the international community a different account of what was happening in the Philippines. The articles, written by opposition senator, Benigno
‘Ninoy’ Aquino Jr, from his prison cell, were smuggled to Thailand to become The Bangkok Post’s ‘world-exclusive’ (Go 2003).
Further afield, the media was even more critical of the Marcos regime.
Lewis Simon of US newspaper group Knight Ridder won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting in 1985, following a series which began with cov- erage of the assassination of Benigno Aquino. As the international media began to show the excesses of the Marcos regime, Marcos lost the support of a critical ally, the United States, and was finally toppled by the EDSA revolution in 1986, as allies like Fidel Ramos and Juan Ponce Enrile turned against him (Casper 1995, p. 109).
Clearly, the media had proved a useful resource for the coalition which toppled Marcos, from the use of the broadcast media to simpler ICT such as Xeroxed copies of speeches and mobile telephony to organize demon- strations. As ICT developed further, the Internet also became a space for opposition voices to wage their propaganda war, something at which they have become more adept. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front maintained its own website,5that carried daily news and photographs about the rebel group. Eid Kabalu, the MILF spokesman, was always available for media interviews, unlike many of the military generals and their public affairs spokesmen. This was also the same for Gregorio Rosal, the CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines) spokesman, and other rebel leaders in Mindanao were as active as Kabalu: ‘They regularly speak on radio pro- grams and occasionally grant clandestine interviews in their hideouts for selected journalists’ (Zamboanga Journal2006).
The outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), had a website, but it had disappeared by 2006.6The site, which previously posted news and photographs of war victories against the military and police and anti-government propaganda became home to travel and tourism portals. Gone was the red hammer and sickle flag, and in its place was an image of a clear blue sky and the headline: ‘Welcome to the Philippinerevolution.Org’.7
THE POST MARCOS MEDIA WORLD: BATTLE
Discussion of the issues facing the Filipino media range from the over- riding influence of the media and the scrutiny of the control of newspaper proprietors affecting editorial decisions to the benefit of business interests, through the murder and imprisonment of crusading journalists and poor quality work and petty corruption, to sex selling the media and television news being repackaged as entertainment, with ratings driving production.
But these discussions also tend to mention the general health of the media, and positives such as the use of the Internet to continue the experiment with libertarian and community journalism, and political debate.
The West has heavily influenced the country’s mainstream media (Masalog 2000, p. 389). Television, in particular, where the United States provided the model, has been accused of ‘dumbing down’ politics to an alarming degree (David 2002). This trend towards infotainment has also led to the aggrandizement of television personalities. News anchors have become superheroes, courageous crusaders against corruption and social iniquity (Rimbau 1999, p. 94), and the growth of an orientation of the media towards these personalities is seen as key to the political ambitions of many of them: ‘name recall by the public . . . [is now] a major key to getting elected’ (Mercado 1991, p. 43).
After his ouster, the ownership of many of the major private mass media outlets and telecom companies which Marcos had managed to wrest control of, returned to their original owners, including the Lopez family.
The industry returned to a form familiar in the days before Marcos, con- centrated in the hands of wealthy families with substantial cross-ownership between media outlets. This is the contemporary position.
By the beginning of the new century, the most widely read newspapers were the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila Timesand Business World. By 2004, the country had 225 television stations, 369 AM radio broadcast stations, 583 FM radio broadcast stations and 5 shortwave stations. Although some media outlets, such as IBC (television) and the Philippine Broadcasting Service (radio), were government-run, most were privately owned. Consequently, some reports tended to be one- sided presentations favouring special interests.8
Family-owned conglomerates also continued to operate the major telecommunications companies, including Globe Communications (owned by the Ayala family together with Singapore Telecommunications), Philippine Long Distance Telephone (owned by the Indonesian Salim family through their First Pacific Holdings and the Filipino Cojuangco family), Bayantel (owned by the Lopez family – critics of the Marcos Regime – through First Philippine Holdings) and Digitel Communications (owned by the Gokongwei family through their J.G. Summit Holding Company). The Cojuangco family – a Marcos ally – also owned the Associated Broadcasting
Company, which managed the Channel 5 television station in Metro Manila and several affiliate television stations in other cities in the country; it also owned a direct-to-home satellite company. The Lopez family, through own- ership of the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, managed the Channel 2 television station and two top radio stations in Metro Manila, more than 20 other television stations and numerous radio stations in other provinces in the country. Three families controlled the Greater Media Arts Company that owned the Channel 7 television station in Metro Manila, and several other television and radio stations.
Family ownership existed among other major radio networks such as the Manila Broadcasting Company (Elizalde), Radio Mindanao Network (Canoy), Nation Broadcasting Company (owned by the PLDT) and the national broadsheets media such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Romualdez), Manila Bulletin(Yap) and Philippine Star(Belmonte).
The industry was also centralized: Globe Telecommunications and Smart Communications had almost a 90 per cent share of total cellular phone line subscribers nationwide. This resulted in enormous profits for both. Local radio and television affiliates of the ABS-CBN and GMA net- works dominated the major provincial centres. Manila-based newspapers, such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer, started publishing editions in the provincial centres.
