The role of the head of department in managing
performance in UK universities
Michael P. Jackson
University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland
Introduction
UK universities have been subject to external audit increasingly in recent years. In part this has been designed to ensure minimum standards. In part though it has been de-signed to measure performance. This is most clearly the case with the Research ment Exercise and Teaching Quality Assess-ment. The former has had the greatest impact. High scores have made reputations. High scores also have had significant finan-cial consequences. While for most universi-ties research funding is still less important than funding for teaching the marginal benefit resulting from a high rating has been considerable. Teaching quality assessment, while it might not have had the same effect as Research Assessment, has been important nonetheless. Universities regularly use high assessments as recruiting tools and in some parts of the UK teaching quality assessments have brought financial reward. All of this has taken place against a background of general financial restrictions. The Dearing Commit-tee report (National CommitCommit-tee of Inquiry into Higher Education, 1997) noted that the unit of resource in higher education declined by 40 per cent between 1976 and 1995.
Such developments have led universities to look much more critically at what they do and the way they do it. Universities that have performed less well in external assessments than they believed they would often have reacted initially by criticising the assess-ment, the methods used, the individuals involved in making it. However, in most cases this initial reaction has quickly given way to a critical internal examination of what went wrong. In universities that have performed as well as or better than expected the initial reaction occasionally has been to bask in a self-satisfied glow. Again, though, this has usually quickly given way to a recognition that competitors will be re-dou-bling their efforts and that they must do so as well if they are to retain their position.
The external measurement of performance, then, inevitably has had internal conse-quences. The way that institutions are man-aged, the way they deal with their staff, has changed. The publication of the Jarratt Report (1985) in some ways marked a mile-stone for the management of UK universities. In that report universities were encouraged to look at and use the best examples from systems employed in the private sector. While the report was controversial, and some of its recommendations were resisted, over the following years practice started to change. The pressure from the external measurement of performance, however, has taken this need for change a significant step further forward. It has led to heightened recognition of the importance of effectively managing staff (see Warner and Crosthwaite, 1992, 1993). This has had particular conse-quences for the university equivalent of the ``line manager'' the head of department (in some universities different titles are used, such as head of school).
Increasingly, heads of department are being expected to manage the performance of their staff. Departments are setting or being set performance targets, usually through an annual planning round, and heads of depart-ment are being expected to deliver against those targets. It should not be pretended that all of the targets are tight with clear mile-stones. Frequently the target will be as general as raising the research performance of the department. In such circumstances there may be some milestones (external grant income, for example) but the real assessment against target will come with the external research assessment which may be many years away. Nevertheless, the head of de-partment usually will be much more aware than in the past that the performance of their department will be critically evaluated and in turn that they will be judged, in part at least, against the performance of their department.
The International Journal of Educational Management 13/3 [1999] 142±149
#MCB University Press [ISSN 0951-354X]
Keywords
Academic staff, Managers, Performance management, United Kingdom, Universities
Abstract
The increasing scrutiny of univer-sities has led to increasing pres-sure on heads of department to deliver increased performance. This paper presents 14 case stu-dies from UK institutions examin-ing in detail and in context how heads of department manage per-formance. It establishes that heads of department have often struggled due to a lack of options and possibilities to influence per-formance and a lack of manage-ment training to help them achieve it. The paper concludes that the real problem facing universities in this area arises from the fact that the change in role of head of department has not been thought through but has been a reaction to external pressure, leading to am-biguity and confusion.
Previous studies have tried to sketch out the role of the head of department. The range of formal responsibilities of the head of department seems remarkably similar in a number of different national settings (see, for example, Tucker, 1984, for details on USA and Moses and Roe, 1990, for details on Australia) although there appear to be more differences between disciplines (Tucker, 1984). Further, Middlehurst (1993) suggests that there may be differences between heads of departments themselves, and members of staff of depart-ments, in terms of which functions are rated as most important. For example, heads of departments rated staff selection and evalu-ating performance as the most important whereas members of departments tend to place emphasis on acting as an advocate for the department, considering staff views and developing long-range plans. Middlehurst went on to emphasise the ambiguity of the head of department's role. This ambiguity arises from the dual identity afforded to the position, one of which is manager/leader, the other of which is academic colleague.
