when they were uncertainly restored to Southeast Asia by the British after the surrender of the Japanese. In 1945, a third of Indonesia’s press disap- peared.
Early independence brought some freedoms: under the 1945 constitu- tion, freedom of speech and of the press was guaranteed. When indepen- dence was granted in 1949, commentators suggested it ushered in ‘an era of press freedom plus western liberal democracy’ (Sinaga 1989, p. 30).
However, this era of openness drew to a close in 1959, when indepen- dent Indonesia’s founding father, President Sukarno, introduced ‘Guided Democracy’, requiring publication permits under which the press was required to sign an agreement tying them to the government, the opposi- tion press was banned and ANTARA, Indonesia’s wire news service, became government-controlled. This was an important move – under Suharto’s New Order, ANTARA became an official mouthpiece for gov- ernment activities, since all other media quoted ANTARA regarding public events and other official activities. The use of ANTARA news meant that other Indonesian media could rely upon ANTARA’s accounts and so could also play it safe in not being critical toward the government (Haryanto 2006).
The controls were part of Sukarno’s effort to shore up power. Sukarno defined the mass communication media as a vehicle for the creation of a
‘national culture’ (Sen and Hill 2000, p. 11). When television was first intro- duced in 1962, in order to showcase the 4th Asian Games that year, it was clearly an arm of the government. Taking over where radio left off, Televesi Republik Indonesia(TVRI), was used to communicate government policies and build society (Gunaratne 2000b, p. 270).
But, this period of ‘Guided Democracy’ was ‘characterized by . . . intense ideological debates’ (Sen and Hill 2000, p. 3). There were heated dis- cussions, particularly in the Jakarta press, reflecting the growing divisions in society and Sukarno’s dwindling influence. Debate intensified until 1965, when the army seized power, finally replacing Sukarno with military general Suharto in March 1966, and communist papers, Chinese language papers (except one official Chinese daily ‘Herian Indonesia’) and left-wing papers were banned (Gunaratne 2000b, p. 268).
THE NEW ORDER AND THE CONTROL OF
Suharto used television to create his Indonesia. Satellite served to carry his visual images to television sets around the nation.
Although the first Press Law passed by the parliament in 1966 provided for press freedoms, these were put into the context of the state ideology, pancasila. Suharto’s brutal suppression of student protests in 1974, and the closure of newspapers for their coverage of the uprising, underlined Suharto’s authoritarian attitudes to the flow of information. Suharto’s
‘mantra’ was clear: stability and economic development ahead of democ- racy and transparency (Harsono 2000, p. 81).
The New Order tried ‘relentlessly’ to make Jakarta the centre of the domestic culture and of the perception industries. This was part of the efforts to centralize power under Suharto and the single-minded push to make Jakarta the epicentre not only politically, but also economically and culturally. Turning his will to uniting the country, and centralizing power, Suharto tried to prevent regional, ethnic, linguistic and religious differences from taking a political form, by seeking to ‘authorize’ them (Keeler 1987, p. 79). In addition, Suharto also created an ‘intricate web of relations between the press and the government’ (Anwar 1978, pp. 263–4).
As Suharto sought to centralize power and maintain the physical integrity of the Indonesian state, much like his neighbours Singapore and Malaysia, he saw Indonesia’s diversity as problematic. Suharto sought to control any separatist tendencies through his SARA legislation (Suku, Agama dan Ras, meaning clan, religion and race) which, alongside the colo- nial legislation, also allowed him legal control over the media. This was further supported by the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Social Affairs which represented the propaganda machinery of the ruling GOLKAR party with General Suharto and his New Order at its head.
Initially, Suharto’s family and close allies controlled the privately-owned media but, as the industry expanded, a more indirect control was necessary.
By the 1990s, other groups moved in to control new media operations.
Membership of this new family, however, depended on being prepared to operate under ‘the constraints imposed by the New Order government’
(Hill 1996, p. 86). Suharto’s time in power marked the growth in influence of powerful corporate conglomerates and the political and business influence of powerful families in the country – many connected to Suharto through his GOLKAR party. Indeed, concern about them internally and externally contributed to the fall of the New Order (Robison 2001, p. 109).
But, Suharto also delivered remarkable economic change. During the 30 years between 1966 and 1996, the important economic and social indica- tors over this period ‘far exceeded the expectations of even the most opti- mistic observers at the beginning of the regime’ (Hill 1996, p. 255). An associated feature of the New Order was ‘the emergence of an affluent
urban middle class’ (Hooker 1993, p. 3), leading to an expansion in demand for the media: in the 1950s sales of newspapers were about 50 000 copies, by 1973 total circulation was 1.5 million (Suanto 1978, p. 230).
Television was particularly easy to police. The state broadcaster, TVRI, provided a news monopoly from Jakarta. Even the independent television stations when they were started after 1995 were backed by influential con- glomerates, and prepared to manipulate their coverage: choice of story, timing of reports, choice of perspective in pictures and quotes, reflected the status quo, producing ‘uncontroversial products’ (Sen and Hill 2000, pp. 126–31).
The impact of satellite, however, was ambiguous. The same technology that was used to unite Indonesia around Suharto’s political and cultural capital, Jakarta, also provided avenues for alternative messages facilitating diversity and division. Satellite television, however, enabled Suharto to send out his unifying messages from Jakarta so, unlike Singapore, Indonesia did not ban satellite dishes.
Suharto also perceived the ‘satellite slush’ (Keane 1991, p. 82), emanat- ing from international broadcasters as uncontroversial products. Similar to the situation in Malaysia, business news like that conveyed by ABN/CNBC Asia, was seen to be a positive element helping develop the ‘tiger’
economies of Asia. The upshot, however, was that there could be no attempts to stop people watching foreign television broadcasts, increasing the relative porosity of the Indonesian state compared with Singapore. Just as, for many years, the Achenese could watch British football relayed on Malaysian television, they could also see and hear the messages conveyed by the more anti-western Malay channels beamed across the Straits of Malacca.
What is important to note in the light of the issues discussed in this book is that these satellite broadcasts became central to the failure of Suharto to reassert his grip after the humiliation of the Asian Financial Crisis, and the consequent delegitimization of the New Order. In 1996, RTP International, a Portuguese satellite television service, began broadcasting into East Timor, using transponder space on the largely Chinese-owned AsiaSar 2.
The Portuguese government encouraged East Timor’s struggle for self- determination, and the Indonesian authorities were helpless to control its broadcasts. Further, the entry of global news networks into Indonesia – CNN, Reuters, BBC, ABN/CNBC and TF-1 (France) – increased compe- tition for local viewers, and it was these global media organizations that carried the pictures of chaos as the army battled protestors in 1998, into homes in Indonesia and around the world, leading to Suharto’s eventual resignation and reminding political elites around Southeast Asia of the importance of being the gatekeeper for the new media.