In this last section, a number of general boundary-related strategies are considered that might be useful in modifying perceptions of the outgroup, guided by the question: “How can we make our images of the outgroup more like those of the ingroup?” Park and Rothbart (1982) have provided one approach to answering this question. When asked to describe female dance and female physics majors, female college students based their ratings primarily on college major, whereas male college students based their ratings pri- marily on gender. For male dance and male physics majors, now male judges used college major, while female judges used gender. In other words, each group of judges used the more differentiating dimension (college major) when rating its own gender and the less differentiating dimension (gender) when rating the other gender. How can we get judges to think about outgroup members in terms of their most differentiating rather than their least differentiating attributes?
Subgrouping
One strategy for making the outgroup more like the ingroup is to increase the perceived variability of the outgroup, particularly with respect to increasing subordinate bases for
classification – that is, by making it clear that a number of subgroup category labels com- prise the superordinate group. This is exactly the program of research being carried out by Park and her colleagues (e.g., Park, Judd, & Ryan, 1992). There may be a number of ways of enhancing the perceived variability of a group, and consistent with the reason- ing offered earlier, presenting the subgroupings in the context of the superordinate group- ing may be particularly effective.
Augmentation of underrepresented subgroups. One source of bias in the perception of outgroups is the overrepresentation of particular subgroups for reasons of extremeness, memorability, threat, etc. (Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, & Birrell, 1978), and the underrepresentation of others. For example, Whites’ images of Blacks may be dispro- portionately influenced by the image of “young Black males.” Even though violent behav- ior occurs in a minority of “young Black males,” this subgroup itself represents only a minority of Blacks, a category which also includes Black females, elderly Blacks, middle- class Blacks, etc. Perhaps due to media attention directed at violent crime among young Black males, other subgroups are inadequately represented in our impressions of the group as a whole. This is an instance where increased public awareness of other Black subgroups may lead both to a more heterogeneous, and less negative, image of the group as a whole.
Aggregation of categories. Often an outgroup category retains its homogeneous, negative characteristics by remaining isolated or compartmentalized from both relevant category members and from other, affectively inconsistent, labels. In a classic study on the effects of consensual information, Asch (1948) had judges rank the favorability of a set of occu- pations, one of which was “politicians.” In one condition, judges were informed that other subjects had rated politicians highly favorably, and in another condition, unfavorably.
Judges were strongly influenced by these consensual ratings, but when Asch probed their thinking, it was clear that in the first condition, judges interpreted the category to mean
“statesmen” and in the second condition to mean “political hacks” (cf. Sia, Lord, Blessum, Ratcliff, & Lepper, 1997, Lord & Lepper, 1999). Indeed, the exemplars activated in both conditions were politicians, by any reasonable definition of the term, and the categories
“statesman” and “politician,” although separated by an implicit boundary, could easily be aggregated to yield a single, more heterogeneous category.
Although there is little enthusiasm to change the public perception of politicians, there are many important social categories, such as “disabled” and “mentally ill,” in which the categories retain their extreme character by virtue of excluding many other relevant classes of exemplars. The category “disabled” includes not only paraplegics or quadriplegics, but also individuals with less obvious impairments to hearing or vision. The mentally ill are not just dangerous psychotics, but include individuals with other disabling mental states (anxiety, fear, depression, etc.). Part of the problem with these categories is the ambigu- ity associated with category membership: How do we define a disability and how do we define mental illness? Although these two cases may constitute extreme examples of ambiguity, most social categories have fuzzy boundaries, and the consequence of such ambiguity is the exclusion or underrepresentation of more moderate exemplars.
The process of aggregation joins together previously separated categories into a superordinate, but more heterogeneous grouping (cf. Abelson’s (1959) concept of
“transcendence”).
