Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue
The peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is essential to cooperation in Northeast Asia. First of all, North Korea should comply with the principle of nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The North’s development of nuclear weapons cannot be tolerated as it threatens peace on the Peninsula and stability in Northeast Asia. The North should return to the NPT regime and abide by the Safeguard Agreements of the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that bans the development of nuclear weapons and possession of facilities for plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment.
Second, the nuclear issue must be resolved peacefully through dialogue.
The tensions that could arise in the course of the issue’s settlement negatively impact on the Korean Peninsula and throughout Northeast Asia. In particular, military options would bring a catastrophic disaster to the Peninsula. Peaceful solutions should therefore be found to the nuclear problem through a variety of channels including multilateral and inter- Korean talks, which persuade North Korea that the peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue will ultimately contribute to guaranteeing the regime’s safety and revitalizing its moribund economy.
Third, South Korea should play an active role in resolving the nuclear standoff. The South should build a consensus on a solution to the nuclear problem among the U.S., Japan, China, Russia, and the rest of the world through various dialogue channels. The South should use this consensus to induce the North to the negotiation table.
78-- Jong-Chul Park
Arms Control and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia
To control arms in Northeast Asia, the following factors should be taken into consideration. Firstly, arms control in Northeast Asia should be pursued on a gradual basis due to the regional countries’ lack experience in multilateral talks. Secondly, nonproliferation efforts in this region should be focused on controlling arms at sea given the importance of the oceans in Northeast Asia. Thirdly, the respective scope of arms control for Chinese, Russian, and U.S. military forces should be determined. Fourth, weapons systems that would be subject to reduction should be selected. In Europe, the marine forces were excluded as the arms control in Europe was focused on the land and air forces. But in Northeast Asia, the maritime forces weapon systems should be included in the reduction. Fifth, the ceilings of weapons systems and forces that are allowed for each country should be set. This would prove to be the biggest challenge.
Meanwhile, multilateral security cooperation for the stabilization of Northeast Asia will generate a comprehensive security including not only the traditional military security but also economic, environmental, and human rights issues. At the same time, multilateral security pursues cooperation in promoting mutual security benefits and preventing as well as seeking solutions to regional conflicts. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a multilateral security body, applies the concept of “comprehensive and cooperative”security to resolving post- Cold War strife and preventing conflicts.
In Northeast Asia, the historical absence of a multilateral security body, conflicting interests, disparities in national powers, tendencies towards bilateral relationships, mutual misunderstandings among countries, and accusations at neighboring countries over past wrongdoings are all obstacles to forming a multilateral security cooperation regime. In this vein, security cooperation in this region will develop differently from that in Europe.
Firstly, considering the significance of bilateral relations in Northeast
Asia, bilateral confidence building and military cooperation are the first priorities. In a region such as Northeast Asia that lacks the conditions for multilateral security cooperation, improved bilateral security cooperation can promote a more favorable environment for multilateral collaboration on security issues. The exchange visits of high-ranking U.S. and Chinese military officials to their counterparts’ military bases, the U.S.-China Deputy-Ministerial-level Military Council, and the U.S.-Japan Security Council are good examples of measures to enhance bilateral military cooperation.
Secondly, security cooperation in Northeast Asia should be pursued as a complement, not as a replacement, to existing bilateral alliances. However, progress in multilateral security cooperation will be followed by adjustments to the bilateral alliances. Exclusive traditional bilateral alliances should shift focus from targeting a common enemy to seeking shared security benefits within a framework of multilateral security cooperation. Efforts should therefore be made to adjust the ROK-U.S.
alliance, the ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, and security cooperation in Northeast Asia to complement one another.
Thirdly, the “Track II” approach of making initial progress in multilateral security talks led by NGOs is desirable given the difficulty of opening formal dialogue channels between governments. Security cooperation talks among NGOs arguably have their own limitations in agenda and ways of discussing issues. Such talks would be little more than exchanges of opinions. Establishing binding guidelines is also difficult.
Moreover, even if civilian-level security cooperation made headway, strong political will is necessary to upgrade the civilian talks to formal, inter-governmental dialogue. Nonetheless, civilian-level security cooperation talks can lay the groundwork for government-level multilateral security cooperation in light of the conflicting security interests among the regional countries.
80-- Jong-Chul Park
Economic Cooperation between the Two Koreas and in Northeast Asia The formation of an inter-Korean economic community is closely related to economic cooperation in Northeast Asia that is expected to provide the necessary resources and markets. Measures should be sought to secure finances and international support for economic cooperation projects between the two Koreas by linking the inter-Korean network of infrastructure to that of Northeast Asia. Uncertainties can be reduced by advancing inter-Korean economic cooperation in the context of Northeast Asian economic cooperation. In addition, ways should be found to promote benefits that can be shared by the regional countries as well as the two Koreas under the cooperative regime in Northeast Asia. In particular, regional countries should aid North Korea and work within the Northeast Asian cooperative framework to develop the North Korean economy. The regional countries should offer the momentum necessary for North Korean reform and liberalization by including it in establishing the Northeast Asian network of logistics and energy.