A number of commentators have noted how the recent developments in higher education, many of which have been noted above, have placed greater pressure on the head of department's role. Thus, Koganet al. (1994) have argued that the ambiguity and tension associated with being head of de-partment have increased as the result of the moves towards ``managerialism''. ``These moves are the result of the increased de-mands on academics to meet the dede-mands for evaluation and defined quality, to reorganise the delivery of the curriculum and to com-pete for resources'' (Koganet al.,1994, p. 60). A similar line of argument has been put forward by Sizer, particularly with regard to the way in which institutions have addressed increasing financial pressures:
The roles of Chairman and Heads of Depart-ments changed substantially as a result of the financial reductions. They were under con-stant, and at times conflicting, pressures from the administration and their own staff. They became more involved in planning and re-source allocation issues and in protecting their department's interests. Their staff management role became more demanding and critical. Their own teaching, scholarship and research inevitably suffered. Some were unable to cope with the extra demands and additional stress (Sizer, 1987, p. 127).
Similar comments were made by Thomas (1997), specifically in relation to financial devolution. In a later commentary, Sizer notes that heads of department are ``being pressurized to move from a collegial and consensus style of management'' (Sizer, 1998, p. 87).
Middlehurst takes this line of argument further. She recognises that the ``potential for role conflict has greatly increased as heads find themselves simultaneously expected to act as agents of institutional management, required to deliver according to institutional objectives, and to act as first among equals in a unit where all are engaged in a collective enterprise'' (Middlehurst, 1993, p. 138). How-ever, she also argues that heads of depart-ments feel themselves ill equipped to deal with the new managerial challenges. Thus quoting from the results of her own research, she says:
Many heads express concern about the power and authority at their disposal and the difficulties of managing academics.
Many academics do not see themselves as belonging to a structure that has to be managed at all.
The problem is in managing academics; they are highly individualistic with no strong sense of corporate identity either to the department or to the University.
Heads of departments in universities have no effective managerial power and operate by inspiring or engineering consent (Middle-hurst, 1993, p. 138).
Outline of the research
The research reported in this article sought to examine the way that heads of department in UK universities manage performance. It took the form of a series of case studies, 14 in all. The value of case studies is that they allow specific issues to be examined in detail, and in context.
It is not claimed that the universities selected were a representative sample. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to ensure that examples of universities from different parts of the sector and with different char-acteristics were included. Thus, there was a mix of ancient, old and new universities; they were from different parts of the UK, they varied in size from some of the largest to some of the smallest. The approach taken was to seek interviews with key individuals (the individuals varied according to the structure of institution but the aim was to see those who could reflect the perspectives of the administrative and of the academic sides of the university) and to supplement this with documentary information. The information obtained is not used to suggest a picture of all UK universities. This would be impossible given the basis of the research. Instead it will be used to illustrate points and issues. Reference will be made as appropriate, to information obtained from other sources (for example, national agreements governing terms and conditions of employment) and to Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of department in managing performance in UK universities
other research, so that the case studies can be set in a broader context.
The changing role of the head of
department
It has been argued above that in the last few years heads of department have been re-quired to take a more general interest in the performance of all staff. Many, of course, still only deal with exceptional performance, but as the performance of the department as a whole has been subject to external scrutiny so more heads of department have felt required to be more interventionist. How-ever, in attempting to be more intervention-ist they have faced a number of problems.
One of the problems, as Middlehurst (1993) noted, is the levers that they have to allow them to influence performance. Heads of department can recommend that staff who perform well (either in absolute terms or in meeting the specific goals of the department) should be rewarded, but in none of the universities that were looked at in this research did they have the power to deter-mine reward themselves. Their recommen-dations are not just subject to review but need not be the deciding factor. Promotion in the old universities is a particular case in point. In all of the old universities looked at the decisions on promotion were taken by a university level committee and it was not simply that the head of department's recom-mendation had to pass through a number of filters: their recommendation would be only one of a number of pieces of evidence looked at by the central committee (others include external references, given particular weight in the case of research). Further, in such universities promotion sometimes was not seen in terms of management interest but was seen much more as a reward for academic excellence (of which research was the key driver). In some cases a member of staff could apply for promotion directly and would not have to rely on the head of department's nomination. Promotion is handled differently in new universities but the award of titles (Reader, Professor) which are highly sought after rewards, are judged, much as in the old universities, primarily on the basis of academic merit.