Redefining category boundaries. Probably one of the clearest examples of altering category boundaries for the purpose of modifying outgroup stereotypes is the imposition of a superordinate category inclusive of ingroup and outgroup members, in effect removing the implicit boundary marker between the two groups. The classic research by M. Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & C. Sherif (1988) on the use of superordinate goals to reverse the destruction effects of intergroup competition can be thought of as an instance of removing category boundaries. Although Sherif preferred to explain the beneficial effects of cooperation on the “functional relations” between groups, it is also possible to inter- pret the results as due either to common fate (e.g., Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969) or to the redefinition of category boundaries to yield a single ingroup (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell,
& Dovidio, 1989; Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, Matoka, Johnson, & Frazier, 1997;
Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990). These ideas are discussed extensively in the chapter by Brewer and Gaertner, this volume, chapter 22, and will not be pursued here.
In summary, two possible routes to modifying the stereotypes of outgroup members have been considered in this paper. One route, through contact with individual exem- plars, can be problematic due to the dynamics of category-exemplar relations. Specifically, those exemplars most disconfirming of the stereotype are least likely to be associated with the category and least likely to produce generalization to the category as a whole. None the less, category-exemplar dynamics can also be exploited to increase the probability of generalization by making sure that atypical exemplars – through a variety of techniques – become strongly associated with the category. A second route attempts a modification of the relations among the categories themselves, by augmenting, combining, and redefin- ing category boundaries in a way that yields a less extreme and more heterogeneous view of the outgroup. In the author’s view, there is as yet no magic bullet that vanquishes the unfavorable, simplified images of the outgroup. Our categorical structures, which repre- sent the mind’s attempt to simplify the complexities of the social world, play a signifi- cant role in such stereotypes. The difficulty of modifying these categorical structures, to make them more complex and more reflective of the actual variety of the social world, should not be underestimated. The importance of achieving this goal also should not be underestimated.
References
Abelson, R. P. (1959). Modes of resolution of belief dilemmas. Journal of Conflict Resolution,3, 343–352.
Allison, S. T., & Messick, D. M. (1985). The group attribution error. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,21, 563–579.
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Amir, Y. (1976). The role of intergroup contact in change of prejudice and ethnic relations. In P. A. Katz (Ed.), Towards the elimination of racism(pp. 245–308). New York: Pergamon Press.
Asch, S. E. (1948). The doctrine of suggestion, prestige, and imitation in social psychology. Psy- chological Review,55, 250–276.
Brewer, M. B. (1979). Ingroup bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis.Psychological Bulletin,86, 307–324.
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. K. Srull & J. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cognition(pp. 1–36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Brewer, M. B., & Miller, N. (1984). Beyond the contact hypothesis: Theoretical perspectives on desegregation. In N. Miller & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Groups in contact: The psychology of deseg- regation. New York: Academic Press.
Brown, R. J., & Turner, J. C. (1981). Interpersonal and intergroup behavior. In J. C. Turner &
H. Giles (Eds.), Intergroup behavior(pp. 33–65). Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press.
Brown, R., Vivian, J., & Hewstone, M. (1999). Changing attitudes through intergroup contact:
The effects of group membership salience. European Journal of Social Psychology, 29(5–6), 741–764.
Cook, S. W. (1970). Motives in a conceptual analysis of attitude-related behavior. In W. J. Arnold
& D. Levine (Eds.), Nebraska symposium on motivation,1969(pp. 179–235). Lincoln, NE: Uni- versity of Nebraska Press.
Dawes, R. M., Singer, D., & Lemons, F. (1972). An experimental analysis of the contrast effect and its implications for intergroup communication and the indirect assessment of attitude.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,21(3), 281–295.
Desforges, D. M., Lord, C. G., & Pugh, M. A. (1997). Role of group representativeness in the generalization part of the contact hypothesis. Basic and Applied Social Psychology,19, 183–204.
Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., Validzic, A., Matoka, K., Johnson, B., & Frazier, S. (1997). Extend- ing the benefits of recategorization: Evaluations, self-disclosure, and helping. Journal of Experi- mental Social Psychology,33, 401–420.
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation from category-based to individuating processes: Influences of information and motivation on attention and inter- pretation, Advances in experimental social psychology(Vol. 23). New York: Academic Press.
Gaertner, S. L., Mann, J., Murrell, A., & Dovidio, J. F. (1989). Reducing intergroup bias: The benefits of recategorization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,57, 239–249.
