‘foreign factors – defeat in war, conquest, allies, foreign pressure, foreign models – often have large impacts on democratization’ (Friedman 1994, p. 33). Moreover, with democratization in Asia best understood as part of a global process, there is a subliminal role for global communications. As Friedman suggests, democratic aspirations have become a common belief, if not a common understanding, and the beginning of a process of build- ing a democratic political culture. Thus democratic ideals can be the consequence rather than the cause of democratization, and the democrati- zation of East Asia is ‘best understood as part of the global process’
(Friedman 1994, p. 23). One needs only to look at the significant increase in the public understanding of democracy brought in Indonesia by the voter education programmes to see that, for many, democratic principles
‘can only be internalized by actually working within the democratic process’ (Dalton and Shin 2003, p. 19).
The ebb and flow of political change becomes more easily understood when democracy is seen as a ‘matter of rules for mediating plural and conflicting interests’ (Di Palma 1990, p. 258). The comparative speed with which it has been introduced in many developing countries means they lack the necessary institutions or these institutions, newly established, are not tested. As a result, when democracy is introduced abruptly and against the wishes of some players, ‘the “losers” will resist it, and the “winners”, will be less than fully at ease with its methods. Thus consolidation is placed in doubt, while backsliding is an ever-present possibility’ (ibid.).
What this book underlines, however, is the central part the media plays in this political process as it unfolds in Southeast Asia. As we shall see in each of the case studies from Southeast Asia, local elites craft expectations via the media. They also face pressure for change through the conscious and unconscious spread of ideas through the globalized media, but they are becoming increasingly adept at using the communications media as a resource to influence and persuade as they indulge in political crafting. So, as we will see, while there is also an increasing use of information commu- nication technology for the expression and coalescing of opposition pres- sure, the role of the media remains ambiguous but important as the political elites meet the growing demands of pressure groups emerging within society.
(Atkins 1999, p. 420), these governments in the twentieth century have been keen to quarantine the source of the contagion of internal instability. Close associations with media organizations created during the rise of national- ism and the struggle for independence was further cemented by commer- cial and legal means in the post-colonial era. And among many journalists around the region, helping their country develop became a priority as opposed to scrutinizing those leading the development. In Malaysia and Singapore, in particular, coverage was seen as subject to ‘public good’,2as opposed to the ‘libertarian’ position of the Western media (Siebert 1956).
The post-colonial state’s nation-building ambitions and control strate- gies have made Southeast Asia one of the world’s most information- sensitive regions (Atkins 1999, p. i). The 1980s saw some loosening of these controls. Hectic economic growth sprouted new local media operations, and the emerging middle classes became a target for an influx of foreign media companies keen to tap the potential market. With governments in the region as keen to reap the benefits of being part of the global economy as they were to continue to control the flow of information across and within their borders, policy confusion led to general growth in the industry in Asia.
As well as the inflow of international print titles to Asia seeking adver- tising revenue on the back of economic growth (Rodan 1998, p. 127; Wong 2000, p. 127), the 1980s were also marked by a major structural shift in elec- tronic media in Asia. Developments in technology, including international satellite television services and later networked computer systems (result- ing in the creation of the Internet), meant it was possible to circumvent official state television systems. Global broadcasters like the BBC, CNN and CNBC threw down a challenge to the monopoly of domestic state- controlled information sources. With the resulting radical changes, the media increasingly became a ‘political battleground – an important con- tested space for conflicting forces and aspirations’ (Atkins 1999, p. 4).
In an effort to attract foreign investment and create the infrastructure which would make them players in the new global economy, Asian states went head to head to become the region’s telecommunications and finance hub. Satellites became the must have on the Asian developmental agenda;
symbols of a new, Asian age. Indonesia’s Palapa which carried CNN, and Asia Sat which carried regional Star Television (established by Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka Shing’s son Richard in 1989, and sold to Rupert Murdoch’s News empire in 1993), spurred regional governments into commissioning new satellite and cable systems by either state agencies or compliant national companies.
Before the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98, commentators saw a pattern of surging economies bringing sweeping changes to the media in
the region, with a generation of middle-class consumers driving a boom in media products, and a proliferation of new media channels, both print and broadcast. This was particularly evident in the region’s largest economies.
In Korea, the number of daily newspapers had grown to 125, from 60 in 1988. Over that same period, the number of television channels grew from three to four terrestrials, plus 26 cable services and one satellite broadcaster.
In Taiwan, 278 newspapers had been registered since 1988. More than 150 new radio stations joined the 33 broadcasting in 1993. Cable TV, ‘legalized’
in 1993, was reaching about 60 per cent of households, which could select programmes from more than 50 channels. And Japan, the largest market, gained more than 200 new television channels, with the government fore- casting an additional 200 by 2005. And, in Asia, the growth of TV had not eclipsed newspapers and magazines. Almost 30 000 consumer magazines and more than 2000 newspapers were being published in Asia, and more titles were launched each year. Even so, it is undoubtedly the rise of regional satellite broadcasters, whose programmes could be distributed either direct to homes or via cable, that had the greatest impact.
