Five reasonable hypotheses have been proposed by researchers to account for the rela- tionships they have observed between affect and intergroup bias. These explanations are not mutually exclusive or necessarily independent of one another. Three of these (affect consistency, affect as information, affect infusion) are related in that they posit some degree of consistency between affective valence and intergroup judgments. The other two (mood and general knowledge, distraction) do not presume consistency between affect and judgments. Rather, the mood and general knowledge hypothesis predicts an asym- metry such that positive affect promotes superficial processing and the use of stereotypes whereas negative affect encourages more careful consideration of information. Finally, the distraction hypothesis argues that strong affect, regardless of valence, distracts the per- ceiver from careful attention to the outgroup and, consequently, leads to increased reliance on existing stereotypes and prejudice.
Affect consistency
Affect primes consistent cognitions and, therefore, disposes consistent behaviors. Positive affect should trigger positive cognitions and actions, and negative affect should foster neg- ative thoughts and behaviors. This hypothesis fits with spreading-activation models of cognitive organization (e.g., Bower, 1981), cognitive consistency theories (e.g., Abelson
et al., 1968), and learning theory based on temporal association (e.g., Byrne & Clore, 1970; Clore & Byrne, 1974; Staats & Staats, 1958; see also Zillman, 1983, for a con- ceptually similar argument that links arousal to aggression via excitation transfer). Extrap- olating from these various, but convergent, approaches yields the simple prediction that the induction of positive affect should lessen negative affect, beliefs, and behavior directed toward an outgroup. If we are feeling good, then we should be less likely to respond unkindly to those around us. Conversely, negative affect should activate unpleasant thoughts and, therefore, encourage bias between groups.
In an experiment showing support for the affect consistency hypothesis, Forgas and Moylan (1991) showed subjects films that provoked either a positive, negative, or neutral mood. As part of an unrelated experiment, subjects viewed drawings of hetero- sexual dyads in which both persons were members of the same race or one person was Asian and one was Caucasian. Overall, subjects in a pleasant mood rated the stimulus persons more positively than subjects in an unpleasant mood did. In addition, there was a significant interaction between mood and the racial pairing: Subjects in a good mood rated the same-race and mixed-race pairs similarly; however, subjects in an unpleasant mood rated the mixed-race pairs as less competent and likable than the matched-race pairs. According to Forgas and Moylan, the mixed-race pairs presented a more complex, unusual stimulus for subjects and, therefore, demanded greater processing when evalua- tions were made. Consequently, a subject’s mood was likely to influence judgments in a manner consistent with the literature on affect-cognition consistency (e.g., Bower, 1981;
Isen, 1984). A negative mood made salient more negative conditions than a positive mood did.
Dovidio et al. (1995) also reported findings showing consistency between affect and judgments. When subjects were made happy, they responded more positively to members of an outgroup. Consistent with their theory of the benefits of a superordinate catego- rization, they found that subjects’ perception of being in a common group with the target outgroup members mediated the relationship between affect and evaluation. Positive affect was significantly related to feelings of a common ingroup identity with members of the outgroup and that, in turn, was significantly predictive of a positive response to the outgroup.
Affect as information
Awareness of affect should instigate an attempt to explain it (Schachter & Singer, 1962).
If the source of the affect is not apparent, the affect will be used as information to inter- pret the situation (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). The affect as information hypothesis can be viewed as a restricted relative of the affect con- sistency premise. The latter stipulates a generalization of affect to stimuli present when the affect is present. The former maintains that spreading occurs only when the affect has not been explained away; in other words, when the affect has not been compartmental- ized and separated from ongoing thought. Therefore, if there is unexplained affect, predictions of the affect as information hypothesis should be similar to the affect consistency hypothesis. In an intergroup setting unexplained positive affect may be attrib-
uted to the outgroup and reduce bias whereas unexplained negative affect should exac- erbate bias.
Affect infusion
Recently Forgas (1995) proposed the affect infusion model (AIM) to explain the influ- ence of affect on social judgments. Forgas argued that the processing strategies a person adopts determine the extent to which affect infuses or influences judgments. He identi- fied four judgmental strategies that perceivers use: direct access, motivated, heuristic, and substantive processing. Direct access (direct retrieval of stored information) and moti- vated processing (directed processing in response to motivational pressures; e.g., motiva- tion to be accurate) result in little affect infusion. These strategies involve relatively narrow and closed search processes which, in turn, allow little opportunity for affect to influence cognition.
