The perspective gleaned from our review of the literature, however, is less accommo- dating of the stereotype accuracy movement. Several lines of research indicate the sheer difficulty in establishing accuracy criteria. Judd, Park, and their colleagues have shown wide variability in people’s judgments of what constitutes accuracy (Judd & Park, 1993;
Ryan, Park, & Judd, 1996). For example, how could one measure whether African Amer- icans conform to stereotypes that they are athletic, loud, superstitious, and academically unmotivated? Would accuracy be determined by group differences on these traits, by the amount of within-group variability on these traits, or by the trans-situational endurance of these traits among different subgroups? Judgments of accuracy are indeed complex, and the “kernel of truth” criteria will likely remain elusive.
Rather than focus on the a priori veracity of stereotype content, more compelling evi- dence supports behavioral confirmation of stereotype content. Research on self-fulfilling prophecies (Snyder, 1992) reveals that people who hold stereotypes about others can elicit confirmatory behavior, making their biases appear grounded in reality. For example, a biased individual who believes “Black people are hostile” might act cold, distant, and suspicious when interacting with an African American (Chen & Bargh, 1997). The African-American person might respond reciprocally, displaying resentment and hostility toward the biased perceiver. The stereotype thus becomes confirmed in the perceiver’s eyes.
Another line of research by Steele and Aronson (1995) shows that members of stereo- typed groups can be vulnerable simply to the awareness of their group’s stereotype, and act in ways that support the stereotype (see Crocker & Quinn, this volume, chapter 12).
For example, African Americans who are reminded of their group membership (and there- fore made aware of alleged academic deficiencies) and women who are reminded about women’s alleged math deficiencies, perform significantly worse on standardized tests com- pared to other group members who are not reminded of the stereotype (see also Steele, 1997). In this instance, stereotype-confirming behavior is not elicited by a biased per- ceiver; simply knowing that the stereotype exists can lead a target group member to confirm it.
Understanding what people do with the content of their stereotypes, rather than whether the content of those stereotypes is true or not, supports a social psychological account of influence processes, rather than degenerating into measurement debates.
ascribe qualities associated with the group to the individual target. One might wonder, What exactly is a cognitive category? Is it a theoretical abstraction, or an actual mental construct? This section addresses these questions by surveying four major social cognitive approaches that clarify how people store information in their minds – that is, how they mentally represent the world as it exists “out there” – and how that organization of information influences subsequent perception and judgment. These four approaches are prototype, exemplar, associative network, and connectionist models of mental representation (see also Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Smith, 1998, for more discussion).
Prototype models
A prototype refers to the average or most typical member of a category. According to pro- totype models, people organize category information around the category’s statistical average. However, the prototype of a category need not represent a veridical instance or member of the category; in most cases, the prototype does not actually exist (Posner &
Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972). One would be hard-pressed to identify the embodiment of the average professor, African American, or lawyer, although one can describe the average attributes associated with these categories.
Prototype models posit that people represent categorical information in “fuzzy sets.”
That is, attributes about the category have no definite boundaries or systematic organiz- ing criteria, except for mere association with the prototype. Category attributes cluster around the prototype according to family resemblance, wherein attributes share similar features, but their direct association makes sense only in the context of the prototype (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). For example, the attributes intelligent,disorganized,distinguished, andawkwardmake little sense as a coherent personality description, but organized pro- fessor prototype can describe many familiar individuals.
Prototypes have important implications for forming impressions and making judg- ments about group members. When forming impressions of people, perceivers compare the target individual with a category prototype; if the target overlaps sufficiently with the prototypical representation, perceivers assimilate the target into the category (Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990). Stereotypes take hold when perceivers assume that fuzzy-set attributes associated with the general category describe the target individual. Following this logic, prototypes can influence all stages of social cognition, from initial impressions people form of others, to the way they interpret subsequent information, to the way they recall targets’ attributes (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999).
Prototype-based stereotyping is strongest when perceivers have little direct experience with the category yet possess strong group expectancies (Smith & Zàrate, 1990), for example, when people learn about an outgroup through cultural socialization rather than actual interaction. Such might be the case for racial stereotypes, wherein perceivers hold strong beliefs transmitted by culture, yet have little intergroup interaction due to racial segregation (cf. Pettigrew, 1997). According to prototype models, changing perceivers’
beliefs about typical members of a given category (e.g., the “average” African American or woman) can dilute the stereotype (Hantzi, 1995).
Exemplar models
Exemplar models emphasize the role of concrete examples in mental representation (Medin & Schaffer, 1978), and are based on actual experience with category members (Carlston & Smith, 1996). Accordingly, perceivers compare target individuals with mental representations of actual category members when forming impressions and judg- ments (e.g., “He reminds me of my graduate school advisor”), rather than relying on pro- totypical abstractions (e.g., “He reminds me of the typical professor”).
Exemplar models suggest that mental representations involve variability – that is, several discrete instances of the category – rather than typicality and homogeneity, as in the case for prototype models (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989). Exemplar models resonate with the notion of subgroups of general categories, which acknowledge within- group heterogeneity and allude to the potential for stereotype change via the accumula- tion of sufficient group variability (Maurer, Park, & Rothbart, 1995; Rothbart, 1996).
According to exemplar models, stereotyping ensues from the match between individ- ual target and category exemplar (Smith & Zàrate, 1990, 1992). When targets resemble the exemplar, perceivers impute characteristics of the exemplar to the target. Although similar to prototype-based processes, exemplar-based stereotypes involve the application of concrete attributes associated with the exemplar, rather than abstract attributes associ- ated with a prototype (Smith, 1998). Research suggests that exemplar-based stereotyping is strongest when perceivers have undeveloped beliefs about the general category (Sherman, 1996), and when discrete exemplars are highly accessible in the perceiver’s memory (see Higgins, 1996 for review). However, stereotyping diminishes when per- ceivers use an exemplar as a frame of reference for forming impressions, and when targets contrast with the exemplar (Stapel & Koomen, 1998).
