CHAPTER 6: HOUSING POLICY AND PRACTICE
6.8 The South African housing policy: a critical overview
a contradiction between what is intended and what is translated into policy. The progressive realisation of housing delivery is according to Baumann (2000) determined by the macro-economic progress. Thus, the accomplishment of housing delivery including incremental housing depends on the economic growth and the stability of macroeconomic programmes.
The third contradiction within the housing policy is seen in the focus on supply versus demand approach (Omenya, 2002). As Khan and Thurman (2001, 11) argue, "having based the programme on supply, decreasing budgets and the preference for width over depth has made entry into the low-income housing markets by developers less attractive". As a result, "the market driven, State assisted approach combined with declining budgets has made it very difficult for other role players (beneficiaries, local authorities and even NGOs) to engage with housing delivery in a socially responsive and politically viable manner" (Khan & Thurman, 2001, 11).
Another contradiction within the policy may be seen with the conception of the subsidy.
The capital subsidy scheme provides grants of up to R38 984, 00 per low-income household for internal infrastructure and top structures (www.housing.gov.za). The income-graded subsidy, the main instrument of the housing programme is regarded as progressive and broadly in accordance with the World Bank principles. There have, however been very significant problems encountered with the subsidy programme.
Most substantively, the subsidy programme has been criticised from numerous angles.
The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) notes that the subsidy criteria exclude individuals without dependents, such as elderly single persons with independent adult children or people who choose to live alone, such as single woman (1999). In addition, the rapidly diminishing ability of the subsidy to bridge the financial gap between income and housing costs is a major contributor to the poor development outcomes. Although, the government never intended for the subsidy to be the only financial contribution to housing, the policy never required any form of 'personal stake' as a condition for receiving the subsidy. There is an increasing debate in government circles that some form of savings scheme should be linked to subsidies, modelled along the lines of the Chilean scheme and the World Bank (1993) proposals. This has already been implemented. In fact, an amount of R 2479, 00 is actually required from households earning an income between R 1501 and 3500 (See Table 6.3). The concern raised by many in progressive circles is that this approach could discriminate against the very poor who earn irregular and/or poverty income (Tomlinson, 1999).
It may be argued that although there is an existence of a plethora of policy documents relating to housing in South Africa, there are still some issues that present shortcomings within the policy itself that need to be evaluated. This is especially necessary if the housing policy is to meet the needs of the poor. Another area that should be explored for a complete evaluation of the housing policy is the implementation and delivery of actual low-cost housing or RDP houses.
The ability of the South African housing programme to deliver housing units on a large scale cannot be questioned. In fact, to date, the Department of Housing has succeeded to delivering almost 2.3 million government-subsided housing units (www.housing.gov.za). Commenting on the number of houses delivered, Rust argues that "it is widely acknowledged that South Africa's housing programme has led to the delivery of more houses in a shorter period than any other country in the world (2003, 36)". In addition, Smit, points out that "one must be impressed with what South Africa has achieved (1999, 2)", compared to the rates of delivery elsewhere in the world.
While there have been considerable modifications and revisions to the housing policy over the years, it can be argued that the South African Housing policy has failed to meet its self-targets and realise its vision as defined in the policy documents such as the 1994 Housing White Paper, the 1997 Housing Act and the 1997 Urban Development Framework. In fact, issues related to quality, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the housing programme still persists. Despite considerable criticism, dwellings tend to be of a generally poor design, environmentally unsound, unsuited to the local climate, relatively expensive to maintain at a physically comfortable indoor climate, locationally peripheralised and spatially marginalised. In addition, dwellings are not conducive to social, economic, aesthetic or environmental sustainability. All the above-mentioned aspect places a great burden on the resources of the country and the poor inhabitants of the houses.
The outcomes of the South African Housing Policy have been criticised by a number of authors (Omenya, 2002; Huchzermeyer, 2003; Baumann, 2003; Charlton, 2004; Khan, 2003; Napier, 2006; Tomlinson, 2004; Rust, 2004). Omenya (2002) for example notes that the initiative in housing the low-income remains a top-down approach, with little consultation and beneficiary satisfaction. Importantly, Omenya (2002) observes that the housing market, despite the Government subsidies, has neither normalised nor delivered the expected results and the private sector involvement remains low.