On the other hand, heuristic and substantive strategies are more constructive and take longer to complete. As a result, heuristic and substantive strategies afford more opportu- nity for affective states to influence information processing. Heuristic processing occurs when perceivers lack prior information and a strong motivational goal yet desire to min- imize their effort. They, therefore, rely on shortcuts or heuristics (e.g., Brewer, 1988;
Paulhus & Lim, 1994). Using heuristics opens judgments to the infusion of prevailing affect. Heuristic processing according to Forgas appears to be comparable to what others refer to as category-based processing (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) or periph- eral processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b). Finally, substantive processing involves the selection and integration of novel information. This is the most complex type of judgment and requires the most cognitive effort. The process of learning and inte- grating new information opens perceivers to the influence of their current affective state.
Substantive processing is similar, if not identical, to what others refer to as individual- based processing in which careful consideration is given to individuating or personal information about the targets (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). It is also remi- niscent of the concept of central processing in the attitude change literature (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986a, 1986b).
Which strategy a perceiver adopts is determined by task requirements. In general, per- ceivers are thought to be cognitive misers and will adopt the processing strategy that requires the least effort yet is sufficient to be responsive to task and social demands. If affect does influence or infuse judgments, then it does so in a manner consistent with the mood state. Like the affect consistency hypothesis, the AIM model predicts greater intergroup bias when perceivers are experiencing negative affect. However, the AIM model forecasts mood effects only when perceivers use heuristic or substantive processing strategies.
In support of the affect infusion hypothesis, Forgas (1989, 1995) reported that atyp- ical targets elicited longer and more elaborate processing by subjects. Longer processing resulted in greater mood infusion; that is, the effects of the subjects’ mood state had more impact on judgments of targets when processing time increased. As a result, subjects in a positive mood made more favorable judgments of atypical targets. But those subjects
who experienced a negative mood made more unfavorable judgments of atypical targets.
The effect of mood state on outgroup judgments was mediated by the amount of time processing information about the outgroup targets which, in turn, was determined by the typicalness of the target. Thus, based on Forgas’ findings, one would expect that judg- ments of atypical or unusual outgroup members will be more influenced by a perceiver’s mood state than judgments of more representative outgroup members. Moreover, the direction of influence will be consistent with the valence of the mood state.
Mood and general knowledge
Mood may affect judgments by influencing a person’s motivation to do detailed process- ing. Specifically, a positive mood may signal that the present situation is safe and, there- fore, vigilance is unnecessary (Bless, 1994, cited in Bless, Schwarz, & Kemmelmeier, in press; Bless & Fiedler, 1995; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). On the other hand, a negative mood signals an aversive, and perhaps threatening, environment in which vigi- lance is important. Consequently, greater attention should be paid to the external envi- ronment under conditions of unpleasant than pleasant mood. This, in turn, should encourage more substantive examination of stimuli by persons in a negative mood state relative to those who are happy. The bottom line is that the use of stereotypes should be greater among happy than among sad or angry persons.
Evidence from the persuasion literature is consistent with this train of thought. Sad persons are more influenced by strong than by weak arguments which suggests that sadness fosters more substantive or central processing. On the other hand, happy persons are equally influenced by strong and weak arguments, indicative of heuristic or periph- eral processing (Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994;
Fiedler, 1991; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991; Sinclair, Mark, and Clore, 1994).
Turning to research on affect and bias, Mackie and her colleagues have conducted a program of research examining the role of positive mood on bias (Mackie, Queller, Stroessner, & Hamilton, 1996; Stroessner & Mackie, 1993). Overall, they have found that positive affect is associated with greater stereotyping. Their findings are most easily explained by the mood as general knowledge and distraction hypotheses (to follow).
In one of their earlier investigations (Mackie, Hamilton, Schroth, Carlisle, Gersho, Meneses, Nedler, & Reichel, 1989), they had subjects read a series of trait statements about target persons following a mood induction. As the first of two experiments, sub- jects watched a videotape designed to create a happy, sad, or neutral mood. Then they read statements containing two attributes (either positive or negative) about fictitious persons who were either described as construction workers, lawyers, or policemen. Sub- jects estimated the frequency with which each trait had described the members of each job category. Results revealed an illusory correlation effect (Hamilton & Rose, 1980) in which subjects overestimated the association between stereotypic traits and occupations.
