As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the media is influenced by ‘the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates’ (Siebert 1956, p. 1). Thailand’s political culture is a study in
contradictions. There remains an exaggerated dualism that has framed the development of the media industry embedded within it.
Thailand’s culture reflects a patriarchal authority that emphasizes the importance of the family and the father at its head. This is traditionally expressed within the state in the form of the Monarchy, at least until the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The concurrent themes of paternal- ism, patronage and hierarchy are also located within a Buddhist tradition that has promoted moderation and tolerance. This has resulted in pro- nounced dichotomies including that of authoritarian control versus plu- ralism and the tendency of the media to indulge in sensationalist criticism.
At the same time, the embrace of modernity and globalization has had effect of encouraging protectionist nationalism.
As McCargo (2000b, p. 136) suggests, ‘crisis and reform are not anti- thetical in Thailand: rather they enjoy a symbiotic relationship, each thriv- ing off each other’. The ebb and flow of elite paction also forms an important thread between these elements as they inform the development of the political system, often guided by the monarchy, which is seen as having the role of bringing balance to society. This is a role which was revived and reinforced under the long reign of King Bhumibol (1946–), a monarch widely loved and respected by the Thai people, leading to specu- lation that when the King died, the role of the monarchy would be severely attenuated. Commentators have suggested that examining the development of the Thai media industry has been to track the development of the modern state, paralleling the nation’s political history as it moved from dic- tatorship to democracy. In other words: ‘to trace the history of mass media laws in Thailand is to be witness to the history of democracy itself in the country’ (Muntarbhorn 1998, p. 25). In the light of the media’s complicit role in the 2006 coup, however, this assessment now has to be revised.
A unified Thai kingdom was first established in the mid-fourteenth century, and run by a ‘quasi-hereditary class of nobles dominated increas- ingly by a small group of families’ (Chandler et al. 1971, p. 64). Known as Siam until 1939, Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country never invaded by a European power. This is attributed to the flexible nature of elements of the Thai political elite in the face of the emerging power of the West.
The beginnings of the modern state have their root in a critical period from its consolidation under the military general turned king, Taksin, in the eighteenth century. This was continued through the rule of Rama I (1782–1809), who cemented a system of relationships between the monar- chy and the nobles under which power and patronage deserved rewards (Mulder 1997, p. 316), as well as the centrality of Buddhism and the monk- hood. Through the rule of his sons Rama II (1809–1824) and Rama III
(1824–1855), Thailand saw the growth of Siamese influence in the central Indochinese Peninsula and flourishing foreign trade. It was, however, Mongkut (1851–1868), and his son Chulalongkorn (1868–1910), who real- ized the culmination of the Chakri dynasty’s efforts to modernize Thailand in the face of the external challenge mounted by Western colo- nialism and Western science and technology.
It was Mongkut and son who ultimately transformed Siam, from a tra- ditional into a modern nation state. Mongkut had close contact with the West and, therefore, was representative of an elite group within Siam who were ‘less likely to underestimate the West than their fathers or neighbours’
(Chandler et al. 1971, p. 117). So, although under the 1855 Bowring Treaty – signed by Mongkut and British colonial representative, Sir John Bowring – the Thai state offered a position of compromise under which it surrendered substantial sovereignty, it was a position which proved prag- matically adjusted to the new nineteenth century reality as Burma and China, states which proved less flexible, became subject to the colonial powers.
Mongkut embraced Western ideas from engineering to politics, and negotiated an arrangement with the Western colonial powers, France and the UK, which kept Thailand independent. This accommodation saw the development of an economic infrastructure and the creation of a bureau- cratic framework in the late nineteenth century, which delineated the ongoing relationship between the Thai state, its neighbours and the global powers, and the design of the role of the monarchy to bring balance to the system, a role which resonates today in a monarchy that: ‘in the face of external demands, was to lead the nation to the acceptance of what was minimally necessary for its survival and to balance the personal and insti- tutional interests at court in order to prevent conflict and paralysis’
(Chandler et al. 1971, p. 122).
These early characteristics of the Thai state resonated through the blood- less revolution in 1932, which led to a constitutional monarchy, an alliance with Japan during the Second World War, and Thailand becoming a US ally following the conflict. They continued to inform the cultural context in which the media industry developed, with the Thais confident early adopters of technology, yet restrained by a consensual censorship and authoritarian patrons uncomfortable with criticism. Given its experience of expansionism, openness to outside ideas, history of interaction with the US, and ability to absorb new material and influences, Thai political culture is a ‘noisy and bruising world’ (Reynolds 1998, p. 126).
Approximately the size of France, with a landmass of 500 000 square kilometres, Thailand borders Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia.
By the turn of the twenty-first century, it remained a very rural country
(Gunaratne 2000a). As with many of its neighbours, Thailand’s tropical environment continued ‘to constrain and shape life as do geographical real- ities’ (Keyes 1989, pp. 6–7). And, as with much of Southeast Asia, income and wealth distribution were ‘increasingly skewed’ (Hewison 1997, p. 110).
In addition, although Thailand was also a relatively homogenous commu- nity, about 75 per cent Thai, 14 per cent Chinese and 95 per cent Buddhist, by 2006 it was currently facing armed insurgency in its three Muslim- majority southernmost provinces.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the idea of a nation under fatherly guidance still had a ‘compelling logic’ (Mulder 1997, p. 311). The role of the King was never purely constitutional since the 1950s’ arrange- ment developed by Bhumibol and General Prem Tinsulanonda – chief advisor to the King, and key mover in the 2006 coup, appointing the post coup parliament and the interim government of Surayud Chulanont. As late as 2006, the King indirectly intervened in the political crisis via his Privy Council.6This reflected the success of an ongoing effort by the Palace to move back to the centre of Thai politics dating back to the 1950s, sug- gesting the constitutional monarchy initially created in 1932 was merely a temporary setback as the Palace sought to accommodate itself with emerg- ing modernity (Handley 2006).
Despite the search for a political structure conducive to the modern Thai public since the constitutional monarchy was established in the 1930s, the creation of a bureaucracy and military manned by people nurtured by the state and educated overseas, and the global flow of ideas which exerted a powerful influence on public discourse, the continuing importance of the family meant ‘patronage arrangements remain the mainstay of Thai society; they carry on into the present where business-affiliated politicians have taken over from aristocrats’ (Mulder 1997, p. 181). This engrained feature of Thai society was often a ‘synonym for corruption’ (Muntarbhorn 1998, p. 34). Since the media could throw light on this or could be part of the system, it had long existed as a weapon with which sections of the polit- ical elites could attack each other such that, by the turn of the century, the flavour of politics was still ‘personal not programmatic . . . commanded by godfathers in all spheres’ (Mulder 1997, p. 314).
Even the expansion and diversification of the economy, the rise of a Sino-Thai class of business people and professionals, the explosion of edu- cation, and the spread of the media which took place as a result of the poli- cies of Mongkut and Chulalongkorn, had a limited impact on the composition of the political elites and the Thai public world remained the domain of a small minority of educated and/or influential people (Mulder 1997, p. 341). Political parties developed as ‘trading outfits reflecting the business interests of rival provincial elites’ (McCargo 2000b, p. 136). The
state and the political elites continued to find the media useful for legit- imization, ‘producing a steady stream of propaganda and by covering up the more unsavoury aspects of the exercise of power’ (Mulder 1997, p. 322).