Universities vary in their treatment of financial reward. A number of the universi-ties looked at had systems that allowed performance to be monitored and financial reward to be offered (often lump sums or discretionary rewards). In practice examples of such systems were found in both old and new universities and the most
comprehensively developed scheme encoun-tered was in an old university. In the old universities the schemes had a history in the discretionary pay introduced first in the 1980s as a result of government policy (for a discussion of the use of discretionary pay in the old universities, see Jackson, 1997). In the new universities the origins of the schemes were more varied and the schemes them-selves sometimes were less comprehensive (in one instance, for example, they only applied to Deans and senior management). Such schemes of financial reward, whether in the old or new universities, were not carefully codified and final responsibility for any reward did not lie with the head of department. Nevertheless, the head of de-partment's view was a key factor, partly because other evidence (for example, refer-ences) was not sought.
Rewards, of course, need not be financial. There are a variety of rewards, some much prized by members of staff in universities, which are not financial. These vary from support for conference attendance, to the provision of secretarial help, to the purchase of computing and other equipment, to more mundane matters like the allocation of office accommodation. None of these non-financial rewards should be under-estimated and some heads of department may use them system-atically to encourage performance. However, in some departments the allocation of some of these resources is not in the hands of the heads of department but is delegated to another member of the department or a committee.
If the system of rewards available to be used by a head of department is limited and constrained, then so is the action that they can take in the case of poor performance. In the universities looked at in this research the head of department had a role in both discipline and grievance. In particular, they were always the first point of contact for an aggrieved member of staff or student and sometimes they would be involved in the initial stages of any disciplinary action. However, while the head of department may be involved at the initial stages and may be the originator of disciplinary action, a vari-ety of patterns was recorded when formal action is to be taken. Some were able to issue a first written warning, though by no means all, and none could go beyond that stage on their own. Further, and more importantly, the use of the disciplinary procedure for academic staff is unusual and while the grievance procedure is more frequently used, most departments never experience activity in either area over a prolonged period. Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of department in managing performance in UK universities
In practice, anyway, the concern of most heads of department will not be with action for which the disciplinary procedure would be appropriate but will be with poor perfor-mance. Such performance will be short, often well short, of what could be seen as a failure to carry out required duties.
The action that a head of department can take to deal with poor performance, rather than indiscipline, is limited. The member of staff will be entitled to annual increments until they reach the top of their current scale (none of the universities covered made progression dependent on adequate perfor-mance although movement to the discretion-ary points on some scales was constrained in that way). A head of department may be able to insist on a member of staff taking a heavier teaching load if they are not productive in research. The new universities all work on the basis of an annual hours formula and this allows a head of a department considerable (in principle) discretion to arrange duties as they see fit. The old universities do not have such a formal system. However, a number of departments within them that were looked at have devised systems that permit heads of department to allocate workloads according to departmental needs and individual abil-ities. The importance of controlling the allocation of workloads should not be under-estimated but it is a blunt instrument when it comes to taking action against under-perfor-mance, especially if the under-performance is in all areas of activity, rather than just one.
