The Idea of Intrinsic Equality

An obvious objection to the claim that the best feasible system tends to exist when a people actively adopts the idea of democracy is that the argument is meaningless unless we know what is meant by "best." By what criteria are we to appraise the worth of democracy whether as an ideal or as an actuality?

I believe that virtually all attempts to answer a question like this ultimately fall back, even if only by implication, on an assumption so fundamental that it is

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presupposed in most moral argument. This is what might be called the idea of intrinsic equality.

A version of this idea is contained in a wellknown passage in Locke's Second Treatise of Government:

Though I have said above . . . That all Men by Nature are equal, I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality: Age or Virtue may give Men a just Precedency:

Excellency of Parts and Merit may place others above the Common Level: Birth may subject some, and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an Observance to those to whom Nature, Gratitude or other Respects may have made it due; and yet all this consists with the Equality, which all Men are in, in respect of Jurisdiction or Dominion one over another, which was the Equality I there spoke of, as proper to the Business in hand, being that equal Right that every Man hath, to his Natural Freedom, without being subjected to the Will or Authority of any other Man. (Locke [1689/90] 1970, chap. 6, para. 54, p. 322)

Locke was ascribing to men a kind of intrinsic equality that while clearly irrelevant to many situations should definitely be decisive for certain purposes, specifically for purposes of government. Though Locke casts his version in a special form, he shares with many others a fundamental belief that at least on matters requiring collective decisions "all Men" (or all persons?) are, or ought to be considered, equal in some important sense. I am going to call this underlying notion the Idea of Intrinsic Equality.

In what respects are persons intrinsically equal, and what requirements, if any, does their equality impose on a process for making collective decisions? It is easier to say what intrinsic equality does not mean, as Locke does, than to say more precisely what it does mean. To Locke intrinsic equality evidently means that no one is naturally entitled to subject another to his (or, certainly, to her) will or authority. It follows that "no one can be . . . subjected to the Political Power of another without his own Consent" (chap. 8, para. 95, p. 348). ¹ To some, however, intrinsic equality means that all human beings are of equal intrinsic worth, or, put the other way around, that no person is intrinsically superior to another. ² To John Rawls, who finds the idea that human beings are of equal intrinsic worth excessively vague and elastic, their intrinsic equality consists rather of the capacity for having a conception of their good and acquiring a sense of justice. ³ To others, intrinsic equality means that the good or interests of each person must be given equal consideration; this is the wellknown Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests (e.g., Benn 1967, 61ff.).

How these various interpretations of intrinsic equality are related, and whether all finally depend on the idea of intrinsic worth, are unsettled questions that need not detain us here. ⁴

Yet democracy might, like Plato's republic, be little more than a philosophical fantasy were it not for the persistent and widespread influence of the belief that human beings are intrinsically equal in a fundamental way—or at any rate some substantial group of human beings are. Historically, the idea of intrinsic equality gained much of its strength, particularly in Europe and the Englishspeaking

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Page 86 countries, from the common doctrine of Judaism and Christianity (shared also by Islam) that we are equally God's children. Indeed it was exactly on this belief that Locke grounded his assertion of the natural equality of all persons in a state of nature.

Even when moral reasoning is intended to stand independent of its religious origins, as it commonly has been in recent centuries, the Idea of Intrinsic Equality is nevertheless usually taken for granted. Thus we have Bentham's dictum, "everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one," which John Stuart Mill asserted

"might be written under the principle of utility as an explanatory commentary" (Mill [1863] 1962, 319). ⁵ What Bentham meant, and what all utilitarians assume as a premise, is that no matter who Jones and Smith may be, and no matter how the ultimate standard of goodness may be described (whether happiness, pleasure, satisfaction, wellbeing, or utility), Jones's happiness (or whatever) must be counted in exactly the same units as Smith's. We ought not to measure Jones's happiness in shrunken units because he is an illiterate farm laborer and Smith's in larger units because he is an artist of exquisitely refined tastes. Even when J. S. Mill contended that some pleasures are better than others, he continued to assume the axiom, for to Mill as to Bentham the relative value of an object or activity depended on its contribution to the pleasure or happiness of the recipient, not on the intrinsic and peculiar worth of the recipient. ⁶

Utilitarianism is vulnerable in many ways, of course, and it has always been subjected to heavy attack, particularly by those who try to demonstrate a right course of action, duty, obligation, or right that is not justified solely by its utilitarian consequences. But these philosophers, from Kant to Rawls, usually also adopt a premise of intrinsic equality.

