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the collaborative efforts of states such as economic, security and environmental factors.
Interpolarity describes this order. According to Grevi:
Interpolarity differs from multipolarity given its focus on the challenges of interdependence and it differs from nonpolarity because it puts the accent on the relations between large state actors, while not neglecting the importance of trans-national relations. (2009, p.28)
Interpolarity advocates collaborative efforts among states towards addressing fundamental issues such as economic, security and environmental concerns in the global arena. It argues that the interests of the major powers converge in these spheres. No single state, irrespective of how big or powerful, can single-handedly resolve these issues. Challenges that arise from energy security, development, food security and migration flows will shape international relations in the contemporary world. In this regard, interpolarity is “interest-based and problem-driven” (Grevi, 2009, p. 28)
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resented across the globe primarily because it was based on a unilateral decision. The United States was able to garner the global legitimacy it required in the war against Afghanistan through the approval of the United Nations. However, in defiance against the decision of the United Nations, it embarked on the war in Iraq. This singular event has shaped global politics to the extent that some scholars argue that the world changed after this historic event. Perhaps, Washington unilateralism after 9/11 informed the formation of BRICS. Countries like China and Russia realised it was imperative to check the power of the United States. The traditional allies of the United States also openly criticised the United States’ war in Iraq. The image of the United States which had not been well managed in the Muslim world, further significantly plummeted after the unpopular war. The global economic crisis which started in the United States and its attendant global recession has highlighted the resilience of the economies of the emerging powers. While the West is still battered by the economic crisis as is evident in some European Countries, emerging powers like China and India who were also hit by the crisis had a speedy recovery (Layne, 2012). The crisis has revealed the weakness of Western liberalism and perhaps posits the Chinese model as a substitute to the Western market fundamentalism which has ignited the current global recession.
In this light, to describe the current global structure as unipolar would be erroneous and an oversimplification of events in today’s world politics. Huntington (1999, p. 35) suggested that “a unipolar system would have one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor powers. As a result, the superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so”.
The ongoing conflict in Syria has proven that the United States alone cannot single-handedly resolve issues of international consequence. In contrary to the position of Washington, Moscow and Beijing have been able to prevent the intervention of the international community in Syria.
There has been significant distribution of power among the major powers in the global arena. For instance China and India have indisputably emerged as economic powers in the international system. The military budgets of the emerging powers have also skyrocketed in recent times.
Russia is also a powerful force with its vast possession of military and nuclear arsenals.
However, contemporary international politics does not reflect a multipolar global framework.
Huntington (1999) argued that “a multipolar system has several major powers of comparable
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strength that cooperate and compete with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major states is necessary to resolve important international issues” (Huntington, 1999, pp. 35-36). The United States remains the only state with dominance in all components of power – military, economic, diplomatic, technological and cultural. The decline of the United States power capability, as observed by Nye (2012), must be understood in relative terms. It is also important to note that, as the emerging powers are rising, other minor or middle powers such as Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and Saudi Arabia are also rising. If the popular rise of China (oft-cited in the literature) is that consequential to the structure of power, then the global configuration should be a bipolar order. In other words, as China is rising to contest the dominance of Washington, other minor powers are also rising to challenge Chinese dominance. In this light, despite the devastating impact of the George Bush unilateral foreign policy and the economic crisis, the United States still remains the most important player in the global arena. This is evident in the global impact of the financial crisis that started in the United States. America remains the only state with military presence in all strategic regions in the world. Whereas the economic rise of China is applaudable, it is important to be mindful of the composition of the economy. For instance, the majority of the Chinese population live in rural areas, China’s Gross National Income per capita is not commensurate with its status as the second largest economy and, above all, China is still regarded as a developing country.
The limitation of Haass’ nonpolarity is its overestimation of the power of the non-state actors. As he rightly argued, the primacy of the state in today’s world is being threatened. However, the non-state actors cannot be convincingly argued to be powerful enough to become polar powers.
Moreover, the activities of the non-state organisations may be strengthened or undermined by the state actors. Huntington’s uni-multipolarity underplays the current functional interdependence in the global arena. The contemporary international system is characterised by interdependence, engendered by issues that require the collaborative efforts of states in the international system.
For instance, no state can single-handedly combat international terrorism and climate change.
This deepening interdependence shapes the structure of power in the international arena. The roles that are played by non-state actors in the uni-multipolar order are not indentified in Huntington’s analysis. In other words, while Huntington emphasised the distribution of powers among states in the international system, he was silent on the significance of non-state actors such as international organisations and multinational corporations.
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The limitation of Grevi’s analysis lies in his underestimation of the United States’ power in the interpolar world order. Despite the perceived United States’ decline, it is still the most important power and no other country equals the completeness and sophistication of Washington’s power.
Even though the nature of contemporary interdependence lessens the extent to which a state can embark on unilateral policies, Grevi agreed that “core national interests” of a great power which are conflictual with the general interests of the other great powers are seldom promoted (2009, p.
29). He did not, however, indicate the extent to which each of the great powers can promote its core interests to the detriment of the general interests. In this light, the United States has shown, more than other great powers, its capability to take unilateral decisions of global consequence, most especially during Bush’s administration. The Obama administration has generally adopted a multilateral posture in its foreign policy. As Nau (2010) rightly observed:
American foreign policy swings like a pendulum. Under President George W. Bush, US foreign policy promoted a democracy agenda, used force readily to buttress and at times even displace diplomacy, championed free markets, and risked if not relished unilateralism. Under President Barrack Obama, US foreign policy has swung decisively in the opposite direction. Now, US security interests matter more than democracy, force is a last resort, substantial regulations are needed to end the booms and busts of global capitalism, and multilateralism is the sine qua non of US diplomacy. (p. 1)
However, Obama’s posture of multilateralism came under serious questioning when the United States unilaterally killed Osama bin Laden on May 1, 2011. This highlighted the willingness and capability of the United States to act unilaterally and decisively to promote its interests around the world. Washington also remains the only state with sophisticated capabilities in all components of power and is the only state with the capacity to maintain military presence in all strategic areas of the world.