The most significant attempt to deal sys-tematically with under-performance has oc-curred in the area of research. The
introduction of the Research Selectivity Ex-ercise, and in particular the requirement that universities identify research active staff, has focused attention on the contribution of individuals to the university's reputation. The proportion of staff submitted as research active was considerably higher in the old than the new universities and as a result it is in the old universities that the most con-certed action against individuals who were not seen to be contributing significantly to the research activity has been taken. In a number of the old universities covered in this research this has involved action by senior management in the university. In one case all staff who were not submitted as research active were interviewed by a senior manager and as a result of that interview judged whether they had the potential to contribute to research in the future. In cases where the judgement was that they did not have a contribution to make then they were either allocated to non-research responsibil-ities (where these existed and were
appropriate) or encouraged to consider early retirement. Most of those in the last category subsequently left. A further round of inter-views has commenced with those remaining. This particular approach was mirrored in a number of other universities, although the details differed. It suggests that although the levers available to deal with under-perfor-mance in the area of research are limited, they can be effective if pursued vigorously. However, they rely on pressure rather than sanctions and it is important to emphasise that in the cases outlined above the pressure has been exerted by very senior managers, not by the head of department. In fact, the head of department has been only minimally involved, and in some instances has been by-passed altogether. The belief of some (though not all) of the old universities covered in this research of the need for senior management action may itself be taken as an indicator of concern that the head of department had either insufficient commitment to undertake the exercise or insufficient power to exercise the pressure required to bring the desired result.
The levers at the disposal of a head of department appear to be greatest in the case of new appointees in the old universities, where almost universally a three-year pro-bationary system operates. In such circum-stances the head of department is expected to monitor and report on the performance of a member of staff in some detail and in all of the old universities looked at the probation-ary system is now being operated much more tightly than in the past. The head of depart-ment may observe teaching, review student responses to teaching, evaluate research performance (which may mean no more than a reference to the impact of the journals published in, but which may be a much more thorough ongoing analysis). However, as with promotion and financial reward sys-tems, the head of department does not have the ability to take the final decision. The decisions of the Commissioners appointed consequent on the 1988 Education Reform Act have made termination of employment of a member of staff deemed not to have satisfac-torily completed probation a complex matter, with review at the highest level in the university essential.
Many of the universities looked at in this research had a staff appraisal system. The formal descriptions differed, as did the prac-tice, but many universities had some system for discussing performance with members of staff. In the old universities the system was almost always the result of the requirement of a national pay deal. National survey evidence (Low, 1995) suggests a variety of Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of department in managing performance in UK universities
different approaches in such schemes: some emphasising staff development and others emphasising performance. The confusion and tension surrounding appraisal is largely a consequence of the way it was established (Townley, 1990, has described the way in which the national guidelines were deliber-ately left vague to allow both the unions and university management to sign an agree-ment). In practice in the old universities looked at in this research the appraisal scheme was largely developmental in orien-tation. In some it was explicitly stated that there was no link between the appraisal system and reward or discipline. In the new universities the schemes differed somewhat but the focus similarly was on staff develop-ment rather than performance. This was given added emphasis in some schemes where the appraisee had the right to choose their appraiser. In some schemes the docu-mentation was confidential to the appraisee and appraiser and the Personnel Department had no record of whether or not the appraisal had taken place. A number of the directors of Personnel and senior managers interviewed questioned the effectiveness of the present schemes and noted that they intended to review the objectives and operation of their schemes. However, in this context, the im-portant point is that what on the surface might appear to be a lever through which the head of department can influence perfor-mance, in practice seems to have much less significance.
It is not, though, just the absence of levers that makes the head of department's ability to manage performance difficult: it is also, as Sizer (1988) and Tapper and Palfreyman (1998), note the persistence of a view of professionalism and collegiality which often challenges the right of the head of depart-ment to judge. In some of the universities looked at, as mentioned above, the teaching of probationary members of staff is observed. However, except where there is a particular problem which has surfaced publicly or where there is a claim for excellence in teaching which is being used as the basis for promotion (in some universities, in such instances, reports on observation of teaching are obligatory), it is rare for teaching to be observed by another member of staff and such observation (if characterised as such) is considered by some to be an infringement on professional freedom. There are pressures for more intervention, particularly when a de-partment is preparing for teaching quality assessment, but that may not overcome a nervousness about such matters.