Moreover, Khan (2001) notes that the mobilisation of finance for low-cost housing
constitutes a serious constraint in the present housing policy and strategy and Rust (2004) asserts that the access to housing finance for low-income household remains a critical issue in South Africa.
The Department of Housing (2003, Section 3) is not unaware of the shortcomings of houses delivered, especially in relation to the poor location of the low-cost housing projects. The document has stated that the Housing projects have made little contribution to the ideas predominant in the 1990s in terms of integrating, compacting and restructuring the Apartheid city. Moreover, the general urban trend over the last ten years has seen both the growth in the areas of poverty increasingly spatially dislocated and the concentration of wealth in increasingly isolated and protected areas located away from traditional urban centres. The main result of wealth decentralisation has been to reinforce segregated settlement patterns along lines of economic privilege (cited in Charlton, 2004).
Another severe criticism of the South African housing delivery comes from the way that housing policies deal with the issue of inadequate housing, understood broadly as a lack of a formal house (Baumann, 2000). Although the definition of inadequate housing can be applied to inhabitants of formal settlements too for example, people staying in overcrowded houses, however the focus seems only to be on residents of informal settlements. Rather than accepting informal settlements as a leading and dominant way of life for millions and supporting them as 'productive and creative housing solutions' (Hall & Feirffer, 2000, 246 - 248), the housing intervention is geared towards removing the scourge of informal settlements, their eradication and ensuring that post Apartheid informal settlements are effectively prevented.
An incomplete perception and a lack of understanding of the complexities of informal settlements (UN Human settlements, 2003) in South Africa has led to the creation of inappropriate policies. In fact, despite the intensive housing subsidies and the availability of credits and loans, Huchzermayer and Karahm (2006) observe that informal settlements remain a perpetual challenge. As Khan (2003) explains it, although, the post Apartheid housing policy struggles to improve informal settlements and to create employment, in the absence of adequate planning frameworks and a proper coherent programme to deal with vested interests in the land markets, settlements in the periphery will continue to develop with poor infrastructure.
Relocation and subsequent reconstitution of communities as per the subsidy
qualification criteria not only creates artificial communities in peripheral locations but also can be exceptionally brutal. Research conducted by Baumann (2000) reveals that relocation is an inappropriate response in dealing with the issue of informal settlements. Relocation as argued by the CSIR (1999) and Baumann (2000) creates an economic reconstitution of communities, changes the status of housing assets, limits freedom of movement, reduces the savings capacity and creates the disruption of a social network which in turn increases insecurity, vulnerability to crime, and an inability to absorb or support an extended family. Besides, the Department of Housing acknowledged the devastative impact of relocation, in that the application of the subsidy schemes to informal settlements destroys the fragile livelihood and coping strategies of the poor. In fact, not unlike the residualisation of the informal economy, informal settlements are spaces wherein the most critical aspect and dynamics of developments occur' and which house approximately 7.3 million people, are viewed as illegal, disorderly and consequently a 'problem' (Minister of Housing, 13th October 2000).
It can be argued that relocation could be an effective way to deal with informal settlements if it was simply a housing problem. However, as Huchzermeyer (2006) argues, it is a misconception to understand the informal settlement issue as a housing problem only to which, housing is a solution. Charlton (2004) makes this argument very clear when she notes that CIa shack in Alexandra in Johannesburg, while physically problematic in many ways, may however offer livelihood opportunities far superior to an 'RDP' house on the periphery of the city". This is to say that replacing shacks with proper homes is perhaps a noble intention, but the social and economic consequences of this type of formalisation need to be factored into official thinking. Many criticisms of government policy point out that in-situ upgrading is far less destructive of survival networks (Baumann, 2000; Huchzermeyer, 2006), but government counters that in situ upgrading is seldom possible as most of the land occupied illegally is unsuitable for development. Thus, it asserts, the necessity of securing post Apartheid land and the relocation of affected communities.
