5.6 China: The “C” in BRICs
5.6.2 China’s soft power in Africa
174 Table 5.4: The top soft powers
Rank Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1 US 84.0 85.5 86.3 88.1 87.0 87.0
2 France 49.7 48.4 50.3 49.6 49.6 49.5
2 Germany 44.0 46.6 46.6 45.8 44.0 43.2
4 UK 46.0 45.9 46.3 46.0 46.7 43.0
5 Canada 36.0 39.4 38.6 36.8 35.3 39.0
6 Italy 33.0 34.6 33.9 34.6 34.2 32.0
7 Japan 36.9 36.5 35.5 34.7 32.5 31.8
8 China 31.1 32.2 32.2 32.2 33.7 30.7
9 India 22.6 21.5 21.9 26.7 22.6 20.4
10 Russia 22.9 18.4 22.9 21.0 23.5 18.0
11 Brazil 5.9 6.0 9.3 12.7 9.7 13.8
12 Turkey 10.3 12.5 11.4 14.4 10.3 12.9
13 Mexico 10.0 11.8 11.8 17.1 19.3 11.5
14 South
Africa
13.0 10.0 8.5 12.6 11.8 10.3
Source: RGM Soft Power Index (2012)
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path in which it simply buys influence and resources without benefitting the Africans themselves.54
Perhaps the realisation of the negative perception of some African countries of China, it has shifted attention into projecting itself in Africa through its soft power currencies. According to Kim (2013, p. 9) “There are several ways that China’s soft power has been spread such as writing off debt from African countries; training more Africans in Chinese universities; sending more doctors to work across Africa; and facilitating major investments in infrastructure, agriculture, and energy”.
China seems to have assumed the role of the champion of African and developing countries and has treated African countries with respect with its policy of non-interference in their domestic affairs. China’s principles on sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states are appealing to African elites, most especially African states with authoritarian regimes. Thus, unlike the Western countries which have imposed sanctions on the Zimbabwean and Sudanese regimes, China relates to these countries with open hands. It is worth noting that China is not alone in its stance on these countries. For instance the Southern African Development Community (SADC) does not see the need for the sanctions to be imposed on Zimbabwe.
Accordingly, China enjoys the support of some African states and citizens on this issue.
According to Cooke (2009), the Chinese win-win trade policy in Africa has been received with approval in Africa because of the following three reasons. Firstly, rather than prescribing values to African countries, China sees itself as a business partner. Secondly, primacy is given to economic diplomacy rather than humanitarian diplomacy. Thirdly, leeway is given to Africa to determine the terms of the engagement. China’s relation with the oil producing states of Nigeria, Angola and Sudan is worth considering. Western hostile relations with Sudan have provided an opportunity for China to wield maximum influence in this country. China has been wanting to become more influential in Nigeria and Angola to counteract the dominance of the Western oil companies in these countries. Thus, China has used diplomatic, security and economic engagements to enhance its advantage in these countries in comparison to the United States.
China’s $2 billion loan to Angola in 2004 and another $2 billion loan in 2007 for the
54 An interview with Nigerian scholar 1
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reconstruction of the infrastructure that had been destroyed by the civil war was greatly appreciated by the Angolan government. The loan appeared to be exactly what Angola needed in the period when the West used liberal reforms as conditions for financial assistance. This prompted Angola’s deputy prime minister, Aguinaldo Jaime, to assert that “China came to Angola with critical assistance at a time when the international community refused, insisting on excessive and unreasonable conditions to more robust assistance” (Cooke, 2009, p. 30).
However, the construction work was done by Chinese companies, with Chinese workers and materials, despite the high levels of unemployment in Angola. The Angolan government appeared unconcerned with Chinese actions because of its dire need for help (Cooke, 2009).
China’s diplomatic presence and shuttles in Africa are clearly evident. Beijing has established diplomatic relations and maintains embassies in all African countries except Somalia. It has embassies, offices of commercial counsellors and Consulate Generals in 48, 40 and 5 of those countries respectively (CRS, 2008, p. 110). In terms of diplomatic shuttles, the former President, Hu Jintao, visited 14 countries in three African tours. Similarly the Premier,Wen Jiabao, has visited eight African countries. What is worth noting is that the visits were not limited to the strategic countries in Africa. Countries such as the Central Africa Republic, Madagascar and Seychelles, of little or minimal strategic importance to China’s interests, were also visited. These visits are likely to boost the image of China, most especially in the small countries in Africa that are given little recognition in the international arena (Cooke, 2009). Some of the primary objectives of China’s engagement in Africa are to be able to garner the support of African countries in the pursuit of its interests in the United Nations and other multilateral arrangements;
and to guarantee future economic ties with African countries (CRS, 2008). Thus, African countries have been vocal in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to thwart the Western attempts to invoke a formal condemnation of China’s human rights record (Tull, 2006).
China regards itself as the champion of African and developing countries in general and provides its developmental model as an alternative to the Western economic model in Africa (CRS, 2008).
