in the war that 65,000 medical officers would be required. Medical oflicers were PI'ocured in 1942 through the activities of recruiting boards. Procure- ment through these boards, however, resulted in the withdrawal of too many physicians from certain communities. The boards were abolished at the request of the 'War Manpower Commission, which assumed responsibility for determining whether or not a particular physician could be spared fr0J11 civilian practice for military service.
The 'Val' Manpower Commission and the Secretary of War in the winter of 1V+1-15 fixed a ceiling of 45,000 Medical Corps officers for the Army. This action was taken because the number of qualified physicians in the United States had declined so rapidly. Charges were made throughout the war that the Army was overstaffed with physicians. This was certainly not the case in the Zone of the Interior.
A critical stage was reached and a shortage in trained medical person- nel de"eloped at fixed hospitals as a result of the oversea shipment of medica 1 personnel. The economical and effective utilization of medical personnel, having extremely variable workloads, constituted a complex problem. The load p1ac~d on Medical Department pel'sonnel assigned
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0to specific Theaters of Operations, and especially to units such as bat- talions, regiments, and divisions, varied with the weather, the climate, the season of the year, and most of all with military operations. The meeting of these variable loads with" minimum of personnel would have required the frequent and rapid transfer of medical personnel between units and major commands. Such a practice was impractical under the traditional method of giving each unit its own medical de- tachment, and was not attempted 011 a large sea If' during the war.
Whether medical officers cot;ld have been better utilized by radically changing the organization of medical service within the Army is questionable.
Early in the waf' all nurses werc l'ecl"uitctl through the American Red Cross. l-Iowevcl', many nurses were unwilling to enroll in that organization as a prerequisite to their appointment in the Army Nurse Corps. Al'rangements werc made for direct appointment, and the Surgeon General used the Red Cross solely as an administrative agency. As in the case of physicinns nnd dentists, the uneven with- drawal of nurses from civilian communities precipitated control of their procurement by the 'Var Manpower Commission. Critical 8hol'tages in the Army existed. however, and at one time the use of statutory authority was contemplated in order to obtain sufficient nurses. Although sllch authority was never obtained, adequate nurs- ing sen' ice for the sick and wounded was supplied in the face of constant shortages, which required nurses to be on duty for abnormal1y long hours for extended periods. The use of Wacs and volunteer nursing aides materially eased this situation.
The hospital system in the ZOlle of the Interior was modified sev- Hal times during the war. At the beginning there were two types of hospitals, general hospitals and station hospitals. The original con- cept was that station hospitals would provide emergency and general medical care to sick and injured military personnel at posts and camps throughout the United States. Patients needing prolonged or special- ized medical care would be transferred to general hospitals. Two forces brought nbout changes in this traditional pattern of hospital organization. First, the rapid e1'acuation of sick and wounded from Theaters in 1944 began to fill the general hospitals. Second, the scarcity of highly specialized medical personnel necessitated readjust- ments in the methods of using hospibd staffs. The Army Service Forces and the Army Air Forces designated certain hospitals as regional hospitals. Each such hospital received patients from all station hospitals, ,whether Ground, Ail', 01' Service, within an area having t\. radius of approximately 75 miles. Regional hospitals were staffed with special personnel and operated jn the same manner as general hospitals. The use of these hospitals for patients originating
in the Zone of the Interior freed the general hospitals for patients returned from oversea theaters. The Arrny Service Forces at one time operated 32 and the Army Air Forces 30 regional hospitals.
No military patient was returned to a duty status until he was physically capable of fully performing nil military dutics. This policy required 11 physical reconditioning progrum that was begun during the convalescent period of the patient's hospitalization. Con- valescent hospitals were established late in lV-H. These facilities were less elaborate than general hospitals, usually being converted barracks or other troop accommodations. COIl,'alescent hospitals were also economical in tel'ms of the personnel and. equipment required for their operation.