Gaertner, S. L., Mann, J. A., Dovidio, J. F., Murrell, A. J., & Pomare, M. (1990). How does coop- eration reduce intergroup bias? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,59, 692–704.
Hewstone, M. (1994). Revision and change of stereotypic beliefs: In search of the elusive subtyp- ing model. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology(Vol. 5, pp. 69–109). New York: Wiley.
Hewstone, M., & Brown, R. (1986). Contact is not enough: An intergroup perspective on the
“Contact Hypothesis”. In M. Hewstone & R. Brown (Eds.), Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters(pp. 1–44). Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Hewstone, M., & Lord, C. G. (1998). Changing intergroup cognitions and intergroup behavior:
The role of typicality. In C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, & C. A. Insko (Eds.), Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hovland, C. I. (1959). Reconciling conflicting results derived from experimental and survey studies of attitude change. American Psychologist,14, 8–17.
Johnston, L., & Hewstone, M. (1992). Cognitive models of stereotype change. 3. Subtyping and the perceived typicality of disconfirming group members. Journal of Experimental Social Psy- chology,28, 360–386.
Judd, C. M., & Lusk, C. M. (1984). Knowledge structures and evaluative judgments: Effects of structural variables on judgmental extremity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,46(6), 1193–1207.
Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1988). Out-group homogeneity: Judgments of variability at the indi- vidual and group levels. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,54, 778–788.
Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1993). Definition and assessment of accuracy in social stereotypes. Psy- chological Review,100, 109–128.
Judd, C. M., Ryan, C. S., & Park, B. (1991). Accuracy in the judgment of in-group and out-group variability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,61, 366–379.
Kelman, H. C. (1992). Coalitions across conflict lines: The interplay of conflicts within and between the Israeli and Palestinian communities. In S. Worchel & J. A. Simpson (Eds.), Con- flict between people and groups(pp. 236–258, 293–294). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
Kunda, Z., & Oleson, K. C. (1995). Maintaining stereotypes in the face of disconfirmation:
Constructing grounds for subtyping deviants. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,68, 565–579.
Kunda, Z., & Sherman-Williams, B. (1993). Stereotypes and the construal of individuating infor- mation.Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,19, 90–99.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Cognitive models and prototype theory. In U. Neisser (Ed.), Concepts and con- ceptual development: ecological and intellectual factors in categorization(pp. 63–100). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Lee, Y.-T., Jussim, J., & McCauley, C. R. (1995). Stereotype accuracy: Toward appreciating group differences.(1st ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Lewin, K., & Grabbe, P. (1945). Conduct, knowledge, and acceptance of new values. Journal of Social Issues,2, 53–64.
Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., Layman, M., & Combs, B. (1978). Judged frequency of lethal events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4, 551–578.
Locksley, A., Hepburn, C., & Ortiz, V. (1982). Social stereotypes and judgments of individuals:
An instance of the base-rate fallacy. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,18, 23–42.
Lord, C. G., Desforges, D. M., Ramsey, S. L., Trezza, G. R., & Lepper, M. R. (1991). Typicality effects in attitude-behavior consistency: Effects of category discrimination and category knowl- edge.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,27, 550–575.
Lord, C. G., & Lepper, M. R. (1999). Attitude representation theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology( Vol. 31). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Mackie, D. M., & Allison, S. T. (1987). Group attribution errors and the illusion of group atti- tude change. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,23, 460–480.
Maurer, K. L., Park, B., & Rothbart, M. (1995). Subtyping versus subgrouping processes in stereo- type representation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,69, 812–824.
Mauro, R. (1981). Effects of the complexity and extremity of social prototypes on perceptions of indi- vidual category members. Unpublished Masters, Yale University, New Haven, CT.
Newcomb, T. M. (1947). Autistic hostility and social reality. Human Relations,1, 69–86.
Nisbett, R. E., Zukier, H., & Lemley, R. E. (1981). The dilution effect: Nondiagnostic informa- tion weakens the implications of diagnostic information. Cognitive Psychology,13, 248–277.
Nissen, M. J., Ross, J. L., Willingham, D. B., Mackenzie, T. B., Schacter, D. L. (1988). Memory and awareness in a patient with multiple personality disorder. Brain and Cognition,8, 117–134.