Unlike the Western countries, China offers total package deals to Africa. In other words, China integrates business, political, aid and military deals in its relations with African countries. This contradicts the Western countries’ dealings with African states because the West usually separates their military, aid and diplomatic programmes in Africa. Therefore, African countries might find China’s engagement more appealing than their relations with the West (CRS, 2008).
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Among others, China’s engagement in Africa has the tendency to yield the following benefits to African countries. Firstly, a burgeoning of China’s investment in Africa, most especially in infrastructure. Secondly, increasing Africa’s exports to China provides Africa with increasing wealth. Thirdly, it reduces the African dependence on Western aid and conditionalities. Fourthly, China serves as an alternative great power ally of African states (CRS, 2008).
In 2000, China and the African countries established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) with the primary objective “to build mutually beneficial economic development, trade cooperation and political relations with Africa” (CRS, 2008, p. 108). Since then, FOCAC has been holding summits triennially alternating between China and African countries. This forum has provided a platform by which China outlines its policies and makes its pledges to Africa. The construction of the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia was financed by China. The building was estimated to have cost between $100 million to $150 million (CRS, 2008). China also contributes to the AfDB and finances some AU and United Nations peacekeeping missions.
FOCAC serves as a platform for African leaders to visit China and it has emerged as the second largest gathering of African Heads of States. The African attendance in FOCAC is only surpassed by the United Nations African presence (Bodomo, 2009). China also engages Africa through other multilateral arrangements such as African Development Bank (AfDB) and the African Union. China attended some important AU summits between 2006 and 2007 and it has an observer status in many sub-regional multilateral institutions in Africa (CRS, 2008). In 2007, the construction of the African Union headquarters in Ethiopia was financed by China. The building was estimated to have cost between $100 million to $150 million (CRS, 2008). China also contributes to the AfDB and finances some AU and United Nations peace keeping missions such as in Somalia and Sudan (CRS, 2008). In 2004 alone, 1,400 Chinese forces were involved in nine United Nations missions in Africa (Tull, 2006).
China has sought to promote its culture in Africa through the Confucius Institutes it has established in African countries. The first of these institutes was established in 2005 in Kenya and the Asian powerhouse has established more than 20 Confucius Institutes since then. The Institutes’ primary objective is to promote the Chinese culture and language in their host countries. Accordingly, in 2008, China pledged 20 million renminbi to South Africa on education project that would involve the teaching of Mandarin in 50 high schools (Cooke, 2009).
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There has also been an increasing wave of migration between China and Africa. This is particularly evident in the movement of entrepreneurs from China to Africa and vice versa (Cooke, 2009).
China’s model of economic growth and strong government is admired by authoritarian regimes and even some democratic regimes in Africa (Horta, 2009). Thus, China enjoys cordial relationship with President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, President Ali Bongo in Gabon and president Paul Biya in Cameroon (Fijalkowski, 2011).The replication of this model also provides Africa with an avenue to market their resources to China (Fijalkowski, 2011). “In 2001, the value of its imports from Africa was roughly 2.3% more than those of its exports. By 2004, this proportion had risen to 46.5% …” (CRS, 2008, p. 119). Even though China encourages African investment in China, in reality the African countries’ investment in the Asian powerhouse is tiny.
In 2004 and 2005, Mauritius and South Africa garnered 82% and 12% of African investment in China in that order (CRS, 2008, p. 119). China also gives loans with no conditionality to African states for the construction of infrastructure, investment in agriculture and enhancement of security (Wenping, 2010). It is also in China’s policy to finance symbolic buildings like a seat of power, headquarters and football stadiums in Africa which are greatly appreciated by African leaders because such buildings tend to help African leaders score political points (Tull, 2006).
In his study on China’s soft power in Africa, Horta (2009) argued that the African elites are fond of blaming Western liberalism for their economic challenges and they have found an alternative in the Chinese model. In Horta’s interviews with 67 African political office holders, he found that 63 officials held positive views about China. This is contrary to his interviews of 98 African citizens in which 73 had a negative perception of China. The positive image China has among the African political elites may be attributed to China’s notion of sovereignty and non- interference in internal affairs of African states coupled with the no-strings attached loans. In the words of a spokesman of the Kenyan government: ‘You never hear the Chinese saying that they will not finish a project because the government has not done enough to tackle corruption. If they are going to build a road, then it will be built’ (Tull, 2006, pp. 466-467).