Another weakness of housing delivery is seen in the tenure options. The emphasis on private ownership and the narrow fixation on the production of housing units is not supportive of urban restructuring objectives, viz. higher density housing in areas that maximise the access of the poor to amenities and objectives and opportunities (Todes, Pillay & Kronge, 1990). Khan and Thurman (2001) point out that in many developing countries rental housing constitutes two-thirds or more of the housing stock.
Unfortunately, in South Africa, housing policy pays scant attention to this kind of housing delivery. Social housing, defined as an housing option for low-to-medium income persons that is provided by housing institutions, and excludes immediate individual ownership (Department of housing, 2003), in principle promote a rental housing option for the poor, but excludes the very poor. In fact, Social Housing is not designed for the poorest of the poor, but for those who earn a regular income and who can pay for housing (Khan & Thurman, 2001).
Another concern about the housing delivery is the capacity of local authorities to be attentive to the housing needs of communities. The Constitution of South Africa (1996) has assigned five roles to local government. Regarding housing delivery, local government must ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner and should promote a safe and healthy environment. The 1998 White Paper on local government assigns a development role to local government, which makes it responsible for an integral part of housing projects and also responsible for poverty alleviation. Thus, there is an imperative need not only to mobilise financial resources for housing projects, but also to utilise them effectively and efficiently. It can be argued that there are various series of capacity deficits related to the ability of Local Government politicians and communities to engage meaningfully in housing intervention.
According to Pottie (2004), local government is unlikely to achieve its developmental role. In fact, he notes that close to one third of local authorities bordered on insolvency.
Importantly, few councils had the necessary skills in place to shift from direct service provision to the development of integrated development plans or have the ability to negotiate long-term service provision contracts with private-sector service providers. In addition, unethical and corrupt practices, perceptions widely held by the majority of South Africans (Reddy et ai, 2003), within local government are incompatible with any development goals of local government.
Although an impressive number of houses have been delivered (2.3 million according to the Department of Housing), the South African housing policy is characterised by a slow delivery. This is seen by the persistence and growing number of housing backlogs estimated at three million homes (Pottie, 2004) and referred to in South Africa as a long waiting list. The slow delivery of houses is one of the reasons, which stimulated the post Apartheid vision of housing policy referred to as BNG.
It is recognised that the National Department of Housing is always making attempts to address a number of weaknesses observed in the housing policy and its implementation. To date, it is recognised that the emphasis of the housing programme, at least in theory, attempted to shift from the quantity delivery to more qualitative aspects of delivery. The Department of Housing acknowledges that they must improving access to housing subsidies, prevent subsidy fraud; crack down on corruption; give the poor access to more housing options, promoting integrated rural and urban development; capacity building; and installing measures and systems to monitor and evaluate progress and trends (Minister of Housing, 1999).
Weaknesses of housing delivery discussed above reveal that "the 'solution' to the problem of using housing to address poverty positively in South Africa may be deceptively simple in theory, but will probably prove difficult indeed in practice" ( Baumann, 2001, 21). In fact, the World Bank (2000), in its report entitled "Voice of poor: can anyone hear us?" recognises that poverty is multidimensional. This is to say that the solution to address poverty should be integrated. According to Baumann (2001), if the South African government plans to address poverty, it should be more democratic and pay more attention to the opinions, needs, and lives of its low-income homeless constituents.
After 10 years of housing delivery, voices were raised and severe criticism was formulated in order to either amend the existing housing policy or to formulate a post Apartheid housing policy, although the preamble of the Housing White Paper states that "the time for policy debate is now past - the time for delivery has arrived"
(Department of housing, 1994, 4 quoted in Huchzermeyer, 2001). In response to the weaknesses presented by the delivery of houses in the first ten years of the housing policy, the Department of Housing has adopted in October of 2004, the BNG which aims at accelerating housing delivery and making housing markets work better for poor people. The adoption of BNG by the Department of Housing in 2004 outlines a post Apartheid direction for South African Housing Policy in the development of sustainable human settlements and traces a post Apartheid line for research.
6.9 A comprehensive plan for the development of sustainable human