The inadequacies of the traditional models to capture some developments in contemporary international politics gave rise to alternative models. Huntington (1999) posited that the models employed to analyse and understand international politics (unipolar, bipolar and multipolar) were insufficient to explain contemporary global politics. According to him, the United States is the only super power but that does not translate to a unipolar global framework. He maintained that the United States is the sole state which dominates in all components of power. However, major issues at the global stage are settled by the sole super power in conjunction with other major powers. He called this “uni-multipolar”. In a unipolar configuration, there exists one super power, there are no consequential major powers; however, there are several minor powers. This enables the super power to unilaterally take major decisions in the international arena without the challenge of a state or group of states. Huntington argued that this configuration was exemplified by Rome and China in East Asia. There are two super powers in a bipolar configuration. Issues in international politics reflect the relation between the two super powers as each super power champions a bloc and endeavours to increase its sphere of influence by wooing the non-aligned states. In a multipolar order, there are many major powers of relatively equal power capabilities that cooperate and compete with each other depending on how the issues promote or jeopardise
34
their interests. Major decisions of international consequence are taken by the coalition of the major states. This was evident in European politics for many centuries. Today’s global power configuration differs from all these aforementioned models. According to Huntington,
Contemporary international politics does not fit any of these three models. It is instead a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers. The settlement of key international issues requires action by the single superpower but always with some combination of other major states; the single superpower can, however, veto action on key issues by combinations of other states. (1999, p.36)
Even though the United States holds preponderance of power, there are major powers at a lower level that not only exert their dominance at the regional level but also wield influence at the global arena. However, the United States enjoys more influence than these states. He argued that countries like Germany, France, Russia, China, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria fall in this category. In the third stratum are “secondary regional powers whose interests often conflict with the more powerful regional states” (Huntington, 1999, p. 36). He argued that Britain, Ukraine, Japan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Argentina belong to this category.
While the most powerful actors in the unipolar, bipolar and multipolar configurations strive for the sustenance of the systems, there is contrary systemic behavior in the uni-multipolar order.
According to Huntington,
In a uni-multipolar system, this is less true. The United States would clearly prefer a unipolar system in which it would be the hegemon and often acts as if such a system existed. The major powers, on the other hand, would prefer a multipolar system in which they could pursue their interests, unilaterally and collectively, without being subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the stronger superpower. They feel threatened by what they see as the American pursuit of global hegemony.
American officials feel frustrated by their failure to achieve that hegemony. None of the principal power-wielders in world affairs is happy with the status quo. (1999, p. 37)
While the United States was able to act decisively and unilaterally in the global arena in the unipolar moment, it can no longer exercise such enormous power in today’s world. Therefore, economic sanctions and military intervention are now often employed by Washington to attain its objectives. Sanctions require the support of other states to be successful. However, states are often reluctant to support the sanctions which prompts the United States either to unilaterally impose them (which jeopardises its economic interests and its cordial ties with its allies) or choose not to impose them, “in which case they become symbols of American weakness”
(Huntington, 199, p. 39). The emergence of a counter hegemonic coalition is not feasible in a unipolar structure as a result of the inability of the other states to challenge the dominant power.
35
It erupts in a multipolar order, if other states feel threatened by the capacity and behaviour of a state. However, it is a constant feature of a uni-multipolar world.
Huntington identified the effects of uni-multipolar order on the United States foreign policy.
Firstly, it makes the United States realise that the unipolar moment is over, as is evident in the collaborative efforts required from other major powers to take major decisions at the global arena. Secondly, policies to promote benign hegemony (wherein American interests coincide with the interests of the rest of the world) must be abandoned. Seldom do American policies promote public goods; more often than not, they do not because of the moralistic tendencies of the American policies and, more importantly, because the United States is the sole super power whose interests may sometimes conflict with other states’ interests. Thirdly, as the sole super power, the United States must marshal its resources to generate cooperation among the other states to take actions on global issues in a way that promote America’s interests. Finally, the interplay of power and culture is significant in transatlantic relations.
