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regional policies. “Today, China’s soft power is dependent on the following three resources: the Chinese developmental model, foreign policy centered on peaceful rise or peaceful development theories, and Chinese civilization” (Cho & Jeong, 2008, p. 461). Among others, policies implemented to attract countries in Southeast Asia include aid, enrolment of international students and playing an active role in regional organisations like the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Chinese rapid economic growth has also largely contributed to China’s influence and image in the region. Cho and Jeong (2008) examined and analysed various surveys such as the Pew Research Centre and the BBC World Service Poll to illustrate a massive improvement of China’s image in Asia.
Against this background, few scholars have tried to examine soft sources of power. What is missing in their studies is a comparative analysis of the dominant states’ soft power as scholarly analyses on the issue are often limited to a single country (dominant power) case. This research seeks to fill this gap by examining the soft power of the United States and China in Africa and the Middle East. The research seeks to give a balanced view of the structure of power by examining both the hard and soft sources of power of the dominant states in international politics, particularly the United States and China.
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inevitability of wars among states. The anarchic nature of the international system encourages states to acquire weapons to guarantee their safety. The acquisition of weapons by a state threatens the security of other states (security dilemma). This creates an arms race as states build arsenals to ensure their safety as they cannot rely on the help of other states for their security (self-help system). Realism is arguably too broad for this study and there are other theories that address more specifically its subject matter.
Power transition theory explains the occurrence of wars among the major powers in the international system. It emphasises the almost indispensability of war between great powers that possess almost equal capability. War is most likely when a rising power contests or overtakes a declining hegemon. The challenger strives to distort the rules of the international system in its favour. The declining hegemon attempts to maintain the status quo. The conflictual interests eventually lead to war between the two powers (Chan, 2004). In their explanation of power transition theory, Goldstein and Pevehouse (2008, p. 56) revealed that “the largest wars result from challenges to the top position in the status hierarchy when rising power is surpassing (or threatening to surpass) the most powerful state”. With respect to the relevance of this theory to the study, it is not too clear, on one hand, if China will be able to surpass the United States’
status as the most important actor in the international system. On the other hand, the overthrow of the United States by China as the dominant power may not necessarily be conflictual, particularly in an age of interdependence.
Hegemony stability theory posits that hegemony establishes an order that can be likened to a central government in the international system: mitigating anarchy, deterring aggression and promoting free trade. The hegemon holds preponderance of power and can unilaterally take decisions of global consequence. This theory ascribes the peace and prosperity that ensued after World War II to US hegemony (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008, p. 58). Hegemony exists in a unipolar world as no state can lay claim to hegemony in a bipolar or multipolar configuration.
Thus, this theory does not apply to this study because in the contemporary international system, the hegemonic status of the United States is, to a great extent, rapidly fading, if it has not already completely faded. Emerging powers are becoming more assertive in expressing positions that are contrary to the interest of the United States, as exemplified by the current standstill in the United Nations with regard to the Syrian war.
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This research will rely on the balance of power theory9 and multilateralism as its theoretical and conceptual frameworks respectively. The balance of power is central to the realist’s interpretation of the international system and is the most dominant theory in international relations in general (Wohlforth et al., 2007). According to Morgenthau (1985, p. 183), the balance of power is linked to the power-seeking nature of a state for the preservation or distortion of the status quo. He contended that the system attains “equilibrium” when there is stability. If the equilibrium is distorted by an “outside force” or by an actor or actors in the system, the system shows a tendency to re-establish either the original or a new equilibrium.
The aspiration of power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to the policies that aim at preventing it.Morgenthau (1985, p. 183)
Morgenthau identified armaments and alliances as significant features of the balance of power.
In order to have the capacity to either maintain or distort the distribution of power in global politics, states embark on amassing weapons and deploying military forces which trigger an arms race between them. This necessitates that military hardware gulps a large share of national budget. It also engenders fear, suspicion and security.
It is in recognition of situations such as these that, since the end of the Napoleonic wars, repeated attempts have been made to create a stable balance of power, if not to establish permanent peace, by means of the proportionate disarmament of competing nations. (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 196)
Alliances formation is an integral part of the balance of power in an international system that comprises many states. A state’s decision to join or not join an alliance usually reflects
“expediency” rather than “principle”. A state will see no need for an alliance if the state has the capacity to effectively pursue its interests at the global level without the help of other states.
Morgenthau argued:
Nations A and B, competing with each other, have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They can increase their own power, they can add to their own power the power of other nations, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. When they make the first choice, they embark upon an armaments race. When they choose the second and third alternatives, they pursue a policy of alliances. (Morgenthau, 1985, p.197)
Rosenau and Durfee (1995, p. 21) posited that the balance of power serves as a mechanism for the maintenance of stability in the international system. States behaviour is usually shaped by the structure of power (polarity) in the international system. “Although the functions of balance of
9 In an anarchic international system, where states cannot always rely on the help of others for survival (self-help system), states embark on balancing against the most powerful state or coalition of states.