Conserntion of hospital facilities was further effected by furlough.
ing patients whose condition was such that continuolls medical super·
vision was not required during convalescence. As a result of this policy, there were more patients normally assigned to hospitals than there we,·e hospital beds during the early months of 1V,15. One further practice used to make the most effective utilization of specialized surgical and medical personnel was the concentration of this personnel in certain general hospitals. There were two general hospitals in 1945 specializing in the care of tuberculous patients, 10 specializing in neuro-surgpry, seven in amputations, three in vascular surgery, two in the care of the blind, three in radiulll therapy, seven in plastic surgery, and three in tropical diseases.
Early in the war it was planned to provide station hospitals with beds numbering 4 percent of the troop strength of each post. This plan was based largely upon the experience of World War 1. How- ever, experience during World War II indicated that this number was excessive and the percentage was revised uowl1wfll'cl, first to 31/2 percent and then to 3 percent, with corresponding reductions in the requirements for medical personnel. Originally a bed capacity of 100,000 was projected for general hospitals. This p,·oved to be in- sufficient, however, and 50,000 additional beds were authorized late in 19-14. There were 154,000 general hospital beds and 59,000 conva- lescent hospital beds in use in the United States at the end of hostilities.
At the time of the surrender of Japan. there were in the United States 185,800 patients in general hospitals, of which 60,000 were on sick leave or furlough; 4V,700 in conmlescent hospitals, 1,1,000 on sick leave or furlough; 39,300 in regional hospitals, 2,100 on sick leave or furlough;
nnd 33,800 in station hospitals, 500 on sick leave or furlough.
Hospital ships and other troop carrying vessels operated by the Transportation Corps were used in evacuating patients from overseas.
Actually more patients were returned by modified troop ships than by hospital ships. About 10 percent of oversea casualties were evacuated
by air, with the proportion rul1Jling as high as 25 percent in the last months of hostilities. A Medical Regulating Office was established in order to govern the flow of patients from the ports to the general hospitals throughout the United States. When patients were returned from overseas, they were moved promptly from shipside to debarka- tion hospitals located ncar the ports.
The Medical Regulating Office issued instmctions for the movement of patients to various general hospitals on the basis of reports from the debarkation hospitals. Although a pmo[ of the Surgeon General's Office, this office waS physically located in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, with which it worked closely in directing the use of the Army's railway hospital equipment. Army equipment by 1945 con- sisted of 320 hospital ward cars, capable of moving 11,000 patients, and of GO kitchen cars. The railroads provided additional equipment in order to meet peak loads. Whenever possible, patients were sent to the general hospitals nearest their homes. By the time hostilities ended, however, patients. had to be sent to hospitnls having available beds, l'egul'dl(lss of the locality of patients' homes. Cases requiring specialized medical care were necessarily treated in hospitals equipped to provide the particular type of therapy needed.
In order to assure the highest level of technical competence and uniformity of treatment, small gronps of expert consultants were assigned to the headquarters of each Service Command and oversea Theater. The consultants visited hospitals and advised their staffs, and inspected medical and surgical practice. This arrangement was useful in improving medical care. The monthly publication of the Army Medical Bulletin also kept medical personnel informed of best treatment practices.
The system for the medical care for battle casualties developed new chat·acteristics in 'Vorld 'Var II. Originally it was intended that general hospitals, miles behind the combat lines, would provide definitive medical care for soldiers wounded in action. The system of battalion and regimental aid stations and division collecting and clearing stations was geared to a concept of static warfare. In'Vorld War II, evacuation hospitals, field hospitals, and mobile surgical hospitals worked very close to the combat front. This introduced a new concept of medical treatment. The wounded were moved promptly from the front lines to these hospitals. Here initial wound surgery was performed before a patient was sent to the rear areas.
This surgery was intended only to remove the immediate danger to the patient's life. Reparative surgery was subsequently performed at general hospitals located in the Communications Zone. The third phase, reconstructive surgery and rehabilitation, was performed at general hospitals in the United States. This system of surgical treat-