China Toward Its Regional Partners, 1990-2004. The preoccupation of China with the United States in both its negative and positive directed dyad interactions with its regional partners is clear from the charts. The weighted sums of China’s directed conflict and cooperation events are from two to four times higher toward the United States than toward all other Northeast Asia countries. Sharp peaks clearly mark the various crises between China and the US over the years, including the Taiwan Straits missile tests in 1996, the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the spy plane incident in 2001.
Japan Toward Its Regional Partners, 1990-2004. Like China, Japan seems
to be preoccupied with the United States in both its negative and positive directed dyad interactions. However, since the peak score in 1994, there has been a steady decline in positive (cooperation) dyadic interactions directed toward the United States. Indeed, the level of (weighted) directed dyad events toward the U.S. has dropped as of 2004 to being barely above the other regional partners. 1995 and 2001 suggest two crises between Japan and the U.S. given the peaks on negative interactions. The first of these “crises,”however, may actually be artifacts of the Kobe earthquake, the Aum Shinrikyo subway attacks in 1995 and the “9/11”attacks in 2001.
Automated coding still has difficulty differentiating between the destruction and damage wrought by these kinds of incidents and the directed violence of an armed attack.
North Korea Toward Its Regional Partners, 1990-2004. North Korea displays a two pronged focus of attention toward the U.S. and South Korea. The rest of the regional partners are comparatively subordinated in their weighted dyadic scores. With negative or conflictual directed dyad interactions, the trends and peaks for the U.S. and South Korea seem to be independent. The positive or cooperative interactions though, seem to track better between those directed at the U.S. and South Korea, with the single exception being the sharp peak in 1994 toward the U.S., likely representing the events surrounding the non-proliferation talks.
Russia Toward Its Regional Partners, 1990-2004. Like China and Japan, Russia’s regional directed dyads are dominated by the United States. The preoccupation of Russia with the United States in both its negative and positive directed dyad interactions is clear, even as the trends diverge a bit between the positive (high in the mid-1990s) and the negative (increasingly so over time, with the exception of 2003 and 2004 that show a large drop in negative scores). Even more than Japan and China the directed conflict and cooperation events are from two to five times higher toward the United States than toward all other Northeast Asia countries.
64-- Doug Bond
South Korea Toward Its Regional Partners, 1990-2004. South Korea’s negative dyadic interactions are pretty much balanced across its regional partners with the significant exception of a peak toward North Korea in 1996 and another toward both the U.S. and North Korea in 2002. On the positive interactions, South Korea’s focus is for the most part two pronged toward the U.S. and North Korea, but with a twist; the two track relatively well until 1998 when an inverse relationship is evident.
United States Toward Its Regional Partners, 1990-2004. The United States displays the most complex directed dyads, with China and Japan consistently receiving a lot of attention. Not surprisingly, the U.S. directs the least amount of negative attention toward South Korea, where the U.S.
has troops close to a heavily armed border. However, the U.S. also directs a very low amount of positive attention toward South Korea, about on par with North Korea. The structural asymmetry of the U.S.-ROK relationship seems to stand out in this context.
Conclusion
Returning to the key questions posed above, it appears from the trends revealed in the charts that Japan’s dyadic interactions (both negative and positive) directed at South Korea are relatively subordinate to the totality of Japan’s directed dyad interaction in the region. South Korea, on the other hand, from time to time elevates its negative interactions toward Japan. Given the oppressor-oppressed relationship early in the 19th century it is understandable that latent animosity would appear more often in South Korea’s directed dyad interactions than in Japan’s. This suggests that the historical legacy between Korea and Japan may not be as relevant to South Korean-Japanese interactions into the future, at least for Japan. It is reasonable to conclude that the pragmatic concerns of
realpolitik,10)particularly with respect to China’s ascendancy, are already driving the patterns of conflict and cooperation in Northeast Asia. We can see evidence of this pragmatism in the cooperative dyadic interactions emphasis the US places on China, Japan and Russia over both South and North Korea. China’s overwhelming attention to the U.S. supports this view as well. And Japan’s steady decline in cooperative dyadic interactions directed at the U.S. also portends a pragmatic shift in emphasis toward China.
When confronted with a common threat such as abandonment or constraints imposed by the United States, a longstanding ally for both Japan and South Korea, economic interests in the region are likely to prevail over old wounds. If pragmatic politics ultimately drive Northeast Asia’s regional alliances and subsequent interactions, and if the sheer size of China’s economy continues to draw the attention of major powers, we are likely to see a continuation of the regional integration in all sectors, including the gradual engagement of North Korea. However, the transition from an isolated, totalitarian state to a regional partner is not likely to be without disruption. Thus the shared interests of its neighbors are likely to shape the regional alliances as much as China’s ascendancy as they seek to consolidate and advance their economic prosperity. Since armed conflict is antithetical to this end, it is a regional imperative to deal swiftly with the cracks in the edifice (i.e. the many issues surrounding the North Korean refugees), that can lead to both national and regional instability.
66-- Doug Bond
10) See Cha (1999), particularly his “quasi-alliance” concept, for an advocacy of realism as the still dominate driving influence in Northeast Asia.
Figure 3-1. China’s Country Stability, 1990-2004
Figure 3-2. China’s Negative Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
Figure 3-3. China’s Positive Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
Figure 3-4. Japan’s Country Stability, 1990-2004
68-- Doug Bond
Figure 3-5. Japan’s Negative Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
Figure 3-6. Japan’s Positive Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
Figure 3-7. North Korea’s Country Stability, 1990-2004
Figure 3-8. North Korea’s Negative Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
70-- Doug Bond
Figure 3-9. North Korea’s Positive Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
Figure 3-10. Russia’s Country Stability, 1990-2004
Figure 3-11. Russia’s Negative Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
Figure 3-12. Russia’s Positive Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
72-- Doug Bond
Figure 3-13. South Korea’s Country Stability, 1990-2004
Figure 3-14. South Korea’s Negative Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
Figure 3-15. South Korea’s Positive Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
Figure 3-16. United States’ Country Stability, 1990-2004
74-- Doug Bond
Figure 3-17. United State’s Negative Dyadic Events, 1990-2004
Figure 3-18. United State’s Positive Dyadic Events, 1990-2004