Park, B., & Judd, C. M. (1990). Measures and models of perceived group variability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,59, 173–191.
Park, B., & Rothbart, M. (1982). Perception of out-group homogeneity and levels of social cate- gorization: Memory for the subordinate attributes of in-group and out-group members. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,42(6), 1051–1068.
Park, B., Ryan, C. S., & Judd, C. M. (1992). Role of meaningful subgroups in explaining differ- ences in perceived variability for in-groups and out-groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology,63, 553–567.
Peters, E., & Rothbart, M. (2000). Typicality can create, eliminate, and reverse the dilution effect.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,26, 177–187.
Pettigrew, T. F. (1986). The intergroup contact hypothesis reconsidered. In M. Hewstone &
R. Brown (Eds.), Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters (pp. 169–195). Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. Annual Review of Psychology,49, 65–85.
Rabbie, J. M., & Horwitz, M. (1969). Arousal of ingroup-outgroup bias by a chance win or loss.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,13, 269–277.
Rips, L. J. (1975). Inductive judgments about natural categories. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior,14, 665–681.
Rosch, E. H. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization(pp. 27–48). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rosch, E. H. (1973). On the internal structure of perceptual and semantic categories. In T. E.
Moore (Ed.), Cognitive development and the acquisition of language(pp. 111–144). New York:
Academic Press.
Rothbart, M. (1996). Category-exemplar dynamics and stereotype change. International Journal of Intercultural Relations,20, 305–321.
Rothbart, M., Davis-Stitt, C., & Hill, J. (1997). Effects of arbitrarily placed category boundaries on similarity judgments. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,33(2), 122–145.
Rothbart, M., Fulero, S., Jensen, C., Howard, J., & Birrell, P. (1978). From individual to group impressions: Availability heuristics in stereotype formation. Journal of Experimental Social Psy- chology,14, 237–255.
Rothbart, M., & John, O. P. (1985). Social categorization and behavioral episodes: A cognitive analysis of the effects of intergroup contact. Journal of Social Issues,41, 81–104.
Rothbart, M., & John, O. P. (1993). Intergroup relations and stereotype change: A social- cognitive analysis and some longitudinal findings. In P. M. Sniderman, P. E. Tetlock, &
E. G. Carmines (Eds.), Prejudice, politics, and the American dream (pp. 32–59, 307–332).
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Rothbart, M., John, O., & Duncan, T. (in preparation). A longitudinal analysis of stereotype change.
Rothbart, M., & Lewis, S. (1988). Inferring category attributes from exemplar attributes:
Geometric shapes and social categories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 861–872.
Rothbart, M., & Park, B. (1986). On the confirmability and disconfirmability of trait concepts.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,50, 131–142.
Rothbart, M., Sriram, N., & Davis-Stitt, C. (1996). The retrieval of typical and atypical category members.Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,32, 309–336.
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (1992). Category labels and social reality: Do we view social categories as natural kinds? In G. R. Semin & K. Fiedler (Eds.), Language, interaction and social cognition (pp. 11–36). London: Sage.
Saltz, E., & Medow, M. L. (1971). Concept conservation in children: The dependence of belief systems on semantic representation. Child Development,42, 1533–1542.
Scarberry, N. C., Ratcliff, C. D., Lord, C. G., Lanicek, D. L., & Desforges, D. M. (1997). Effects of individuating information on the generalization part of Allport’s contact hypothesis. Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.,23, 1291–1299.
Sia, T., Lord, C., Blessum, K., Ratcliff, C., & Lepper, M. (1997). Is a rose always a rose? The role of social category exemplar change in attitude stability and attitude-behavior consistency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,72, 501–514.
Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1988/1961). The Robbers Cave experiment: Intergroup conflict and cooperation. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
Sherif, M., & Hovland, C. I. (1966). Social judgment: Assimilation and contrast effects in commu- nication and attitude change. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Tajfel, H., & Wilkes, A. L. (1963). Classification and quantitative judgment. British Journal of Social Psychology,54, 101–114.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Tversky, A. (1977). Features of similarity. Psychological Review,84, 327–352.
