There seems to be general consensus among scholars of international politics that the 21st century is witnessing a transformation in terms of how power is distributed and how the emerging powers and other middle powers are becoming more assertive in decisions of international and global consequence. In other words, the relative decline of the United States has provided the platform for other powerful states to become more assertive as expected of global players in the international system. According to a Nigerian scholar, for over five hundred years the international order has been shaped by the overwhelming military and economic superiority of the West. But the world is not static. Nothing lasts forever under conditions of globalisation and since the turn of the new century, various scholars have begun to rethink the future shape of the world order. Their conclusions are that the old western world is fast losing its privileged position as new actors, most notably, but not only, in Asia, begin to assert themselves. As a result, one of the greatest power shifts in history is underway with consequences that could prove to be critical to international affairs in the 21st century. International politics is presently being shaped by a challenging combination of processes of structural change occurring simultaneously and interacting in all manner of complicated ways: financial crisis (a largely Western crisis brought about by neoliberal excess and with economic growth a severe challenge for the US, Japan and nearly all major European economies and a problem at least for the rest of the global economy);
shifting economic power (characterised by the rise of countries like China, India, Brazil and others too); and environmental threat (the eventual realisation that climate change is both real and accelerating and questioning of the ongoing viability of traditional notions of economic growth and indeed of society itself).41
While the United States has no rival in the military realm, the competition from other states mostly manifests in the economic arena as illustrated by the constant economic growth experienced by these countries and the resilience of their economies during the 2008 financial crisis. Notably among these states are the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China).
41 An interview with Nigerian scholar 1
138
Regarding the waning of American global hegemony and the power shift in global politics, Zakaria (2011) observed that within a particular month in 2008, India and Brazil openly challenged the United States at the Doha trade talks, Russia invaded and annexed parts of Georgia like South Ossetia and Abkhazia and China successfully hosted the most glamorous and expensive Olympic Games ever. Zakaria (2011) further argued that a decade ago, none of those states had the wherewithal to exercise such assertiveness and competence. His observation sheds light on the realities of the 21st century global politics. While the BRIC countries usually act collectively to pursue their interests in the global arena, sometimes they engage in bilateral relations in the pursuit of their agenda, most evident in some of China and Russia’s positions at the United Nations Security Council, whereby they maintain stances which are contrary to the interests of the United States and its allies. It is within this context that the Iranian nuclear programme under President Mahmood Ahmadinejad, the Syrian crisis and possibly the Ukrainian crisis can be located. Finally, each country also acts individually when the need arises to promote vital interests.
The unfolding power shift has been tagged to the rise of the rest. It is worthy to note that the most fundamental rise has been in Asia, most especially in China and India. It must also be emphasised that the apparent recent “rise” of Asia is an incorrect assumption: in the mid- eighteenth century already, Asia accounted for over 50% of the world’s population and products and China was the largest economy. It may be more accurate therefore to describe the “recovery”
of Asia which was triggered by Japan, following the Meiji Revolution and manifested in South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia, and currently exemplified by China and India as the contemporary power houses of the global economy (Nye, 2011). Against this backdrop, an Indian scholar observed that: “The past two centuries of Western domination of world history are the exception, not the rule, during two thousand years of global history” (Renard, 2009, p. 9).
Against this background, this chapter seeks to investigate the capabilities of the BRICS countries with the exception of South Africa.42 In doing this, it explores both the hard power and soft power resources of these states and identifies China as the most important BRIC state with the
42 While South Africa is also a powerful force in the international arena particularly with the enormous influence it wields within the African continent, it is not a great power like the other BRIC members. Thus, South Africa lags behind in its soft power and hard power currencies incomparison to the other BRIC members and consequently does not wield much influence in the global arena.
139
capacity to possibly challenge the hegemony of the United States in the international system. To this end, the chapter investigates the degree to which China wields its soft power currencies in Africa and the Middle East. The chapter concludes that the BRIC members’ pursuit of individual interests at the expense of collective interests is a major impediment to the objective of the bloc to distort the balance of power and possibly create a true multipolar system.