The persistence and generality of the assumption of intrinsic equality in systematic moral reasoning could be attributed to the existence of a norm so deeply entrenched in all Western cultures that we cannot reject it without denying our cultural heritage and thereby denying who we are. But a ground for adopting it that appeals less to history and culture and more to its reasonableness is the difficulty of presenting a rational justification for any alternative to it. To be sure, the idea can be rejected without selfcontradiction. ⁷ But to reject it is to assert, in effect, that some people ought to be regarded and treated as intrinsically privileged quite independent of any social contribution they may make. To justify such a claim is a formidable task that no one, to my knowledge, has accomplished.

Still, the question persists: What does intrinsic equality actually mean? The aspect that seems to me most relevant to the democratic process is expressed in the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests. Yet what that principle requires is far from evident. Let me try to clarify it both by filling in some additional meaning and then, following Locke, by saying what it does not mean.

To begin with, the principle implies that during a process of collective decisionmaking, the interests of every person who is subject to the decision must (within the limits of feasibility) be accurately interpreted and made known. Obviously, without this step, the interests of each "subject" could not be considered, much less

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given equal consideration. Yet the principle does not imply that the "subject" whose interests must be considered should also be the "interpreter." Nor need the

"interpreter" necessarily be the decisionmaker.

Suppose the subjects are Able, Baker, and Carr, but Dawson is the best possible interpreter of their interests, while decisions are best made by Eccles, who is required to given equal consideration to the interests of Able, Baker, and Carr. The principle would require not only that (1) Dawson accurately interprets and expresses the interests of Able, Baker, and Carr; (2) Eccles fully understands Dawson's interpretation, and (3) Eccles makes the decision, after having fully considered and taken into account the interests of each, as interpreted by Dawson. But additionally (4) in deciding, Eccles gives "equal consideration" to the interests of each.

What this means is that Eccles treats Able, Baker, and Carr as equally entitled to having their interests served, with no one having an intrinsically privileged claim.

Suppose Able's interest is best served by choosing X, Baker's by Y, and Carr's by Z. The principle prohibits Eccles from choosing Z, say, on the ground that Carr's claim to Z is intrinsically superior (for whatever reasons) to Able's claim to X or Baker's to Y. Eccles must search for a decision that is neutral with respect to Able, Baker, and Carr. ⁸

Two Weaknesses in the Idea of Intrinsic Equality

Standing alone, however, the Idea of Intrinsic Equality is not robust enough to justify much in the way of conclusions—and certainly not democracy. It is weak in at least two ways. In the first place, whatever limits it may set on inequalities are extremely broad. It does not mean, for example, that we are all entitled to equal shares, whether in votes, civil rights, medical care, or anything else. While it would rule out some allocations, it would allow an immense range. If my neighbor has defective kidneys and needs dialysis in order to survive, equal shares would require that both of us, or neither of us, would be entitled to it, which of course would be nonsensical.

We can see the limits of the principle more clearly with the aid of Douglas Rae's "grammar of equality" (Rae 1981). In some situations, Eccles's best solution might be to award amounts that would provide each person with "goods" of equal value to each person. What is of "equal value to each person" might be determined by considering each person's needs, wants, satisfactions, ends, or whatever. This is ''personregarding equality." However, while intrinsic equality might seem always to require personregarding equality, sometimes Eccles might reasonably choose to award Able, Baker, and Carr equal lots, bundles, or quotas of "goods." This is lot

regarding equality. Ordinarily equality of lots will violate personregarding equality, and conversely.