Huntington has observed:
Virtually all major regional powers are increasingly asserting themselves to promote their own distinct interests, which often conflict with those of the United States. Global politics has thus moved from the bipolar system of the Cold War through a unipolar moment – highlighted by the Gulf War – and is now passing through one or two uni-multipolar decades before it enters a truly multipolar 21st century. (1999, p. 37)
Haass (2008) suggested that the reality of the 21st century international politics can be interpreted through the prism of what he termed “nonpolarity”. He defined nonpolarity as a world in which both state and non-state actors play active roles in determining global outcomes, a world dominated not by one or two or even several states, but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power: “Power is now found in many hands and in many places” (p.
45). Unlike the multipolar order which is characterised with few polar states that influence the pattern of global politics, the nonpolar order has many centres with significant power. Even though contemporary global structure of power seems like a multipolar system particularly when one considers the power capabilities of the dominant actors like China, the European Union (EU), India, Japan, Russia and the United States which account for 80 percent and 75 percent of the world’s military budget and gross domestic product respectively. However, the realities of contemporary international politics reveals that power is more diffused as many power centres
36
exist, among which are the non-state actors. For him, states have lost their primacy at the global stage. His line of argument is informative enough to deserve an elaborate quotation:
Indeed, one of the cardinal features of the contemporary international system is that nation-states have lost their monopoly on power and in some domains their preeminence as well. States are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of non governmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations. Power is now found in many hands and in many places. In addition to the six major world powers, there are numerous regional powers: Brazil and, arguably, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela in Latin America;
Nigeria and South Africa in Africa; Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East; Pakistan in South Asia; Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea in East Asia and Oceania. A good many organizations would be on the list of power centers, including those that are global (the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, the World Bank), those that are regional (the African Union, the Arab League, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the EU, the Organization of American States, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and those that are functional (the International Energy Agency, OPEC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the World Health Organization). So, too, would states within nation-states, such as California and India's Uttar Pradesh, and cities, such as New York, S ao Paulo, and Shanghai. Then there are the large global companies, including those that domi nate the worlds of energy, finance, and manufacturing. Other entities (45) deserving inclusion would be global media outlets (al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN), militias (Hamas, Hezbollah, the Mahdi Army, the Taliban), political parties, religious institutions and movements, terrorist organizations (al Qaeda), drug cartels, and NGOs of a more benign sort (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Doctors Without Borders, Greenpeace). (Haass, 2008, pp. 45-46)
Rather than power being concentrated, it is widely distributed in the contemporary international system. The United States still remains the dominant power in the global configuration as is evident in its second to none military spending and its economy being the largest in the globe. In addition, Washington is the master of soft power particularly in the realm of culture. However, the wide postulation about the United States decline is a reality. The American status in the international system has been under decline. “The reality of American strength should not mask the relative decline of the United States' position in the world – and with this relative decline in power an absolute decline in influence and independence” (Haass, 2008, p. 46). The economic decline is manifested in the United States percentage in global imports and the projected dominance of the Asian powers in the world’s GDP following the recorded high growth rates in these Asian countries, “a large number of which are growing at more than two or three times the rate of the United States” (Haass, 2008, p. 46). Also, the dollar hegemony in the international economy is under threat. The euro and pound are stronger than the dollar in terms of the value of the currencies. Most of the world’s foreign exchange holdings are currently in other currencies, not the dollar. The dominance the dollar enjoys in the international oil market may also be later challenged by other currencies. This will further weaken the United States economy. In the military sphere, the September 11 attacks have illustrated that there is a gap between military
37
spending and military capacity. Relatively little military spending by the terrorist group caused enormous and memorable damage to the dominant state in the world. According to Haas:
Power and influence are less and less linked in an era of nonpolarity. US calls for others to reform will tend to fall on deaf ears, US assistance programs will buy less, and US-led sanctions will accomplish less. After all, China proved to be the country best able to influence North Korea's nuclear program.
Washington's ability to pressure Tehran has been strengthened by the participation of several western European countries-and weakened by the reluctance of China and Russia to sanction Iran. (2008, p. 47).
