In the long run, if North Korea faithfully fulfills her verification and dismantlement requirements, the construction of LWR could be resumed.
Such an expectation will serve to give Pyongyang an incentive to remain a responsible actor in the verification and dismantlement process.
Based on the above concept, the U.S./Thai bilateral exercise Cobra Gold was linked with two other existing traditional U.S. bilateral exercises—
Tandem Thrust (U.S./Australia) and Balitakan (U.S./Philippines)—into a joint exercise, “Team Challenge.”The PACOM and forces from Thailand, Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore participated in and 22 countries have observed this umbrella exercise during April and May 2001. The participating nations are linking existing exercises under Team Challenge to improve readiness and interoperability, and to increase security cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region. The multilateral framework of Team Challenge compliments the existing bilateral relationships throughout the region, and provides additional training and engagement opportunities. Team Challenge set an ambitious two-phase plan for the future development, including the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) for maritime, air and army forces among participating countries.
The focus of PACOM-led military exercises has shifted more on anti- terrorism operations especially after the September 11 incident. The prime focus of operation in Balitakan since 2002 was virtually the ‘search and destroy’ operation against the anti-governmental group Abu-Sayaff, the group suspected to have a linkage with Al-Quaida. The future premise of Team Challenge is yet to be given, but there is growing potential for the
“web”of US-led military cooperation to become an ever-solid foundation
for multilateral security cooperation. The implication for Northeast Asian security cooperation is yet to be proven, however, the web of multilateral exchange of military to military cooperation among U.S. allies and friends, China-Russia, and among the Shanghai Cooperation Organization participating states will create a future foundation of military cooperation in this region.
130-- Ken Jimbo
Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI)
Recently emerging forms of coalitions of the willing took form under the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI). The PSI was led by the Bush Administration’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2002 where ‘interdiction’ is listed first among various ‘counter-proliferation’ strategies, which, in turn, were given prominence over more traditional nonproliferation efforts. The meeting for PSI in Madrid (June 12, 2003), Brisbane (July 9-10) and Paris (September 4) developed the principles for PSI and came up with the Paris Agreement.
The membership of PSI currently comprises 17 nations. The PSI aimed at the pre-emptive interdiction, including detaining and searching ships and aircraft as soon as they enter a PSI member’s territorial waters or national airspace; denying suspicious aircraft over-flight rights; grounding planes when they stop to refuel in member countries or in states willing to cooperate on a case-by-case basis; and boarding and searching ships registered in a PSI member nation or operating under a ‘flag of convenience’ of another state prepared to authorize an interdiction in a particular instance. The White House emphasize that the PSI “reinforce, not replace”existing nonproliferation regime to curb the spread of WMD, ballistic missiles and related technology to “state and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”
On September 13 to 15, a multinational naval exercise took place in the Coral Sea on the interdiction of WMD and related materials. The exercise aimed for enhancing the collective capabilities of participants to conduct actual sea, air, and ground interdiction operations in cooperation and partnership. As part of Pacific Protector, France was providing military assets and Japan was lending Coast Guard and law enforcement capabilities, while Australia and the U.S. were supplying military equipment. Other PSI nations will participate as observers.
Pacific Protector and the exercises seek to “improve the modalities, the
processes, the standard operating procedures, the intelligence exchanges—all those things allow us to think and react and act more quickly because when you get actionable intelligence, you have to move quickly.”5) It also serves as a confidence-building measure for the PSI countries to be able to work together collectively. Japan and Singapore are the only countries in East Asia on PSI, but these norms should also be applied to Northeast Asia.
The China Factor: A Search for Strategic Convergence
An emerging feature of a foundation for regional infrastructure in East Asia could neither be distant from nor ignore the “China factor.”How then, should these developments and future prospects of the ARF and the emerging features of the coalition of the willing challenge these agendas?
The key answer may be; China itself is struggling to adjust gradually to the emerging structure of multilateral security. China’s “New Security Concept” which they first advocated in 1997 emphasizes multilateral effort referring examples of the CBMs between China and Russia on border issues and the Shanghai Security Organization (SCO) initiatives. Concepts’ “position paper” insists that China would emphasize to expand security cooperation in non- traditional fields, such as combating terrorism and transnational crimes.
China has also decided, for the first time, to send observers to the U.S.-Thai military exercise Cobra Gold in May 2002. China’s recent military contacts are increasingly richer and more flexible. China’s National Defense in 2005 stated
“China intends to selectively and gradually participate in more multilateral joint military exercises in the non-traditional fields.”
These would imply how the multilateral security cooperation and coalition of the willing could work with China and other nations in this
132-- Ken Jimbo
5) U.S. Department of State, “Pacific Exercise Stimulates on the Interdiction on the High Seas,” Washington File, September 12, 2003.
region. China, Korea, U.S., and Japan may find enough reason to expand the role of multilateral security in a different but inter-twined context.
China’s willingness to join the “coalition”in the non-traditional fields could work to set up the norms and cooperation levels without lowering the targeted cooperation agendas. The U.S. may find that the multilateral cooperation and other mechanisms could serve as a complementary framework of the alliance in more visible terms. If low-intensity conflicts, such as the case of East Timor, political crisis, and small border conflicts, could be dealt with through an autonomous framework in the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. can refrain from over-commitment in regional affairs.
Within this context, China would be able to participate in vigorously and to promote the multilateral process. This is the possible point of “strategic convergence.”This may help to create a more promising architecture for a multi-layered security network, as applied to the infrastructure of security cooperation in Northeast Asia.