Most lay discussions of stereotypes focus on content. In American culture, stereotypic content describes the “characteristics” of people who are ethnic minorities, women, elderly, overweight, and homosexual, among other categories. Stereotypes overgeneralize, misattribute, prescribe, and often condemn the behavior and personal characteristics asso- ciated with these categories. As this section discusses, such is the nature of stereotype content.
In contrast to popular discussion, social psychology has devoted considerably less research to content, focusing more on structures and processes (discussed in subsequent
sections). However, studies of stereotype content matter just as much, for they illuminate what, rather than how and why, people think about others. Insight into stereotype content can elucidate intergroup relations, political attitudes, social tension, and other societal phe- nomena, whereas knowledge of process and structure may be less helpful in these domains.
One of the first studies to address the content of stereotypes was Katz and Braly’s (1933) classic examination of ethnic stereotypes, which concluded that ethnic stereotypes were uniformly negative and consensually shared. However, follow-up studies observed over time diminishing negative attitudes toward minorities, concluding that these stereo- types were fading (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969). Prior research was claimed ungeneralizable (cf. Gergen, 1973); stereotype content allegedly provided his- torically sensitive descriptions of social attitudes, but fell outside the purview of general psychological principles.
The thesis in this section, however, is that stereotype content indeed follows general psychological principles. A review of research reveals basic principles that underlie stereo- type content. These principles are that (a) stereotypes contain ambivalent beliefs reflect- ing relationships between groups, (b) stereotypes augment perceptions of negative and extreme behavior, and (c) stereotypes maintain division between ingroups (“us”) and out- groups (“them”). This section briefly addresses the issue of stereotype accuracy and the debates about whether a “kernel of truth” underlies the content of stereotypes.
Ambivalent belief systems: Competence versus niceness
The content of stereotypes described in Allport’s (1954) groundbreaking text The Nature of Prejudicereflects antipathy toward members of derogated groups. However, emerging perspectives in social psychology indicate that stereotype-based antipathy is rare. Instead, stereotypes more likely contain ambivalent beliefs, with a mixture of mostly negative but some positive attributes. The blend of these traits indeed reflects overall disparagement, but not utter repugnance.
For example, the Black stereotypes endorsed in Katz and Braly’s (1933) study included superstitious,lazy,happy-go-lucky,ignorant,musical,ostentatious, and religious. Thus, even when explicit endorsement of negative Black stereotypes was somewhat acceptable, Katz and Braly’s respondents in 1933 reported more ambivalent disapproval than outright antipathy. However, some stereotypes, even today, remain resolutely negative, including beliefs about terrorists and criminals. But again, ambivalence is more common than antipathy in stereotypes of outgroups.
The ambivalence of most social stereotypes reflects the structural relationship between groups, determined by (a) groups’ relative status and (b) the nature of interdependence between groups. Relative status predicts whether the target group is perceived as compe- tent or incompetent, and interdependence (cooperation versus competition) predicts whether the target group is perceived as nice or not (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, in press).
In this view, competence and niceness represent core dimensions of ambivalent belief systems.
Stereotypes ensue from groups’ structural relationships, such that non-majority groups tend to be viewed as high on one domain but low on the other: either highly competent
but not nice, or extremely incompetent but nice. Stereotype content adheres to this pattern. Recent data (Fiske et al., in press) indicate that people believe the following groups are nice but incompetent: retarded people, housewives, elderly people, disabled people, and blind people. In contrast, people believe the following groups are not nice but competent: feminists, business women, Black professionals, Asians, and Jews. The beliefs associated with these two clusters reflect their relationship with the dominant majority (White, male, middle-class, able-bodied). The first group presents no threat to the majority, whereas the second group presents significant threat.
The payoff between perceived niceness and competence corroborates many common cultural stereotypes about categories and their subtypes (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivkanan- than, 1968). Business women are stereotypically industrious and aggressive (high com- petence–low niceness), whereas “pink-collar” workers are stereotypically nice but not very smart. Middle-class or wealthy African Americans are often viewed as ambitious but defensive about racism (high competence–low niceness). According to this analysis, only members of the dominant majority profit from being both competent and nice.
The dimensions of competence and niceness, which derive from groups’ status and interdependence, reflect a trans-historical principle of stereotyping. Most common stereo- types contain ambivalent, rather than purely negative, beliefs about outgroup categories, which can influence perceivers’ attitudes and behaviors in subtle yet powerful ways (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Situational context can determine the overall valence and potency of ambivalent stereotypes (Oakes, Haslam, & Reynolds, 1999). An example of stereotypes about Asians demonstrates this point. Recent findings (Lin & Fiske, 1999) showed that some Anglo-Americans believe Asians are intelligent, shy, upwardly mobile, hardworking, and socially awkward – truly a heterogeneous combination of traits. Social context can trigger how perceivers use this stereotype: In a social situation, Asians are irrelevant and non-threatening, but in a competitive situation, Asians are dominating and menacing.
Negative and extreme behavior
A second principle of stereotype content is that stereotypes augment negative and extreme behavior. This simple principle has permeated social cognition research for decades (see Fiske, 1980), and impacts how people think about outgroup members.