5,2 BRICs
The acronym BRIC refers to the states of Brazil, Russia, India and China and was coined by Jim O’ Neill, a Goldman Sachs investment and banking firm employee, in 2001 in his paper The World Needs Better Global Economic BRICs. He argued that these countries are emerging powers in the international system and projects that they will significantly shape the future global economy (Skak, 2011). In less than a decade after O’Neill’s postulation, BRIC became a political reality as the four countries held their first summit in Russia in 2009. BRIC countries continued to make tremendous progress in their contribution to the global economy. By the end of 2000, the BRIC countries accounted for close to 8 percent of the global economy (O’Neill, 2001, p. 3). In 2009, these countries accounted for 15.5 percent of the world’s GDP (Renard, 2009, p. 21). Renard further projected that in 2050, the size of China’s nominal GDP would probably double the size of the United States and that of India could equal the size of America (Renard, 2009, p. 22). Renard’s observation clearly reinforces the ascendance of the BRIC countries, most especially China and India, in the global economy.
Unlike the Western countries’ economies that have generally been affected by stagnant or slow growth rate and also been battered by the financial crisis, the BRIC countries have maintained a high growth rate and have coped better with the financial crisis. In other words, the BRIC economies, most especially the Chinese economy, proved to be more resilient during the crisis.
This explains why President Obama has argued that “our generation’s Sputnik moment is back”
(Skak, 2011, p. 2). While the rise of the rest is not limited to the rise of the BRIC countries, as countries like Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and South Africa are also rising, the impact of the BRIC countries on global growth dwarfs the significance of these other countries in the world economy.
Countries like China, India, Brazil and even South Africa are emergent powers with influence and followership in this changing system. With this development, the powers of the United States are gradually, but surely declining. It is logical to argue that we now have multiple centres of power in the
140
global system. Power is presently shifting, especially in terms of economic power to China, India, South Korea in Asia, to Germany and Russia in Europe and to Brazil in South America. These are therefore, emerging centres of power, reflected in the composition of the BRICs states.43
In illustrating the significance of BRICs in the global market, Renard (2009, p. 23) was of the opinion that from 2000 to 2007, the BRIC countries accounted for 27 percent of global growth, more than that of the United States. The states of South Korea, Mexico and Indonesia could only account for 5.5 percent. Similarly, in Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World the National Intelligence Council (2008) projected that between 2040-2050, Brazil, Russia, India and China would equal the G7 share of the World GDP and by 2025 the world’s largest economies would be the United States, China, India, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Russia, in that order. While Brazil and Russia are large suppliers of natural resources and raw materials, China and India are the world’s manufacturing warehouses. No doubt the BRICs form a force in the international system and have been playing active roles in multilateral organisations particularly in the G20 and other initiatives. These countries have shown their capacity to shape the world economy and the structure of power in the international system.
At this point, it is imperative to highlight the rationale for the emergence of BRICs. This is important in that, despite the divergence in the international behaviour between the BRIC countries, they cooperate in some respects in the international system. In this light, the primary objective of the BRIC countries is to distort the western dominated international order in order to have more influence in determining decisions of international consequence. In other words, the BRIC countries seek to put an end to the United States hegemonic position and create a world in which their voices can be heard. The ultimate consequence of this is a tilting of the structure of power from a unipolar order, or illusion of a unipolar system, to a multipolar global framework.
This attitude towards the West, especially the United States, is attributed to September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States soil and the subsequent war on terrorism. The United States unilateral posture in the war in Iraq, despite its overwhelming condemnation by other states in the international system and the United Nations, revealed to the BRIC nations the need to balance the power of the United States. The prevalent view among these countries was that if the United States was not tamed, it could assume the role of an empire by using similar force against
43 An interview with a Nigerian bureaucrat
141
other countries in the international system that are threatening its interests (Laidi, 2011). This explains why the BRIC countries portray themselves as defenders of states’ sovereignty.
Undoubtedly, the strength of BRICs to meaningfully shape the structure of power lies in its pursuit of collective interests which manifest in approaches to climate change, world trade negotiations and working towards creating a global financial institution in which their voices can be better heard as the emerging economic power houses in the world (Pant, 2013). They collectively oppose the United States global hegemony and disapprove of the United States projection of its military power around the world as demonstrated by the United States war in Iraq (Pant, 2013). In calling and working towards multipolarity in the international system, they seek to reduce meaningfully the dominance of the United States. They are sovereignty hawks which strive to thwart the United States’ attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. They seek to defend the sovereignty of the states in the international system irrespective of regime. They disapprove of international intervention in the Arab states engulfed by revolution (Laidi, 2011). The BRIC countries have strongly opposed the 1998 American air bombardment of Iraq, the 1999 US championed air strikes in Yugoslavia, the 2003 US war on terrorism in Iraq and the 2011 United States led intervention in Libya (Pant, 2013).