Star Television’s service grew to more than 50 Asian countries and 300 million homes, and many of Asia’s TV networks were trying to become regional broadcasters. Hong Kong’s leading station, TVB, is one example.
Successful in Taiwan, it announced deals in Thailand and the UK. Even formerly torpid broadcasters, like China’s CCTV and India’s Doordarshan, were becoming satellite services and trying to compete with more modern programming.
Of course, the Asian Financial Crisis had its casualties in the media industry. One symbol of tightening revenues was the merger of business news operations ABN and CNBC Asia in December 1997, in an effort to
‘cut losses and share the costs of increasing their global operations’
(Shrikhande 2001, p. 22). But it was early in the new century, as the global economic reverse deepened the problems in Asia, that the local media industry really felt the pinch. Already weakened by the Asian Financial Crisis and now having to contend with the impact of 9/11 and the need to rationalize some of the expansion associated with the Internet and tech- nology bubble, there was a shakeout, particularly in the region’s two major media hubs, Singapore and Hong Kong.
By the beginning of 2002, regional advertising expenditure on regional print titles was down almost 20 per cent from the similar period in 2001 (Oliver 2001). In Hong Kong, Next Media, the publisher of Next Magazine and Apple Dailyannounced redundancies, as did the South China Morning Post and the Hong Kong iMail, the two English-language dailies. In Singapore, Singapore Press Holdings cut staffin its television and Internet operations, rebranding its English-language channel in the face of poor
ratings, and closing one of its newspapers, newly-born out of government liberalization of the industry (Project Eyeball).3
And it was a similar story around the rest of the region. For example, UBC, Thailand’s monopoly pay television provider, reduced its staffby 25 per cent in 2001, as part of a broader cost-cutting effort in the face of the weakening baht (Kazmin 2001). Moreover, the big international media names in Asia did not escape unscathed. Time Inc. and Dow Jones Inc.
were forced to make cuts. Dow Jones reorganized its various publications in Asia in order to share resources, while Time’s Asiaweek, which closed in November 2001, was the most high profile casualty of the slump in advertising (Tan 2001, p. 2).
Despite these problems there was still some positive news for sharehold- ers. By April 2002, News Corporation’s Star TV, the pan-Asian broad- caster, announced an operating profit for the first time (Jacob 2002). Star TV was able to reverse a 10-year losing streak by extending its reach into
‘every nook of India’s broadcast sector, from local language production to old-fashioned free-to-air TV’ (Prystay 2004b). In addition, adspend in Asia rose annually from 2002, to more than $US90 billion by 2006, with predic- tions it would reach $US106 billion by 2008 (Zenith Optimedia 2006).
And, Asia was still seen as the most likely source of growth for the global media giants. Cathleen Black, President of Hearst Magazines ‘asked where future growth at Hearst will come from, Black has one word: “Asia”. She pointed to the size of the potential market in China where Hearst had a joint venture with IDG, the technology publisher’ (Grande 2003, p. 11).
So, while the short-term numbers had to be revisited in the wake of the events on 11 September, 2001, in the long term, the worldwide appetite for the output of the communications media was set to continue with Asia leading the way. International news publications, for example, showed they could generate strong revenue streams from the region. Advertising rev- enues for Time Asia for 2000 were almost $US65 million dollars, up more than 31 per cent from the previous year. For the Asian Wall Street Journal, the number was slightly more than $US63 million for the same period, up almost 38 per cent. The total revenue for the 18 publications named came to more than $US362 million, a rise of more than 22 per cent over 1999 (MEDIA2001, p. 21).
Despite the serious financial crisis, Asia’s appetite for media and enter- tainment products did not diminish after 1997. Indeed, in May 2002, a new media battle was brewing between international heavyweight brands, the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal and the International Herald Tribune, both globally and for the Asian market. The FT launched an Asian version, Wall Street Journalparent Dow Jones had plans to beef up its regional operation and, when the New York Times acquired full
ownership of the International Herald Tribune, it expected to turn it into a global newspaper capable of competing with both the FT and the WSJ (Cassy 2003).
Meanwhile, Asia, with its 472 million television households and 180 million homes passed by cable, in broadcasting terms, compared very favourably with both the US (101 million and 98 million), and Western Europe (145 million and 87 million) (Hansen 2001, p. 34). In South Korea, alone, broadband subscribers grew from 800 000 in 1999 to 4 million in 2000 (Rohwer 2001, p. 54). By the turn of the century, Hong Kong, Beijing and Singapore, were beginning broadband experiments, often ahead of many European markets and, as deregulation continued across Asia, the growth continued.