Of interest was that the illusory correlation was strongest for happy subjects.
Stroessner and Mackie (1992) induced either a positive or a neutral mood using the manipulation cited in the last paragraph. Then all subjects read descriptions of members
of an unnamed group. Descriptions gave trait information relevant to intelligence, socia- bility, stupidity, and friendliness. The variability of the information was manipulated so that subjects had information indicating either high or low variability of these traits among the unnamed target group. Subjects in the neutral mood condition accurately reported greater variability in the group when they had seen more variable information.
However, subjects experiencing a positive mood reported relatively low variability (or greater homogeneity) even when they had seen highly variable information.
Mackie, Queller, and Stroessner (1994) examined the impact of a pleasant mood on perceptions of outgroup homogeneity by varying the dispersion of information inconsis- tent with stereotypes of a group. For some subjects stereotype inconsistent behavior was concentrated in a few group members; for other subjects the stereotype inconsistent infor- mation was dispersed across many group members. In the neutral mood condition, sub- jects accurately estimated less consistency and greater atypicality among group members when counterstereotypic information was dispersed. However, when subjects had experienced a positive mood, they reported that the information they had seen was typical and consistent with stereotypes in both the dispersed and concentrated conditions. Hence, a positive mood appeared to enhance perceptions of outgroup homogeneity which might well contribute to the development of stereotypes.
Using a similar procedure in which subjects were exposed to both stereotypic and non- stereotypic information about an outgroup, Stroessner and Mackie (1992) asked subjects to rate the extent to which two stereotypic and two nonstereotypic traits were represented in the group. Subjects in the neutral condition rated the group equally across the traits (which, as the authors argued, most likely reflected the mix of information given them).
Happy subjects, however, rated the stereotypic traits as more characteristic of the group and the nonstereotypic traits as less characteristic of the group.
Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser (1994) also examined the relationship between pos- itive mood and judgments of an outgroup. Consistent with research reported by Mackie and her colleagues, they found that positive mood led to greater stereotypic judgments of an outgroup target. In a series of experiments they found no evidence that this rela- tionship was due to cognitive deficits such as distraction. (To do so, they used mood manipulations that were unlikely to diminish cognitive capacity such as smells and having subjects contort their faces to display the desired affect.) Apparently, subjects did not stereotype more because they were distracted by their pleasant mood and paid less atten- tion to information about the outgroup target. However, this effect for happy mood was eliminated when subjects were made accountable for their judgments. The accountabil- ity manipulation presumably caused subjects to focus more carefully on the individuat- ing information presented to them, so their judgments of the targets were less affected by group stereotypes.
In a series of experiments, Bless, Schwarz, and Kemmelmeier (in press) varied both the mood of subjects (happy, neutral, sad) and the consistency of a target person vis-à- vis subjects’ expectations about the target person’s group. Target characteristics were either positive or negative, and stereotypes of the target group were either positive or negative.
When subjects were feeling sad, evaluations of the target person were influenced only by the valence of the individuating information. Sad subjects rated the target with positive characteristics more favorably than the target with negative characteristics. Stereotypes
based on the target’s group membership had no influence on judgments. On the other hand, subjects experiencing a happy mood rated the target most favorably when the target had positive characteristics and the target’s group was also thought to be pos- itive. Thus, subjects made more stereotypic judgments of the target outgroup member when his behavior matched the expectations of the outgroup. This finding is consistent with the general pattern that happy subjects stereotype more than sad subjects. However, when the target’s characteristics were negative, happy subjects showed a contrast effect and rated the target most unfavorably when the target’s group was positive.
Overall, these studies by Mackie, Bodenhausen, Bless and their co-authors have found that positive affect usually causes superficial processing and greater stereotyping. Among the five hypotheses presented at the outset of this section, their findings are most consis- tent with the mood as general knowledge hypothesis and the distraction hypothesis (dis- cussed next) and less supportive of the consistency-based explanations (affect consistency, affect as information, affect infusion).
Distraction
Affect may sap attention from other ongoing activities. Attending to and coping with affect can distract a person from other stimuli and, consequently, may disrupt processing of other activities (Wilder & Simon, 1996). In an intergroup situation affect may dis- tract a perceiver from the behavior of the outgroup. This possibility is based on the premise that attention is a zero-sum game. The more affect saps attention, the less there is available to deal with other activities. As a result, persons rely on well-learned habits (e.g., stereotypes) in lieu of careful attention to their immediate environment.
