2 Fundamental Orientations in Resource Allocations
3.1 Psychological and Sociostructural Correlates of Allocation Strategies
One important goal of the intergroup relation research has been to uncover the social psychological mechanisms most likely to foster harmonious and egalitarian relations
between social groups. What structural and social psychological conditions are most likely to encourage group members to choose resource allocation strategies that are parity ori- ented rather than discriminatory? Figures 5.2A–E provide three-dimensional depictions of the five major allocation orientations already described in Figure 5.1. In the name of justice and equity, the implicit goal of most efforts to reduce discrimination is the even- tual adoption by group members of the parity strategy in the distribution of valued resources to ingroup and outgroup members. This desired outcome is depicted in the
“resource allocation landscape” in which parity is the only strongly endorsed strategy (largest volume) in Figure 5.2A. Note that the absence of the other four types of strate- gies is depicted by the flat surfaces in the quadrants surrounding the parity strategy.
The strong parity response presented in Figure 5.2A is also the allocation outcome that Henri Tajfel and colleagues expected in their classic minimal group paradigm study (MGP) (Tajfel et al., 1971). By excluding from the intergroup situation known factors contributing to discrimination other than the “us–them” categorization, the MGP was designed to foster the parity response depicted in Figure 5.2A. With parity established as the baseline condition of the MGP, the next step of the research program was to add
“one-by-one” intergroup bias producing factors such as objective conflict of interest, intra- group loyalties, historical rivalries between the groups, threat to ingroup identity and group distinctiveness, self-interest, and ideologies legitimizing the glorification of the ingroup and the disparagement of outgroups (Turner, 1996). In their distinctive ways, each of these “aggravating factors” was expected to shift the allocation strategies from mainly parity responses to the various permutations of ingroup favoritism responses pre- sented in Figure 5.1 (MIP; MD, MOB).
Of course, what in fact happened in the classic MGP was that the “us–them” catego- rization was sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination of the kind depicted in Figure 5.2B. To the degree that individuals do identify with their assigned group within MGP studies, resource allocations using the Tajfel matrices show that group members both dis- criminate and are parity oriented toward outgroup members. MGP studies show that parity is usually somewhat stronger than ingroup favoritism strategies such as MIP and MD. This trend is depicted in Figure 5.2B by the greater volume obtained for the parity orientation than for the ingroup favoritism strategies. Thus, within laboratory studies using the classic MGP, group members deciding on how to distribute positive resources between contrasting groups are concerned with reaching a compromise between system- atically favoring members of their own group (MIP, MD) and sharing resources equally between ingroup and outgroup members (parity). The fact that maximum differentiation (MD) is obtained in most classic MGP studies supports the SIT explanation that the desire to positively differentiate from the outgroup (social competition) is involved in the minimal group discrimination effect. However, the most extreme form of social compe- tition against outgroups depicted in Figure 5.1, namely minimum outgroup benefit (MOB) has not been observed or explored in studies using the MGP.
As in some real-life intergroup situations, outright discrimination without the mod- erating effect of parity (see Figure 5.2C) was obtained in a MGP study exploring the impact of sociostructural variables on the resource distribution strategies of undergradu- ates in Ontario (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). Using the MGP, students were randomly
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Figure 5.2. Three-dimensional representations of social orientations in the intergroup distribution of resources.
assigned to groups which varied in power, status, and group numbers and were asked to make decisions concerning the distribution of valued resources to anonymous ingroup and outgroup others. Results showed that dominant group members were much more discriminatory (MIP, MD) and less parity (P) oriented toward outgroup members than were subordinate group members. High status group members were more discriminatory (MIP, MD) and less parity oriented than members of low status groups. More impor- tantly for our current concern, results showed that dominant high status minority group members were exceptional in engaging in discriminatory behavior (MIP, MD) without moderating this strategy with any parity whatsoever. It is as though this dominant elite could not afford the “noblesse oblige” of granting any parity toward the subordinate low status outgroup whose strength in numbers as a majority nevertheless had the potential of threatening the hegemony of the dominant elite. In line with SIT (Tajfel, 1978), one could expect that high status dominant groups could be even more likely to discriminate without the moderating effect of parity in circumstances where the power and status dif- ferential between the groups was challenged as being illegitimate and unstable by sub- ordinate majorities thus making dominant groups less secure in their social identity.