Associative networks
Associative network models can clarify basic assumptions of prototype and exemplar models, meanwhile offering unique predictions about stereotyping. According to asso- ciative network models (e.g., Anderson, 1983), information is stored in discrete mental structures called nodes. Each node corresponds to one and only one concept, whether it be a name, place, object, visual concept, personality trait, affective response, evaluation, or any other form of raw data (Carlston, 1994). Nodes are systematically interconnected by links, which map out meaningful associations between the concepts contained in each node. Inter-nodal linkages structure people’s mental representations. Some links are par- ticularly strong, denoting significant association between concepts, whereas others are rel- atively weak. The nature of nodal linkages fluctuates according to perceivers’ experiences:
Links increase or decrease in strength depending on the perceived correlation between concepts, and new nodal links can develop according to new associations between previ- ously unpaired concepts.
Network models suggest that all knowledge and experiences are cognitively represented and organized by interlinked nodes. But most nodes lie dormant – that is, stored in long-
term memory – and only a small portion are currently active, thus influencing conscious or unconscious cognition (Carlston & Smith, 1996). Impressions, judgments, and mem- ories depend on which nodes are active at any given time, and the activation of one par- ticular node implies the activation of closely related concepts (see also Smith, 1998, for more discussion).
Associative network models can explain how stereotypes ensue from mere categoriza- tion. According to prototype and exemplar models, perceivers infer targets’ attributes asso- ciated with either a typical member (prototype) or a discrete instance (exemplar) of the general category. Network models extend this analysis, suggesting that stereotypes occur from spread of activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975), whereby the excitation of one node (e.g., the social category “professor”) flows across links to stimulate other nodes (e.g., attributes such as intelligent and forgetful, visual concepts such as eyeglasses and disor- ganized desks, affective responses such as feeling intimidated). According to network models, excitation travels rapidly across strong links, triggering automatic associations between linked concepts.
This analysis resonates with findings in the stereotyping literature, particularly priming studies that measure response latency and strength of judgment (e.g., rapidly identifying the word “good”) following the presentation of a single concept (e.g., seeing the word
“white”). Some of the best-known studies in the stereotyping literature (e.g., Devine, 1989; Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985; Perdue et al., 1990) employ this technique, suggesting that stereotypes represent the strength between two or more conceptual nodes stored in people’s mental representations. Because of the emphasis on micro-level cognitive structures, network models suggest that stereotyping via associated nodes occurs largely outside of the perceiver’s awareness (see also Banaji & Hardin, 1996, for discussion).
Parallel-distributed processing (PDP) models
Emerging from cognitive and neuroscience laboratories over the past decade (e.g., McClel- land, Rumelhart, & Hinton, 1986), PDP, or connectionist, models of mental representa- tion have infused social psychological research with new theoretical perspectives on the structures guiding thought (see Smith, 1996, for review). Like associative network models, PDP models posit that knowledge is represented in nodes, which are interconnected by associative links. But whereas network models focus on the information contained in acti- vated nodes, PDP models suggest that a given node has no inherent meaning by itself, and nodes are not category specific. Rather, meaning comes from the patterns of activation across nodes, and nodes are general mental structures non-specific to any particular cate- gory. The focus, then, moves away from the discrete properties of each particular node, and is instead on the blend of impulses that arise from activation across a pattern of nodes.
With the focus now on the patterns across nodes, research emphasizes the properties of pattern activation, which has implications for research on stereotypes (see Smith, 1996, 1998, for more general discussion). Activation patterns – for example, from node a to nodesb,c, and d– function from the excitation level of initial node aand the weight of a–b, a–c,a–d nodal connections (as well as b–c,b–d, and c–d connections). Activation
between nodes can be positive or negative; positive activations facilitate the connection between nodes, and negative connections inhibit connection. Given repeated stimulus exposure and experience, the activation of a few nodes within a pattern can lead to the completion of prior learned patterns; triggering nodes a andb alone can complete the pattern by stimulating candd. Pattern activation is constrained by the initial informa- tion input, and by prior weights (positive or negative) between nodes. Multiple simulta- neous patterns of activation occur at the same time, reflecting people’s capacity for concurrent on-line cognitions.
Applications of PDP models to social psychology have been few thus far, largely because theoretical models are still developing. However, a few programs of research apply PDP models to stereotyping phenomena. One particular new trend in the stereotyping literature is the focus on both facilitatory and inhibitory mechanisms that underlie stereo- typic thought (see Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998, for review). Extending the emphasis on both positive and negative nodal connections, recent research has examined the vari- ables that undermine or dampen stereotypes (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998;
Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Ford, 1997; Monteith, 1993), rather than focusing solely on variables that set them in motion. Another new trend in stereotyping research, derived from PDP models, is the explicit focus on constraint satisfaction processes (Kunda
& Thagard, 1996; Miller & Read, 1991), in which activated nodes (e.g., individuating traits or personal motives) can counter the overwhelming effects of other nodes (e.g., cat- egorical beliefs) when forming impressions and making judgments.
Social and cognitive psychology offer several models of mental representation, each model overlapping significantly with others, yet providing unique explanations and pre- dictions. Prototype, exemplar, associative network, and PDP models have contributed valuable insight into the cognitive structures that sustain stereotypes. They indicate that stereotypes emerge from basic cognitive units that store prior beliefs and expectations, and are thus embedded within our mental architecture.