Families also controlled companies cross industry. The Lopez family controlled Bayan Telecoms and ABS-CBN, but also had interests in power generation and distribution, highway management. The Ayalas had a stake in Globe Telecoms as well as various interests in banking, real estate, semi- conductor manufacturing, and automotive retail. The Gokongwei’s 47.5 per cent control of Digital Telecoms and Summit Media came alongside various interests in retail, real estate, transportation, banking, petrochemi- cals and textile. Cojuangco (Antonio Jr) had stakes in PLDT (15.4 per cent), Associated Broadcasting (n.a.) and Dream Satellite (n.a.) as well as interests in the banking industry.9
ICT absorption was dependent on cost and physical availability. By the turn of the century, the Philippines had good television and mobile distri- bution although other ICT were relatively underdeveloped due to the state of the economy. With approximately 15 million households, the Philippines had a television penetration of about 73 per cent (10.86 million), setting it behind its ASEAN neighbours: Singapore, 99 per cent; Malaysia, 97 per cent; and Thailand, 94 per cent, but ahead of Indonesia with 61 per cent.
Of the television channels, ABS-CBN 2 dominated, with 45 per cent of viewers in 1998, while its nearest competitor GMA-7 had 21 per cent. There were three cable operators servicing Manila and, with current cable sub- scriptions rates remaining competitive at between US$7 and $US11 per
month, there were believed to be one million subscribers out of the 12 million population in the Metro Manila area (Lucero 2001, p. 25).
VCR penetration was 30 per cent (as compared to Singapore 80, Malaysia 53 and Thailand 40). Cinema admissions to the 950 screens nationwide have been on the decline: from a peak of 141 million in 1994, down to 105 million in 1998. Computer penetration was relatively low at about 1.3 per 100 people, and the number of Internet users was about 200 000 in 2000, with an annual growth of about 40 per cent (Masalog 2000, p. 388).
Mobile phone use had become one of the highest in Asia, with a pene- tration of more than more than 27 per 100 – compared to India with 9 – Filipinos send an average of 200 million messages daily (Bulos, 2004).
Computer and Internet penetration by 2004 was 4.46 per 100 and 5.32 per 100, respectively. This compared to 6 and 11.25 for Thailand, 1.36 and 6.52 for Indonesia and 19.16 and 38.62 for Malaysia (International Telecommunications Union 2006).
What is noticeable, however, is that despite investments like that of Singapore Telecom in the Ayala family’s Globe Communications, a broader, integrated Southeast Asian media market has not emerged. Despite the attempt to show regional unity through institutions like ASEAN, this has not allowed the corporate elites to form intra-regional media brands of any note. As we shall see in the case study of Thailand, most of Southeast Asia’s political elites are wary about sharing their control of media and ICT resources.
In the Philippines, there have been few constraints on the media post Marcos, so the 1990s saw rapid growth, intense competition and an embrace of the sensational that left ‘scant space for the serious and sensi- ble’ (Coronel 1999b, p. 92). No licence was needed to publish, although foreign ownership of the media was not allowed. There were three moni- toring bodies, the Press Council of the Philippine Press Institute, the ethics Committee of the National Press Club, and the Center for Press Freedom and Responsibility. None, however, had legal or statutory basis, and existed on the strength of a ‘fragile consensus within the journalistic community’
(Masalog 2000, p. 380).
Unlike elsewhere in Southeast Asia, even the foreign media wrote with impunity about the Philippines, and foreign journalists were not required to have a permit to report from within the country. Foreign media, from Timeto the Reviewwere popular with the English-speaking elite, and US television programming was eagerly devoured (Coronel 2000, p. 151).
Press freedom was enshrined in the constitutions, and laws of libel, national security, privacy and obscenity, which impacted journalists, were
‘interpreted liberally by Philippine courts’ (Masalog 2000, p. 380). The
popular media became dominated by ‘rip-roaring tabloids published in Filipino – rambunctious, sensational, freewheeling and irresponsible’
(ibid., p. 389).
The Philippine broadcast media was also commercially orientated, and was subject to three regulatory bodies: licences for radio and television are issued by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), the Kapisanan ng mya Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP or the Association of Filipino Broadcasters), and the Movie and Television Review Classification Board (Masalog 2000, p. 384). This set the tone for even more mainstream broadcast media. By way of example, in early 2005, ABS-CBN Channel 2 sent a formal letter of complaint to the Professional Artist Managers Inc. (Pami), protesting what the network said was ‘irre- sponsible journalism’ practiced by rival network GMA 7. In a letter to Pami president, June Rufino of the Kapamilya network said GMA 7’s showbiz show ‘StarTalk’ aired parts of a sex video and ‘blatantly named’
ABS-CBN contract star Piolo Pascual as one of the participants (Velasqez 2005). This focus on the salacious and scandalous meant Philippine presidents and other politicians were ‘subjected to vigorous and sometimes libellous criticism’ (David 2002).