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power remains constant irrespective of the polarity of the international system, polarity does affect the actual implementation of the balance” (Rosenau & Durfee, 1995, p. 23). The behavioural pattern is manifested through the system of balance of power. They argued that “the balance, law, war and diplomacy” are employed by actors to maintain the state system.
Sometimes states lack the capacity to establish balance. Other times, they may see no logic in distorting the status quo. The balance of power influences the “behaviours” of states. Goldstein and Pevehouse (2008, p. 52) suggested that the “balance of power can refer to any ratio of power capabilities between states or alliances, or it can mean a relatively equal ratio”. They equally see it as the rise of “counterbalancing coalitions” to challenge a state from becoming an empire. The counterbalancing is a constant feature of balance of power which guarantees the stability of the international system. “The system is stable in that its rules and principles stay the same: state sovereignty does not collapse into a universal empire” (, 2008, p.52).
Stability in the system does not symbolise peace; rather it is maintained by “recurring wars that adjust power relations” (Goldstein, 2008: 52). Goldstein and Pevehouse (2008) further argued that alliance formation is an important element of balance of power. A state deployment of military forces against the dominant state or competitor is one way of power balancing.
However, alliance formation against the dominant states “is often quicker, cheaper and more effective” (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008, p. 52). While some states may form an alliance to balance the strength of a threatening or powerful states (balancing), other states may “jump on the bandwagon of the most powerful state” (bandwagoning). They maintain that “in the anarchy of the international system, the most reliable brake on the power of one state is the power of other states” (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008, p. 51). They further argued that:
In the post-Cold War era of US dominance, balance of power theory would predict closer relations among Russia, China, and even France – great powers that are not close US military allies. These predictions appear to be on the mark. Russian-Chinese relations have improved dramatically in such areas as arms trade and demilitarization of the border. France contested the US position vigorously in global trade negotiations and discussion of NATO’s command structure, and sometimes sided with Russia and China in the UN Security Council, notably in 2003 before the Iraq War. (p. 52)
Stephen Waltz (2009) was of the opinion that two important factors make it essential for states to balance the most powerful state. Firstly, to ally with the dominant state connotes reliance on the state’s continual “benevolence” which will ultimately pose a risk to the “survival” of the dependent state. Secondly, an alliance with the weaker side gives greater responsibility and
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“influence” to the new state, while alliance with the stronger side diminishes the new state’s
“influence” in global politics. Bull (1977) argued that while the theory of balance of power is assumed to emphasise the military capabilities of states, it recognises other sources of states’
power. It is within this context that some scholars have identified soft balancing as a tactic utilised by states to counteract the dominant state in world politics. T.V. Paul belongs to this tradition of scholars. Paul (2005, p. 58) argued that hard balancing which is characterised by the arms race and alliance formation is insufficient to explain the current global politics. With the end of the cold war, states have resorted to “coalition formation and diplomatic bargaining within international institutions”. This tactic, for him, is soft balancing.
… second-tier major powers – barring the United Kingdom – are concerned about the increasing unilateralism of the United States and its post-September 11 tendency to intervene militarily in sovereign states and forcibly change regimes that pursue anti-US policies (such as Iraq). In this new environment, the second-ranking states are taking steps –including bandwagoning, buck-passing, and free-riding –both to constrain US power and to maintain their security and influence. They have also begun to engage in “soft balancing,” which involves the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the United Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if the United States goes beyond its stated goals. (Paul, 2005, p. 47)
Pape (2005) argued that soft balancing employs non-military resources such as territorial denial, entangling diplomacy, economic strengthening and signals of resolve to weaken the influence of the dominant state. This implies that soft balancing entails an attempt to thwart the dominance of a superior state through the use of soft power currencies. Apparently, no state possesses the wherewithal to challenge the United States on the battlefield because of its military superiority.
Therefore states, particularly the BRIC states, have significantly employed their soft power resources to challenge the United States’ global dominance through territorial denial, entangling diplomacy and economic strengthening. Specifically Russia, China and even Brazil have embarked on territorial denial to minimise the influence of the United States in their respective regions. Through entangling diplomacy, Russia and China have employed the veto power in the United Nations Security Council to frustrate the position of the United States illustrated by the Syrian crisis. They have also been promoting their distinctive world views in institutions such as the G20 and BRICS. The economic strength of the BRIC countries, evident in their growth rate and the resilience of their economies during the 2008 financial crisis, has impacted positively on their global influence vis-a-vis the relative decline of the United State. China’s model of capitalism and authoritarian regime has gained more attention around the world and there have been predictions that China will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the near
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future. The resolve to balance is an attempt to resort into somewhat hard balancing which is evident in increases in the military expenditure of the BRIC countries in recent years.