Weber, R., & Crocker, J. (1983). Cognitive processes in the revision of stereotypic beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,45, 961–977.
Developmental and Socialization Influences on Intergroup Bias
Frances E. Aboud and Maria Amato
Over the past 25 years, our understanding of how children come to perceive and prefer certain ethnic groups has expanded greatly. Since 1974, when Brand, Ruiz, and Padilla published their Psychological Bulletinarticle reviewing children’s ethnic identification and preference, a number of reviews have presented quite a different perspective (Aboud, 1988; Brown, 1995; Hirschfeld, 1996; Katz, 1976; Schofield, 1982). In particular, two traditionally held views have undergone major revision. One view, that children become gradually more prejudiced with age, is no longer tenable. Empirical research now typi- cally shows an inverted-U relation between age and prejudice. The second view, that chil- dren learn stereotypes and prejudice solely from parents and peers, has also not been supported. Rather, children are now seen to play a more active role in the biases they develop. Perhaps the revisions are due in part to a decline in normative forms of preju- dice and thus greater variability in attitudes of parents and children. We now have a diver- sity of developmental trends and causal variables to be studied. Research from different cultures and historical periods has contributed to the observed diversity. Finally, theories of cognitive development, social cognition, interpersonal relations, and social change have been added to traditional learning theory to help explain age- and culture-specific phenomena.
For readers who are familiar with adult social psychology research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, the developmental field provides a closer look at the origins of prejudice and the different routes children take as they become prejudiced or tolerant adults. From our perspective, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are not inevitable, normal, pragmatic, and adaptive. Individual differences and age changes belie such a conclusion. While social psychologists have focused primarily on normative cog- nitive processes driven by contextual cues to form and use ethnic categories (Fiske, 1998), developmental psychologists examine when these cognitive processes develop in relation to emotional processes, and how they impact on prejudice. Context is relevant to the
acquisition and reduction of prejudice, but stable social influences rather than temporary environmental cues have greater explanatory value. To understand why certain social influences are greater than others, developmentalists consider children’s motivation to make sense of their social world and their place in it – a cognitively driven motivation – in addition to their desire for approval and other short-term goals. Consequently, the two explanatory frameworks currently used in developmental research, namely social influ- ences in the environment and cognitive/emotional developments in the child, take a longer term perspective but are not incompatible with the prevailing social psychology view.
Our chapter focuses on ethnic/racial intergroup bias. Although biases based on gender, disability, and other criteria also exist in children, their development does not always follow the same trajectory (Fishbein, 1996; Powlishta, Serbin, Doyle, & White, 1994).
Ethnic bias has been particularly harmful in imposing constraints on the social and aca- demic opportunities afforded minority children, and on the social relationships of major- ity children. Gender stereotypes impose the same harmful constraints on development;
however, we know that boys and girls will eventually be dating and mating. The ethnic divide only becomes larger with age, not necessarily because of personal bias, but because of societal structures such as marriage and religion that keep us apart.
We review several aspects of the development of intergroup bias: attitudes, categorical perceptions and cognitions about ethnicity, and cross-ethnic peer relations. These differ- ent ways of understanding ethnicity and relating to members of ethnic groups may not show consistent levels of bias. Moreover, they may not necessarily reflect bias. For example, awareness of different ethnic groups and the formation of social categories are not in themselves harmful. However, the over-use of categories when making judgments about individuals often leads to inaccuracy because of an exaggeration of between-group differences and within-group homogeneity. This can interfere with recognition and respect for an individual’s qualities. Although schema-driven judgments are arguably more normative (i.e., prevalent) than data-driven judgments, they are not necessarily inevitable or normal. Our theories of development will eventually have to explain not only the uni- versal tendency to categorize (the focus of social cognitive and evolutionary frameworks) but also the age, individual and cultural differences that are so apparent in heterogeneous societies.
To organize the recent developmental research on intergroup bias, we will discuss measurement issues and then review findings with respect to age and majority-minority status of children. The final section will deal with explanatory frameworks, such as the influence of significant others, cultural-historical variables, and cognitive development.