In Southeast Asia, governments view information communications technol- ogy as an important element in political change. From the dusk of colonial power, when newspapers expanded the public sphere allowing space for the flow of ideas of nationalism and independence, the media and other com- munications technology has been a resource to be fought over by competing political elites. The move towards democracy, however, is not as straightfor- ward as it is made out to be by those who support the argument that eco- nomic development in the form of industrialization creates the conditions for the transition to, and the consolidation of, democracy.
Democracy is most obviously demonstrated through elections in which citizens choose their representatives. However, it is clear that, from a
Southeast Asian perspective, ‘democracy’ is not a clear-cut category. Regular elections, by themselves, are not enough for a country to be ‘democratic’, as countries like Singapore and Malaysia show. Instead, a state’s democratic credentials involve assessing many, if not all, aspects of governance and the political system.
Classically, Robert Dahl (1971) maintained democracy requires not only free, fair and competitive elections, but also the freedoms that make elec- tions meaningful (such as freedom of organization and freedom of expres- sion), alternative sources of information and institutions to ensure that government policies depend on the votes and preferences of citizens. Thus, democracy is not just about majority rule, but requires political freedoms so there can be debate and independent decision making, as well as limita- tions on power and the independence of institutions such as the judiciary and the media.
Commonly recognized essential components of democracy include:
multi-party electoral competition, freedom of association, freedom of movement, independent media, and the rule of law. Achieving such free- doms may be an evolutionary process which affords different patterns of democracy. Thus Diamond (2002) draws a distinction between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism, suggesting that what separates them is the freedom, fairness, inclusiveness and meaningfulness of their elections.
Explanations for the evident waves of democratization in the late twen- tieth century that implied an inevitable development must be seen as simplistic (Huntington 1991). Studies by Cardoso and Faletto (1980), O’Donnell (1973), and others have demonstrated that economic develop- ment is as easily compatible with authoritarian regimes as it is with demo- cratic ones. Huntington (1991), suggests that democratic consolidation is facilitated under conditions of an expanding economic system, such that it generates necessary surplus resources that can be used for redistri- bution, thereby legitimizing the democratic process. Yet, countries such as Singapore and Malaysia are authoritarian systems that maintain legiti- macy by the relatively equitable distribution of resources from their expanding economies.
Similarly, any suggestion that there is a natural expansion of democracy looks ill-considered as democracy, as we shall see illustrated particularly well in the Thailand case (Chapter 7), ebbs and flows, and may be lost completely.
Nor does it seem that the ideals of democracy are necessarily universal, and could rather be a result of the effective export of these ideas through the political and cultural dominance of Western liberal democracies. In particu- lar, questions have been raised as to the disproportionately low number of Muslim states with democratic government. Whitehead (2002) suggests
democratization is a complex, long-term process, the outcome of which is not certain – more than just the creation of democratic institutions, it is a social construction informed by past experiences which govern behaviour such that competing actors do not always have the incentive to behave
‘civilly’. He suggests the success of democracy is not just about quantifiable terms like the Freedom House indices, but what people think of its perfor- mance. This, he maintains, is a function of whether the government meets the popular expectations, plus the society’s political culture which influences the expectations people bring to the new democracy.
Another useful analysis is that provided by Di Palma (1990). Di Palma suggests that by focusing on the objective conditions that make democracy probable, sociological and historical theories of democracy often lose sight of what is possible. He explores those conciliatory political undertakings that political actors engage in to make the improbable possible. His empha- sis is on political crafting: in regard to constitutional choices, to alliances and convergences between contestants, to trade-offs, to the pacing of the transitions. Di Palma also examines the reasons – stalemate, the high cost of repression, a loss of goals, international constraints and inducements – that may motivate incumbents and non-democratic political actors to accept democracy. Di Palma suggests that, as we can see in post-Suharto Indonesia (Chapter 6), ‘what starts as an effort by members of the old elite to rescue the status quo may take an unintended direction as the members of the elite with more innovative dispositions join in’ (Di Palma 1990, p. 34). Nor is the development of democracy only suited to particular con- ditions, as modernist developmental theory suggests. Friedman (1994), rec- ognizes that democracy is one of many political possibilities, and one which demands a broad consensus between a number of political contenders:
The myth of either-or tyranny or freedom, authoritarianism or democracy, the terror or the old order, the ‘outs’ replacing the ‘ins’, all obscure the reality of democratization as a process of broad coalitions that cut across the antagonis- tic opposites of established elites and new challengers and thereby facilitates peaceful institutionalization, legitimating democracy by involving much of the old in the new. (Friedman 1994, p. 43)
Friedman further maintains that the evidence of East Asia, with its cultural diversity, proves the ability of democratic norms to take root in many different types of cultural traditions. He suggests that Taiwan and South Korea are particularly good examples, underlining the fact that democracy is not a regionally distinct phenomenon that can only develop in Western Europe.
After all, political change does not occur in a national vacuum.
Increasingly, in the context of globalization, there are external influences:
‘foreign factors – defeat in war, conquest, allies, foreign pressure, foreign models – often have large impacts on democratization’ (Friedman 1994, p. 33). Moreover, with democratization in Asia best understood as part of a global process, there is a subliminal role for global communications. As Friedman suggests, democratic aspirations have become a common belief, if not a common understanding, and the beginning of a process of build- ing a democratic political culture. Thus democratic ideals can be the consequence rather than the cause of democratization, and the democrati- zation of East Asia is ‘best understood as part of the global process’
(Friedman 1994, p. 23). One needs only to look at the significant increase in the public understanding of democracy brought in Indonesia by the voter education programmes to see that, for many, democratic principles
‘can only be internalized by actually working within the democratic process’ (Dalton and Shin 2003, p. 19).
The ebb and flow of political change becomes more easily understood when democracy is seen as a ‘matter of rules for mediating plural and conflicting interests’ (Di Palma 1990, p. 258). The comparative speed with which it has been introduced in many developing countries means they lack the necessary institutions or these institutions, newly established, are not tested. As a result, when democracy is introduced abruptly and against the wishes of some players, ‘the “losers” will resist it, and the “winners”, will be less than fully at ease with its methods. Thus consolidation is placed in doubt, while backsliding is an ever-present possibility’ (ibid.).
What this book underlines, however, is the central part the media plays in this political process as it unfolds in Southeast Asia. As we shall see in each of the case studies from Southeast Asia, local elites craft expectations via the media. They also face pressure for change through the conscious and unconscious spread of ideas through the globalized media, but they are becoming increasingly adept at using the communications media as a resource to influence and persuade as they indulge in political crafting. So, as we will see, while there is also an increasing use of information commu- nication technology for the expression and coalescing of opposition pres- sure, the role of the media remains ambiguous but important as the political elites meet the growing demands of pressure groups emerging within society.