China is expanding and reaching out to the rest of the world not only to extract resources but also to look for markets in order to be able to sell its surplus produce. This explains China’s presence
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in Africa where there are resources, as in Nigeria. They are able to make inroads into Africa because, unlike the Western world, the Chinese do not “moralise”. They are not engaged in moral preachings about democracy, human rights and they are not imposing their culture and ways of life on anybody. They request friendly and economic relations. In exchange for taking resources, they offer assistance in building infrastructure. According to a Nigerian scholar, across the African continent today, most of the major construction is being done by the Chinese on soft loans. The loans and grants from the Chinese seem to be easier to access for Africa and other third world countries than Western aid that comes with many political conditionalities and considerable debilitating legal and social obstacles which make them very difficult to access. For example, the Nigerian National Assembly has legislated against gay marriage and the British government has openly said that it would consider cutting aid to Nigeria because this is in violation of human rights. Wouldn’t a country that believes it is sovereign in terms of its domestic policies consider it offensive to be dictated to because of aid, especially when there is another power prepared to give aid without moralising. For this reason the Chinese influence is growing gradually and if care is not exercised, it will challenge and may overtake Western nations on a continent which used to be their primary area of influence. “In terms of winning hearts and minds of third world people to itself, I think the Chinese are making a hefty progress”.55 The combination of China’s cancellation of some African countries debts, provision of soft loans, burgeoning imports from Africa undercut the Western aid and their conditionalities which have not been effective illustrated by the Western aid to the tune of billions of dollars which has not successfully constructed a railway network in Nigeria or power grids in the Horn of Africa (Khanna, 2009).
On the other hand, the African citizens’ negative perception perhaps reflects the influx of the Chinese citizens in Africa countries who are employed in the Chinese construction companies at the expense of the huge number of unemployed African people and also the Chinese entrepreneurs who set up businesses in Africa with which African entrepreneurs struggle to compete. In the words of a Mozambican high school teacher: “They say China is a great power just like America. But what kind of great power sends thousands of people to a poor country like ours to sell cakes on the street and take the jobs of our own street sellers who are already so
55 An interview with Nigerian scholar 2
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poor” (Horta, 2009, p. 2). According to a South African scholar, Chinese soft power is considered foreign in Africa. We rarely see African people eating with chopsticks or eating a bowl of Chinese food. There are very few Chinese restaurants in South Africa and very few black people patronise them. They are patronised largely by white South Africans. Chinese music is not popular in Africa.56 Moreover, the political values of democracy and human rights are very popular in Africa and Africans citizens are not willing to let go of these values. African academics feel that China does not take these values seriously (Wenping, 2010). A Nigerian scholar opined that one has to bear in mind that the Chinese are coming from a background of totalitarianism. They are now being forced by the global circumstances to liberalise the economy but they retain totalitarian policies. Africa does not have that kind of totalitarian background.
Instead, in Africa there is a dictatorial background, military rule, autocracy, and sit-tight governments. It is not feasible that Africa can replicate the Chinese model no matter how much they want to admire it.57
In general, China has the tendency to win over African states because it does not impose tariff on the exports from the 25 poorest countries in Africa (Fijalkowski, 2011, p. 230). If you want to see China in an attractive light, Africa surely provides the best vantage point. In fact, Chinese involvement in Africa has mainly taken the form of co-operative development, rather than aid.
Africans are generally receptive to China’s developmental approach: they observe with approval one developing country helping another, “the poor helping the poor”; they value the longstanding connections built over decades with their Chinese partners. In Africa, China’s image has been thriving, principally because of its contribution to economic development, mainly through the building of infrastructure projects and advancing the technological capabilities of many developing nations. “This advantageous image, of the benevolent actor who delivers results, combined with the ‘spirit’ and values enshrined in the Beijing Consensus BJC explains why now most of Africa looks to China rather than the US for a reliable partner”.58There is very little doubt that China presently wields huge soft power Africa. And Chinese influence, which could be said to be comparatively positive in Africa, began as far back as the construction of the Tanzanian Railways in East Africa. More recently, we see the immense infrastructural projects
56 An interview with South African scholar 2
57 An interview with Nigerian scholar 2
58 An interview with Nigerian scholar 1
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China had undertaken or is involved with in different parts of the continent.59 Table 5 below depicts China’s favorability in selected African states.
Table 5.5: China’s favourability in Africa
Country Favourable (%)
Kenya 78
Ghana 67
Senegal 77
Nigeria 76
South Africa 48
Source: Pew Research Centre 2013
Table 5.5 shows that China is generally perceived in positive light in Africa. However, as soft power is about relations and is based on an assumption that an ability to attract others changes their preferences in a way that they act in the interests of the country projecting attractiveness, it is difficult to argue that China projects soft power in Africa (Fijalkowski, 2011, p. 231). “I do not believe either China or the United States wield great “soft power” in Africa, although the United States is probably a bit more influential than China is.”60 In Africa, there is the Chinese economy is attractive. China has a very strong private sector. “However, African states are enthusiastic about not replicating the Chinese authoritarian, communist party system. There is no open contest to elect the president of China. China has very few African students’ presence in their universities.”61 “I do not think the Chinese already has the cultural and technological wherewithal to get to the people not just the government like the Americans. It will take time for the China’s information system to be so pervasive to be telling us their own side of the story.
They have but it is not as influential as the BBC and CNN. People are still skeptical about the Chinese products. When you mention anything that is substandard, you hear it is made in China.
China will have to overcome that adversity among other things.”62
59 An interview with Nigerian bureaucrat
60 An interview with American scholar 1
61 An interview with South African scholar 1
62 An interview with Nigerian Scholar 2
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