Against this background, this study seeks to synthesise uni-multipolarity and interpolarity. The synthesis will be referred to as uni-interpolarity in the context of this study. Renard (2009) argued that while the unipolar moment is over, the current power configuration is not multipolar.
He labelled it as “fading uni-multipolarity in the age of comprehensive interdependence” (2009, p. 18). He argued that the United States is still the most important player in international politics and will maintain this status for years or decades. He further posited that the United States is in decline and the emerging powers of BRICs are rising. Another feature of this era, he observed, is the functional interdependence of states. He argued, however, that whether cooperative or competitive, multipolarity will emerge in the near future. This study departs a little from Renard’s in its analysis of the existence of a stable uni-multipoalrity in contrast with Renard’s
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fading uni-multipolarity. Similarly Nye (2012) argued that the end of the cold war resorted in a power configuration which could be likened to a “complex three-dimensional chess game” (p.
215). The top chess board is the realm of military power which is unipolar and the United States is indisputably the dominant power in this realm. The middle chess board is the sphere of economic power which is multipolar and has the United States, Europe, Japan and China as the most important players. Finally, the bottom chess board is the domain of transnational relations that are beyond governmental control. Non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations and global threats like climate change, fall within this realm. While Nye’s analysis encompasses the unipolar, multipolar and interpolar features of this study, he confined his analysis of the unipolar and multipolar arena to the military and economic capabilities of states. However, this study considers both the hard power resources, which include economic, military, diplomatic and soft power currencies in the triangulation of these models. Owing to the centrality of soft power in this study and also because most studies on polarity have focused on hard power resources, a review of soft power will not be out of place in this study. Therefore, the following section explores Nye’s concept of soft power and how other scholars have applied this to the United States and China.
2.6 Nye’s ‘Soft Power’: The significance of power of attraction in international politics As presented earlier, most studies on polarity focus on the hard power status of the great powers, which is evident in the literature reviewed thus far. Since a major concern of this study is to investigate both the soft power and hard power resources of the great powers, a review of the soft power of the major powers becomes imperative. The concept of soft power was coined and popularised by Nye. Nye (2004a) identified and distinguishes two types of power – hard power and soft power. He argued that hard power was primarily derived from the economic and military capabilities of states. “Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks)”
which enables a state to influence other states. However, a state may attain its desired objectives in relation to other states through intangible resources. This is primarily because other states admire its values, culture and policies and long to be like it. In other words, to influence other states in international relations, a state cannot only rely on threats of economic sanctions and military force. The state must be equipped with the resources that attract other states (soft
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power). Nye argued that hard power and soft power can also be referred to as command power and co-optive power respectively. Nye observed:
Command power – the ability to change what others do – can rest on coercion or inducement. Co- optive power – the ability to shape what others want – can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others to fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. The types of behavior between command and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to economic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction. Soft power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum of behavior, whereas hard-power resources are usually associated with command behavior. (2004a, p. 7)
To ensure cooperation of states, soft power is derived from resources other than force or money.
Soft power employs attractive resources that draw other states to a state that masters the use of the co-optive currencies. A state that commands the power of attraction particularly through its culture, values and domestic and foreign policies, will be able to draw other states to promote its interests in the global arena. “Simply put, in behavioural terms soft power is attractive power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction” (Nye, 2004a, p. 6). Nye further argued:
Much as Adam Smith observed that people are led by an invisible hand when making decisions in a free market, our decisions in a market place for ideas are often shaped by soft power – an intangible attraction that persuades us to go along with others’ purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place. (2004a, p. 7)
In the realm of international politics, soft power resources are derived from the values inherent in a state’s culture which it promotes at the global arena, the standard it sets by its domestic policies and the nature of its interaction with other states in the international system. Soft power explains why some countries enjoy a powerful status in international politics that is not commensurate with their economic and military might. This is usually a reflection of those states’ attractive foreign policies in global politics which may include economic aid and peace keeping.
Nye showed that a state can project its soft power through the platform of international institutions. This was particularly evident in British and American foreign policies behaviour in the 19th and 20th centuries respectively. The great powers promoted values that reflected the liberal and democratic principles of their economic system. While Britain campaigned for free trade and the gold standard, the United States promoted the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the United Nations (UN). The legitimacy of a state’s power in the international system enables it to promote its interests with little or no opposition.
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The appealing attribute of its culture and ideology guarantees the willingness of other states to cooperate and support it. Nye observed:
The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). (2004a, p. 11)
While trade is an important avenue to diffuse or transport culture, culture can also be transmitted via personal contacts, visits and exchanges. Universities play a significant role in this regard.
Universities, particularly in the United States, attract many foreign students from across the globe. These students often internalise the culture of the foreign country. Government policies can boost or erode a country’s soft power. Government policies that reflect the narrow interest of a state with little or no consideration of the preferences of other states will weaken a state’s soft power. This was evident global image of the United States plummeted following the 2003 unilateral war in Iraq which received wide condemnation even among the United States western allies. Nye further claimed:
The values a government champions in its behavior at home (for example, democracy), in international institutions (working with others), and in foreign policy (promoting peace and human rights) strongly affect the preferences of others. Governments can attract or repel others by theinfluence of their example. (2004a, p. 14)