The BRIC countries have also made it a policy to speak in one voice in forums such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and in global trade negotiations in order to promote their interests which might be contrary to that of the West, particularly the United States (Pant, 2013). The BRIC countries, excluding Russia, formed a bloc in 2009 at the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change to veto the Western blueprint for environmental protection. This was done in the belief that the Western proposed policy might be to their detriment (Pant, 2013). In July 2014, the BRICS countries established the BRICS development bank which will lend investment money to developing nations, thus assuming a responsibility similar to that of the IMF and World Bank.
This clearly shows that the BRICS nations are detaching themselves from the Western dominated international institutions and creating other institutions where they can be more effective in determining global outcomes.
However, the weakness of BRIC lies in the pursuit of individual states’ interests in comparison to collective interests. Collectively, they can challenge American dominance in the international
142
system. However, individual members of the association relate cordially with the United States on issues of strategic and national significance even when such action jeopardises the collective interests of BRIC (Laidi, 2011, p.7). The emergence of Mrs Lagarde as the successor of Dominique Strauss-Kahn as the head of the IMF is of interest in this regard. Brazil and China especially did not support the candidate from Mexico (who in a sense represented the emerging markets) owing to their national interests. From the perspective of Brazil, the decision was informed by the rivalry between Brazil and Mexico, while China had the option to either support the candidacy of an emerging market or assume the number two IMF position; China opted for the latter (Laidi, 2011). Similarly, like many other states, the BRIC countries have been vocal in the call for reform of the United Nations in order to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the institution. However, the call for the reform of the permanent members of the security council to reflect the realities of the 21st century world politics with the possibility of states like India and Brazil becoming permanent members have been frustrated by China and Russia (Pant, 2013). China and Russia value their exclusive status and its attendant influence as permanent members of the Security Council and are not willing to share that status with the other BRIC members. Therefore, rather than China and India, it has been the United States that has promised to support India in its quest for a permanent seat in the Security Council (Pant, 2013).
Russia, like the other BRIC countries, values its membership of this bloc because it serves as a platform in which the resurgent power can engage in multilateralism in the international system particularly in its areas of weakness. However, it seeks to avoid the multilateral approach in areas where it enjoys considerable strength. Thus Russia has not supported the enlargement of the Security Council because it does not want to share the influence that accompanies that status.
Moreover, it sees its membership of this exclusive club as one of the fundamental sources of its power aside from its nuclear arsenal (Ladi, 2011). Russia also has considerable interest in ensuring the continual existence of the G8 despite the emergence of the G20 which apparently subsumed the original group (Ladi, 2011).
China sees itself as the major competitor to the United States. Paradoxically, it seeks to have a robust partnership with America, particularly in the realm of trade. To this end, China’s values its competitive and cooperative relations with America and endeavours to prevent other states from enjoying similar relations with the United States (Ladi, 2011). Like Russia, China is also
143
against the enlargement of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. While it is not limited to this, this is borne out of the likelihood of India’s emergence as one of the new permanent members of the council (Ladi, 2011). With the realisation that Russia and China might thwart Brazil’s global ambition most especially its pursuit of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, Brazil has sought to find alternative ways to promote its interests.
For instance, in his address on Brazil’s external relations, the head of Brazilian diplomacy conspicuously made reference to IBSA rather than BRIC, even on issues as fundamental to global politics as the Syrian crisis (Ladi, 2011). Similarly the bureaucrat had been reported to have argued that what constitutes Brazil’s power and influence is different from that of China and Russia (Ladi, 2011).
The pursuit of individual rather than collective interests is not surprising because these countries have divergent capabilities and as a result each member can influence global outcomes to varying degrees. Brazil is endowed with vast natural resources and huge agricultural land and it is widely considered to be the strongest BRIC soft power. However, it has weak military power.
Russia is no doubt a military power and boasts the highest number of nuclear warheads among the nuclear powers but its economy and soft power are not commensurate with its status as a great power. India also possesses considerable military capability with a fast growing economy but has a very antagonistic neighbour in Pakistan. China has a very large and growing economy with relatively strong military power and is also trying to boost its soft power. However, it lacks raw materials and energy (Bertonha, 2010).
Against this background, it is worth assessing the power profile and the international behaviour of each member of the BRIC countries.