Classic factors such as realistic conflict of interest with the outgroup (Sherif et al., 1961), perceived threat from the outgroup (Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur- Kaspa, 1998), prejudicial and disparaging attitudes against the outgroup (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996), social dominance orientation (SDO, Sidanius &
Pratto, 1999), and “submissive” right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998) are likely, singly or in combination, to foster the type of clear-cut discrimination depicted in Figure 5.2C.
The clearest case of the combined parity and outgroup favoritism strategies depicted in Figure 5.2D was also obtained by Sachdev and Bourhis (1991). In this MGP study it was undergraduates assigned to the subordinate, low status minority group position who not only were quite parity oriented (P) but also gave more resources to members of the outgroup than to members of their own group (-MD and -MIP; outgroup favoritism).
Though moderated by parity, why did subordinated low status minorities deny resources to members of their own group and instead favor members of the dominant high status minority? Implicitly, this outgroup favoritism acknowledged the superior status of the minority elite on the pertinent and legitimated dimension of comparison established by the experimenter acting as an authority figure.
Outgroup favoritism responses in both evaluative and resource allocations have been observed in the field among subordinated low status minorities who have internalized their inferiority on specific comparison dimensions within stable stratified societies. For instance in the Canadian setting, the classic “matched guise” studies conducted in Mon- treal during the 1960s showed that Quebec francophones not only evaluated French speakers of their own group less favorably than English stimulus speakers but also pro- vided ratings of their own group which were even more negative than those provided by English Quebecers who themselves had also rated French speakers less favorably than English speakers of their own group (Bourhis, 1994b).
Thoughmaximum joint profit (MJP)is a more economically rational allocation strat- egy than parity, results of classic MGP studies rarely obtain the combination of parity (P) and maximum joint profit (MJP) responses depicted in Figure 5.2E. One exception stands
out and this is a study in which three types of intergroup power relations were established between ad hoc groups: an absolute power group (100% power) faced with a powerless outgroup (0% power); a high power group (70% power) faced with a low power group (30% power); and two equal power groups (50%–50%) as in classic MGP studies (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985). Results showed that participants in dominant group posi- tion (100% and 70% power) used their power advantage to discriminate against subor- dinated outgroups (FAV on P, FAV on MJP, MD) while also being parity oriented.
Participants in the equal power position engaged in both parity and discrimination in their allocations, thus replicating the classic MGP effect. Even group members who were subordinate but had some power (30%) did use the little power they had to discriminate (MD, FAV on P) against the dominant outgroup while also adopting parity. No-power group members (0%) did not discriminate at all, eliminating the classic MGP effect and confirming that usable power is a necessary condition for effective discrimination (Ng, 1981). However, these no-power group members were exceptional in adopting the most rational combination of strategies in the study: maximum joint profit (MJP) and parity (Figure 5.2E). For powerless group members, MJP and P were the optimal strategies for claiming valued resources within an intergroup situation totally controlled by the domi- nant outgroup.
The laboratory and field research of the last decades could be portrayed as exploring ways of shifting group members from using mainly the discriminatory strategies depicted in Figures 5.2B and 5.2C to using the parity and joint profit strategies depicted in Figures 5.2A and 5.2E (Brewer & Brown, 1998). Extrapolating from prejudice and ingroup favoritism research, one can identify numerous factors likely to shift resource allocations from the discrimination to the parity and joint profit orientations. Measures likely to reduce ingroup bias are the following: intergroup cooperation to reach superordinate goals or avoid superordinate threats (Sherif et al., 1961); the establishment of social norms favoring fairness rather than ingroup favoritism (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996);
stressing individual merit and equity concerns for intergroup allocations (Ng, 1984;
Platow et al., 1997); the fostering of equal status contact between groups (Pettigrew, 1997); the decategorization of group members as individuals rather than as ingroup versus outgroup members (Brewer & Miller, 1984); the recategorization of ingroup and outgroup members into a single superordinate common identity representation (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993); cross-cutting categorization and multiple category membership as factors reducing intergroup bias (Vanbeselaere, 1991).
As is well known in the literature, most of these ingroup bias-reducing mechanisms more or less suffer from the problem of generalizability. Their positive impact in reduc- ing prejudice tends to degrade with time especially as group members return to their respective status and power positions within stratified societies. While much is known about how the above motivational and cognitive processes can reduce prejudice, less is known about their impact on reducing actual discriminatory behaviors as measured in resource allocation tasks such as the Tajfel matrices. Our point therefore is that the Tajfel matrices offer a sensitive measure of a wide range of resource allocation strategies which can be especially suitable for assessing the impact of motivationally and cognitively inspired methods of reducing discrimination and promoting intergroup harmony.