Historically the same position has held for research as well as teaching. In the new
universities historically there was no con-tractual requirement to undertake research and so it was difficult to justify too close a scrutiny of such activity. In the old univer-sities research was a contractual require-ment but in practice was also treated as an individual responsibility and often driven more by curiosity than any contractual term. The position has changed over the last decade with the introduction of external judgement of research through research selectivity exercises. Research income, and particularly research output, has become an explicit concern of all old and most new universities. Members of staff in all univer-sities are likely to be called to account, at least in the most general of fashions, for the time spent on research (see Hughes and Tight, 1995; McNay, 1997; Tomlin, 1988). In some of the universities looked at this is an annual exercise. Research targets are set (sometimes agreed but sometimes pressure is put on to agree to a certain target) and performance is measured against targets. However, this was not true in all cases. In some there was simply a consensus in a department about the need to meet certain kinds of research targets and individuals were exhorted to play their part in meeting them. Further, there was evidence that in a number of the old universities the traditions of academic freedom remain potent and the right to follow academic curiosity is still cherished.
In a number of the universities looked at disappointment at the results of the last Research Assessment Exercise led directly to significant internal structural change. One particular instance might be quoted as an example. In this case the university moved from a structure of faculties (with no de-partments) to one where departments were created and given a critical management role. They were seen as the vehicle for the more effective organisation and prosecution of research and heads of department were seen to have a key role. Heads of department were appointed, rather than elected and were given comprehensive job descriptions. It is too early to assess how effective this move will be. However, if it is effective it will not be because heads of department have been given new responsibilities because in practice they still have to rely on the same kind of levers available to comparators in other old uni-versities but it may be the result of a clear statement that they have a managerial role and are managerial appointments.
One of the other problems facing heads of department in managing performance is that in many cases they have not been appointed because of their managerial abilities, they Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of department in managing performance in UK universities
would not necessarily claim any and they have not been trained to any significant extent in such matters. There is a clear difference in such matters between the old and the new universities, although in the universities looked at in this research the differences were not as extreme as often claimed. In the old universities heads of department were appointed from within on a fixed term basis. In some cases this was a managerial appointment but in others it followed some kind of consultative process (in some cases an election but in others something less formal). Especially when appointed following a consultative process, their role was more one of chairing a group of colleagues than managing a department. As Weiner (1996) has noted, in many cases the head of department does not see the appoint-ment as a career move (on occasions it can help when applying for promotion but it will rarely be the determining factor). They are more likely to see the pursuit of their research as the key to enhancing their career prospects and being head of department will actually hinder research output (Sizer, 1987). Inevitably, this often colours their attitude to the job. Some nevertheless see performance management as important and despite the short tenure of their office, seek to influence performance in a measurable way. Others see this less as individual responsibility and more as collegiate responsibility.
In the new universities the position of head of department has been different. It has been seen as a substantive appointment, usually following external advertisement, and carry-ing a not insubstantial salary premium. They have been seen as line managers, allocating duties within the overall workload agree-ment. However, even within the new uni-versities the role of the head of department has been very different from that of line manager in industry. The collegiate empha-sis may not be as great as in the old universities, but it is not absent, and the professional status of academic staff has restricted the head of department's role. One of the key variables influencing the approach taken by the head of department may be the basis of their appointment. Certainly the informants consulted for this research routinely argued that heads of department appointed as the result of a managerial decision were more likely to adopt a managerial approach (and to be given more explicit powers and responsibilities) than if they were appointed as the result of an election. Further, in a number of instances the relationship between the dean and the head of department, and the decision as to who should be given the main managerial
responsibility, seemed to be strongly influ-enced by the method of appointment.
In the new universities appointments as head of department are commonly perma-nent (though not always ± in some cases the option remains to return to a full-time teaching and research career). However, in the new universities looked at in this research the criteria for appointment as head of department emphasised a mixture of academic and managerial qualities and, while the separation of titles from positions (professorships from headship of depart-ments) enabled managerial qualities to be highlighted more than they might have been, some still looked for a mix and stipulated academic criteria as a minimum.