While the emergence of other great powers, powerful organisations and the United States’
misguided policies have contributed to the rise of nonpolarity, globalisation has played a prominent role in shaping the global structure of power. Globalisation has turned the world into a global village as is evident in the movement of drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, goods, viruses, weapons and people across the world with little or no hindrance. Globalisation particularly facilitates nonpolarity in two ways. Firstly, states cannot totally monitor activities within their boundaries as social activities are now less constrained by geographical boundaries. This weakens the influence of the great powers. Secondly, the free movement empowers the non-state actors like energy exporters who have been able to amass wealth and terrorists who utilise the internet to recruit and train members. In today’s reality, the strongest state in the international system does not have a monopoly on the use of force and its global influence is widely checked.
Individuals and groups are becoming more and more powerful and influential on the global stage. Threats from terrorist groups, rogue states and energy producers will be a constant feature of the nonpolar world.
Grevi (2009, p. 9) identified the two sources of change at the global arena. Firstly, the emergence of new great powers in the international system has tilted the global structure of power to a multipolar order. Secondly, unprecedented interdependence which determines the prosperity and security of the major players and the entire international system. Even though these trends are not entirely new at the global arena, , the intensity with which they manifest in today’s world has been unprecedented. These trends will significantly shape contemporary global politics. Grevi described the current international system as an age of “interpolarity” which he defined as
“multipolarity in the age of interdependence”. He argued that multipolarity is not suitable to describe the emerging international system as climate change, terrorism and proliferation of
38
nuclear weapons are menaces that require the collaborative efforts of the globe which is outside the scope of multipolarity. According to Grevi:
Interpolarity is arguably a better illustration of the international system in the making than multipolarity, as it captures the shifting balance of power and the ensuing geopolitical tensions while highlighting the fact that the prosperity and security of all the major powers are interconnected as never before. On the other hand, it suggests a set of guidelines for the reform of global governance structures based on the respective interests of the main global and regional powers and on the potential for their convergence around concrete policy issues. As such, interpolarity is interest-based, problem- driven and process-oriented, as it focuses on the frameworks and procedures that could help bring about cooperative solutions to shared challenges (2009, p. 9)
After the September 11 attacks on the United States, the influence of Washington around the world has been weakened. The United States’ influence in today’s world is not commensurate with its power capabilities primarily as a result of a rapid decline in its international image following the unilateral policies of Bush’s administration and “the shifting balance of power in the international system” (Grevi, 2009, p. 11). These two issues significantly undermine American global dominance. The first source of decline can be checked, if the United States pursues pragmatic foreign policy that will redeem its image across the globe. However, the second factor, aided by the United States-born 2008 financial and economic crisis, appears to be unstoppable.
The “asymmetric distribution of power” is an important driving force in contemporary international politics. The nature of the distribution prevents the major powers from employing unilateralism in the pursuit of their interests in the global arena. The implication of this is that collaborative efforts in the pursuit of state interests will be a significant feature of the forthcoming order. “Three issues lie at the core of global interdependence, namely the economy, energy and the environment” (Grevi, 2009, p. 24). How these issues and the curtailment of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are handled by the international community will define the course of the 21st century. The financial crisis that had its roots in the United States but had a global effect, signifies the extent of interdependence across the globe.
“Multipolarity and deepening interdependence” will shape the international politics of the 21st century. If multipolarity has not fully emerged, its full-blown emergence is irreversible. What may appear to be a subject of debate is the nature of the multipolar order. Will it be confrontational, competitive or cooperative? While all these factors may manifest in the multipolar order, the promotion of cooperation is crucial most especially with issues that require
39
the collaborative efforts of states such as economic, security and environmental factors.
Interpolarity describes this order. According to Grevi:
Interpolarity differs from multipolarity given its focus on the challenges of interdependence and it differs from nonpolarity because it puts the accent on the relations between large state actors, while not neglecting the importance of trans-national relations. (2009, p.28)
Interpolarity advocates collaborative efforts among states towards addressing fundamental issues such as economic, security and environmental concerns in the global arena. It argues that the interests of the major powers converge in these spheres. No single state, irrespective of how big or powerful, can single-handedly resolve these issues. Challenges that arise from energy security, development, food security and migration flows will shape international relations in the contemporary world. In this regard, interpolarity is “interest-based and problem-driven” (Grevi, 2009, p. 28)