A similar argument has been made in other literatures. Research on helping has shown that sad moods sometimes increase and sometimes decrease helping. One determinant appears to be the focus of the sad person’s attention. When attention is focused inwardly, helping decreases, in part, because need for aid may be less noticed (e.g., Pyszczynski &
Greenberg, 1987). In addition, Fiske and Morlin (1996) have argued that anxiety due to powerlessness can lead to a reduction of processing capacity. One way in which this may occur is that the anxiety allows intrusive thoughts that interfere with attention to the task at hand.
Applied to intergroup relations, the distraction hypothesis predicts that strong affect should enhance reliance on existing prejudice and stereotypes when evaluating members of an outgroup. Strong affect should increase perceptions of outgroup homogeneity and, consequently, should lessen the impact of atypical behavior in the outgroup. The dis- traction hypothesis seems to be most applicable to situations involving relatively “hot”
affect such as anger or anxiety at the prospect of an imminent threat. Anxiety, for example, has been associated with a narrowing of one’s focus of attention (Easterbrook, 1959;
Kahneman, 1973). Distraction appears less relevant to the milder mood inductions used in the many happy–sad experiments (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994). Neverthe- less, a distraction explanation may partially account for the differential effects of happy versus sad moods predicted by the mood and general information hypothesis. Bless,
Schwarz, and Kemmelmeier (in press) point to evidence that more positive than negative information is stored in memory and that positive information is better connected than negative. Consequently, if a positive mood state activates similarly valenced cognitions, the potential for interference and distraction is greater for persons in a positive mood state. Consistent with a distraction prediction, being in a pleasant mood should decrease processing capacity and increase reliance on heuristics, such as stereotypes, when making judgments of others (Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994).
In a set of studies relevant to the distraction hypothesis, Bodenhausen and his colleagues (Bodenhausen & Kramer, 1990; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994) looked at the relationship between negative moods and stereotyping. They reported that happiness and anger increased reliance on stereotypes but that sadness had no effect as compared to a neutral control. Both happy and angry subjects appeared to rely more on heuristic cues when making judgments and less on individuating or particular information. From the standpoint of the distraction hypothesis, anger and happiness are likely to be “hotter” emotions than sadness and, therefore, more likely to distract sub- jects from careful attention to the task, thereby increasing the likelihood of their making stereotypic judgments.
Baron, Burgess, Kao, and Logan (1990) examined the impact of anxiety on stereo- typing in a dental setting. In the first of two experiments subjects completed a mood measure assessing their anxiety while waiting for a dentist appointment. Then they read a series of sentences involving members of occupational groups (e.g., “Sue, a librarian, is wise and gentle”). The statements systematically varied how stereotypic were the actors’
behaviors. Anxious subjects significantly overestimated the correlation between stereo- typic traits and members of the corresponding occupation.
In Baron et al.’s (1990) second study, subjects were provided with information about dental procedures that was designed to generate either high or low fear. Then they were exposed to a weak persuasive message that was presented with superficial cues suggesting a strong message (e.g., applauding audience). Baron et al. reasoned that subjects who examined the message carefully would rate it poorly whereas those who superficially exam- ined the message would judge it to be more convincing. The latter subjects would be more affected by the peripheral cues and presentation style of the speaker. As expected, subjects in the high fear condition rated the message as more persuasive than subjects in the low fear condition. These findings suggest that high fear led to superficial processing of the message.
A set of experiments by Wilder and Shapiro (1989a, 1989b, 1991; Wilder, 1993a, 1993b) investigated the impact of anxiety on judgments of an outgroup member who behaved contrary to expectations about his group. Following Stephan and Stephan (1985), Wilder and Shapiro reasoned that intergroup contact may not improve relations between groups when anxiety is generated in anticipation of the contact. Such anxiety (and any attempts to cope with it) may poison the interaction, not only because the negative affect is associated with the outgroup, but also because it interferes with infor- mation processing in the contact setting. To the extent that anxiety distracts individuals, they should be more likely to interpret the contact experiences in terms of their expecta- tions or stereotypes of the outgroup. In a series of experiments, subjects were made