Negative and extreme information captures people’s attention (Skowronski &
Carlston, 1989; Taylor, 1991). For example, research on salience (Taylor & Fiske, 1978) indicates that attention flows to negative and extreme stimuli – such as inappropriate behavior (crimes) or unanticipated accidents (car accidents). This occurs because people generally expect other people and events to be slightly positive or benign (Matlin & Stang, 1978), and in contrast, negative and extreme stimuli stand out. Consequently, perceivers assume that negative and extreme stimuli are diagnostic of a person or situation, and thus become central to subsequent formed impressions (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).
Perceptions of outgroups are particularly vulnerable to the cognitive effects of nega- tive and extreme behavior. Perceivers associate minority groups with negative or extreme behavior – known as the illusory correlation (Hamilton & Sherman, 1989) – because
both are rare occurrences that represent exceptions to the rules (i.e., the majority group and positive events). When encountering both an unusual group and a rare event, per- ceivers assume the two are directly associated. For example, people tend to view AIDS as a homosexual disease because both are novel stimuli – homosexuals are a minority group and AIDS is a negative occurrence – when they happen to co-occur. Although the inci- dence of AIDS is higher among other groups (e.g., heterosexual women), the illusory cor- relation between AIDS and homosexuality persists. Other examples include the illusory correlation between African Americans and welfare recipients (most recipients are White) and between Mexicans and illegal immigration to the United States (just as many, if not more, illegal immigrants come from Canada, Europe, and Asia).
Stereotypes capitalize on the distinctiveness of negative and extreme concepts stored in people’s mental representations. Minority group members tend to be novel or unique to majority group members, so are vulnerable to the cognitive processes that pair their distinctiveness with socially undesirable traits and behavior.
Us and them
The third principle of stereotype content is the advantage given to the ingroup and rel- ative disadvantage given to the outgroup. This principle is the cornerstone of social iden- tity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and an elementary concept in social psychology (see also Brewer & Brown, 1998).
People allocate more rewards to ingroup members than outgroup members (Brewer, 1979), have more positive reactions to ingroup versus outgroup stimuli presented uncon- sciously (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990), and engage in more cooperative rather than competitive behavior with ingroup members (Schopler & Insko, 1992).
Stereotypic beliefs of the outgroup are implicated in all of these findings (Fiske, 1998).
Although most laboratory evidence reveals ingroup favoritism rather than outgroup dero- gation per se, the realities of social life and resource scarcity suggest that the two are at least partially correlated (Brewer & Brown, 1998). Moreover, mere presence of an out- group might suggest that one’s own personal goals are at risk (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993), thereby prompting motivated stereotyping.
Stereotype accuracy?
Recent years have witnessed increased studies addressing the relative accuracy of stereo- types. Do they reflect a “kernel of truth” about outgroups? This perspective was high- lighted in a volume by Lee, Jussim, and McCauley (1995), which countered the dominant view of stereotypes as incorrect, biased, and socially harmful. Lee, Jussim, and their col- leagues argue that stereotype content has some factual basis. They cite evidence indicat- ing that societies consensually agree about groups’ traits and attributes; that minority group members themselves endorse stereotypes about their group; and that objective cri- teria, such as grades, standardized test scores, and job evaluations, corroborate the valid- ity of stereotypes (see Ottati & Lee, 1995, for a summary of this evidence).
The perspective gleaned from our review of the literature, however, is less accommo- dating of the stereotype accuracy movement. Several lines of research indicate the sheer difficulty in establishing accuracy criteria. Judd, Park, and their colleagues have shown wide variability in people’s judgments of what constitutes accuracy (Judd & Park, 1993;
Ryan, Park, & Judd, 1996). For example, how could one measure whether African Amer- icans conform to stereotypes that they are athletic, loud, superstitious, and academically unmotivated? Would accuracy be determined by group differences on these traits, by the amount of within-group variability on these traits, or by the trans-situational endurance of these traits among different subgroups? Judgments of accuracy are indeed complex, and the “kernel of truth” criteria will likely remain elusive.
Rather than focus on the a priori veracity of stereotype content, more compelling evi- dence supports behavioral confirmation of stereotype content. Research on self-fulfilling prophecies (Snyder, 1992) reveals that people who hold stereotypes about others can elicit confirmatory behavior, making their biases appear grounded in reality. For example, a biased individual who believes “Black people are hostile” might act cold, distant, and suspicious when interacting with an African American (Chen & Bargh, 1997). The African-American person might respond reciprocally, displaying resentment and hostility toward the biased perceiver. The stereotype thus becomes confirmed in the perceiver’s eyes.
Another line of research by Steele and Aronson (1995) shows that members of stereo- typed groups can be vulnerable simply to the awareness of their group’s stereotype, and act in ways that support the stereotype (see Crocker & Quinn, this volume, chapter 12).
For example, African Americans who are reminded of their group membership (and there- fore made aware of alleged academic deficiencies) and women who are reminded about women’s alleged math deficiencies, perform significantly worse on standardized tests com- pared to other group members who are not reminded of the stereotype (see also Steele, 1997). In this instance, stereotype-confirming behavior is not elicited by a biased per- ceiver; simply knowing that the stereotype exists can lead a target group member to confirm it.
Understanding what people do with the content of their stereotypes, rather than whether the content of those stereotypes is true or not, supports a social psychological account of influence processes, rather than degenerating into measurement debates.