Bone and Bowner (1998) found that about half of all universities they surveyed offered a training course for new heads of depart-ments. However, in most cases such courses were voluntary. In all of the universities looked at in this research some training was offered to heads of department. The extent and type of training, though, varied greatly. In some the training amounted to no more than a basic introduction to university policies and procedures. In others, training was offered regularly, throughout a term of office. In still others it was in-house though some used outside trainers and some joined together as a consortium of institutions. However, the amount of training offered in all cases was limited and few senior man-agers claimed that it was designed to do much more than alert and sensitise. It would be difficult to argue that it was training them to be managers as such or designed to rectify a gap in management skills recognised on appointment and some heads of department anyway would have resisted such a notion.
Discussion
Staff, particularly academic staff in univer-sities, traditionally have been given consid-erable autonomy. They have been viewed as professionals who can be relied on to deliver the performance needed because of their personal interest in and commitment to their subject. The autonomous model has been most clearly seen in the old universities, but it has not been without influence in the new universities as well. The autonomy given to academic staff has been mirrored by the collegiate system. Again, this has been at its strongest in the old but by no means absent in the new universities. Heads of department have had a limited role to play. This has varied from, at one extreme in many old universities, acting as little more than a Michael P. Jackson
The role of the head of department in managing performance in UK universities
chair for a group of colleagues, to the other extreme in some new universities where heads of department have had significant administrative responsibilities, including organising the allocation of teaching duties. However, in few cases, traditionally, were heads of department called on, in any sig-nificant way, to manage performance.
The traditional picture, and role of the head of department, started to change around a decade ago. It has been argued earlier that this was in part a response to universities paying much more attention to management, following the Jarratt report (see Sizer, 1988), but more importantly a response to pressures felt by universities as the result of national attempts to measure their performance, in teaching and research (see Koganet al.,1994). The role of the head of department has changed, though not as the result of a serious consideration and debate about that role. In few universities looked at, the research reported here, have they systematically con-sidered the role of head of department as such; rather the role of the head of depart-ment has changed as a result of the pressures placed on the university itself. In one of the universities looked at management consul-tants were engaged to review the structure and operation of the institution. In a key passage in their report they described the devolution of responsibilities to the head of department as ``haphazard'' rather than planned. Such a comment undoubtedly could be applied well beyond the example from which it has been taken.
In this article attention has centred on the way that the national assessments of teach-ing and research have fed through to the role of the head of department. In other areas as well, though, the same has been happening. As budgets have been devolved, so heads of department have been called on to exercise more financial expertise and responsibility (Sizer, 1987). As legislation has been intro-duced on equal opportunities and health and safety, so heads of department have been called on to pay more attention to such matters (Hall, 1996).
If the changes to the role of the head of the department had occurred because of a sys-tematic consideration of that role rather than because of the indirect consequences of other pressures, then one might have expected changes to the role to be reflected in the selection and training of holders of the post and in the range of levers made available to them. In fact, because of the way the changes have occurred, little seems to have happened in this regard. It would be misleading to claim that nothing has happened. In the old universities when members of a department
are nominating or electing one of their members to act as head of department and in the new universities when a new appoint-ment as head of departappoint-ment is being made, then more attention may be paid to their management/administrative skills. How-ever, this may be only one among a range of considerations. Similarly, in all of the uni-versities looked at for the research reported in this article there was an attempt to offer at least some training to heads of department, but the training is limited and sometimes offers little more than a guide to institutional policy.
The way in which the role of the head of department has changed has also meant that little thought has been given to the levers they need to be able to use to do their job, particularly as far as performance manage-ment is concerned. In many examples re-viewed in this article they only had limited ability to measure ongoing performance ± such is the continuing hold of the profes-sional model. Further, even if they encounter markedly poor or good performance they have to rely on others to implement any recommendations they might make. Persua-sion and encouragement are likely to be the mainstay of the head of department's armoury.
The result of such developments is to further increase ambiguity and tension al-ready present in the role. The head of department frequently is seen as a manager of performance but he/she rarely has the skills, training or levers to carry out this function. Some of course do so, but this is more the result of chance (the personality of the individual concerned) than a deliberate strategy on the part of the university. The ambiguity and tension are exacerbated in the old universities where the position of head of department is normally temporary and a career route is likely to be one seen as best pursued through research (which will be hindered rather than helped by taking the role of head of department).
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