The Bush administration post 9/11 unilateralist posture and the global financial crisis have changed the direction of global politics. The emerging and resurgent powers, China and Russia, with their economic and military muscles respectively, are in the position to distort the balance of power in their favour. It is within this context that the Syrian crisis that started in 2011 can be located. The vetoes of these Great Powers appear to be the factor that keeps the world at a standstill on an issue that requires urgent attention. China is the greatest threat to America’s dominance in the globe among the emerging powers. John Mersheimer (2005) is of the opinion that if China continues to maintain steady economic growth over the next few decades, there is bound to be arms race between the United States and China which may eventually lead to war.
Russia retains its potential as a major power owing to its possession of a nuclear arsenal and its control of a large amount of gas. The decline of the status of Russia, as a result of the collapse of the bipolar world order with its attendant unipolar international system, is still a tragedy that the Russian policy makers find difficult to erase from their memories (Turner, 2009). The formation of the BRICs signals a shift in international political economy. The BRICs, comprising the emerging economies, are exploiting the twin blows on the United States – global legitimacy that has plummeted and economic decline following America’s unilateralism under Bush and the global financial crisis that began in the United States. The world is becoming increasingly multipolar with the emergence of China, India, Brazil, and with the resurgence of Russia (Renard, 2009). The European Union, despite its current financial crisis appears to have the wherewithal to have a significant impact on the emerging global politics.
Drawing inspiration from Ruggie, Bouchard and Peterson (2011, p. 10) have shown that most definitions of multilateralism take three factors into consideration: “rules”, “inclusiveness” and
“voluntary cooperation”. They defined multilateralism as “three or more actors engaging in voluntary and (essentially) institutionalise international cooperation governed by norms and principles, with rules that apply (by and large) equally to all states”. Multilateralism is the antithesis of unilateralism. In contrast to unilateralism, in which one state acts alone to take decisions of international consequence, multilateralism symbolises decisions or acts executed by more than two states. The driving force of multilateralism is the shared norms, beliefs and
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expectations by the members of the institution or regime. Ruggie (1992, p. 571) claimed that what distinguishes multilateralism from other “organisational forms” is the “principles”
entrenched in a multilateral organisation. He defined multilateralism as “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of "generalised" principles of conduct – that is principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence”. He argued that in the economic sphere, multilateral institution discourages discrimination among its members that produce similar goods and services. In the security realm, it ensures the prompt response to “aggression” without considering an individual state’s interest. In general, multilateralism sacrifices an individual interest for collective good. It is a collective response to systemic problems. He further proposed two underlying tenets of multilateralism, “indivisibility” and “diffuse reciprocity”. These tenets enable states to embrace collective long-term benefits in lieu of individual’s short-term benefits. It is expected that there will be a measure of equity among members of a multilateral institution. It also entails collective security arrangement in which an attack on one is regarded as an attack on all. In Third try at world order, Ruggie (1994, p. 556) claimed that “a multilateral order embodies rules of conduct that are commonly applicable to countries, as opposed to discriminating among them, based on situational exigencies or particularistic preferences”.
Multilateralism has the tendency to significantly boost a state’s soft power. According to Nye (2004) foreign policies that are perceived by other states to be unilateral, arrogant, narrow and exclusive can erode a state’s soft power. On the other hand, foreign policies that are perceived to be inclusive and multilateral, strengthen a state’s soft power. The erosion of the United States’
soft power and the attendant anti-Americanism, most especially in the Middle East, is attributed to the United States’ unilateral war on terrorism in Iraq and the continual drone attacks in the Middle East. American soft power plummeted in Bush’s era explaining why Obama embraced multilateralism, his diplomatic shuttles around the world and his reluctance to employ force in the pursuit of American foreign policy. According to Nau (2010, p. 27),
Under President Barrack Obama, US foreign policy has swung decisively in the opposite direction.
Now, US security interests matter more than democracy, force is a last resort, substantial regulations are needed to end the booms and busts of global capitalism, and multilateralism is the sine qua non of US diplomacy.
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Economy, energy and the environment are the most important issues that encourage interdependence among states in the global arena (Grevi, 2009). Terrorism, climate change and nuclear proliferation are issues that cannot be handled by a sole state. These threats to global existence are addressed by a collective response. The 9/11 attacks on the United States attracted international condemnation and the United States benefitted massively from the huge support it received across the world particularly in its war on terrorism campaign in Afghanistan. In summary, the response to the event was multilateral. Thakur (2012) recognised international peace and security, economic development and international trade, human rights, functional and technical cooperation, and the protection of the environment and sustainability of resources are issues that cannot be left to the preserve of a single state. He argued that even the most powerful states cannot unilaterally solve these problems as a result of the interconnectedness of the globe.
All states are vulnerable to the “dark side of globalisation” as the events of 9/11 have clearly shown. These issues he argued “require joint action to reduce costs and bring order and regularity to international relations” (Thakur, 2012, p. 1).