state and the political elites continued to find the media useful for legit- imization, ‘producing a steady stream of propaganda and by covering up the more unsavoury aspects of the exercise of power’ (Mulder 1997, p. 322).
under the Chakri rulers before 1932 than they were allowed during consti- tutional regimes. Ironically, the Thai press could be seen as at its ‘freest under absolute monarchy’ (Gunaratne 2000a, p. 432).
It was the monarchy that first attempted to control the press through a Royal Decree in 1917, which formed the basis for Thailand’s law on defamation. Then, through the 1922 Act on Documents and Newspapers, whereby the media must seek permission to publish, and the 1927 Licensing Act, the King sought to define the rights, duties and scope of publishing organizations.
Significantly, the media has always stepped around the monarchy which was perceived as the final arbiter of power (Keyes 1989, p. 193), but when, in 1932, the absolute monarchy was terminated in the first of many military coups, despite a constitution guaranteeing freedom to publish, systematic censorship by the state began. As well as installing many bureaucratic hurdles, under Phibun Songkram (1938–1957) the media’s ability to report news continued to be hindered by legal means, for example the 1941 Printing Act that gave the authorities the power to close media organiza- tions. This trend continued under Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat (1959–
1963). His government issued the law Announcement No. 17, which required the licensing of all newspaper publishers.
So, just as the media helped develop the public space for the expression of opinion and ideas, including those of equality, so elite patronage meant it was also used as a tool of inequality, and was manipulated by those who sought to monopolize power and resources rather than distribute them.
Only a year after the 1932 revolution, the Department of Propaganda was established and charged with ‘publishing government announcements, news and government official speeches to promote and legitimize the new political order’ (Suriyasarn 1997). Marshal Phibun used key propaganda architect, Luang Wichitwathakan, to mould the nation, particularly using radio to convey political ideas that reflected Phibun’s view of society, which showed a ‘deft use of the mass media provided support for his regime and its policies’ (Pongsudivak 1997, p. 220).
The example of Japan informed much of the authoritarian position of Southeast Asia’s political elites towards the mass media from the 1930s onward, and Thailand was no exception. Already looking to their North Asian neighbours for guidance on modernization before the conflict, accommodation during the Second World War was a meeting of minds for Thailand’s political strongmen. During the Second World War, while prac- tical constraints such as a shortage of resources contributed to the restric- tion of publishing, the Printing Act of 1941 introduced broad powers to curb press freedom on grounds of conflict with public order and morals. By the end of the War, and the rise of military governments into the 1990s,
authoritarian governments never felt comfortable with press freedoms and, as a result, ‘censorship was rampant’ (Muntarbhorn 1998, p. 27).
The regimes of Sarit and Thanom carried Phibun’s media legacy: Sarit (1957–1963) showed ‘shrewd use of press interviews to gain legitimacy fol- lowing the 1957 coup’ (Pongsudivak 1997, p. 220), and Thanom (1963–
1973) used the print media for legitimacy and consensus building. During the 1950s to the 1970s the state doctrine was the confrontation of commu- nism. This meant sporadic clampdowns, usually led by the military, on any newspapers with Leftish sympathies. Many journalists were arrested during this time for being left-wing or antithetical toward military rule, as politi- cal elites moved to protect their own interests and media controls were explained as ‘essential to protect the monarch and to counter communist insurgency’ (Chongkittavorn 2000, p. 222).
By the 1950s, the growing popularity of newspapers amongst an emerg- ing and literate urban middle class made their licences a valuable com- modity, and encouraged a popular press that remained sensational and full of inaccuracies. By the 1960s, as competition for circulation heightened, sex and sensationalism came at the expense of political issues – they were, after all, subjects that were less like to attract the ire of the political elites. But, by the end of the Thanom government, although the media remained a tool of political elites and interest groups rather than an independent actor or commentator, there were signs of the increased politicization of the urban Thais and, to cater for this demand, the press became more ‘incisive and critical’ (McCargo 2000a, p. 9).
Indeed, in 1973, when Thanom’s regime gave way to Thailand’s first civil- ian Prime Minister since 1956, Sanya Dharmasakti, he told editors to tell him what the people wanted. But what resulted was the increasing identification of the press with particular interests and the growth of per- sonal relationships between the media and the government, which all resulted in partisan reporting as newspapers came ‘to identify with partic- ular, friendly power holders and their ongoing access to information – and in a sense their commercial survival – relied on supporting their patrons on their pages’ (Chongkittavorn 2000, p. 223). In the end, this ‘degenerated into sensationalism, muckraking . . . corruption’ (Gunaratne 2000a, p. 434).
Despite these tendencies and the obvious controls, liberal newspapers and magazines developed, and were instrumental in the 14 October 1973 popular revolt against the military, acting as a ‘spectator, providing infor- mation from the students to the people, leading to Thanom’s downfall’
(Pongsudivak 1997, p. 221). The events of 1973, were the ‘closest thing Thailand ever had to a revolution’ (Owen 2005, p. 359). After a brief period of democratic government in 1969, and mounting student activism around
the world in the late 1960s, students poured onto the streets of Bangkok in their hundreds of thousands, mobilizing mass power for probably the first time in the Thai polity. When military and police leaders refused to order troops to attack crowds of students which contained their own children, Thanom and his close associates fled the country.
The immediate objective was the unseating of the ‘Three Tyrants’, but the long-term goal, the institution of democratic government, was to prove beyond them. Thailand slipped into chaos, as the social cleavages between
‘rich and poor, city and countryside, management and labour, monarchist and anarchist, revolutionary and conservative, came to the fore’ (Owen 2005, p. 359). The explosion of new media gave voice to complaints about
‘social justice, corruption, abuse of power, and economic exploitation’
(Handley 2006, p. 217).
But the laws to enforce censorship remained and when the military crack- down took place in October 1976, with a massacre of student activists, and the period of democracy ended, all newspapers were banned. When they were allowed to begin printing again, although still in the hands of the private sector, the moderate and conservative publications allowed to exist had to fire undesirable journalists and bar others from writing (McCargo 2000a, p. 11). There remained a commercial imperative to the business: the new regime, the National Administrative Reform Council (NARC), began its own newspaper, the Chao Phraya, but it was so unpopular that it folded within three months (Chongkittavorn 2000, p. 223).
From 1976 onwards, the search began for a political arrangement that would suit the competing interests. In 1977, the King moved to secure a central place in the political order, allying with the extreme right and using the growing internal unrest and the fear of communism, to install a mili- tary government under the rule of a general favourable to the monarchy, Prem Tinsulanonda.
Political parties had some success in mobilizing popular support behind economic and social issues, as pressures grew from the Thai middle class for a more representative and transparent political process. This was interwo- ven with efforts by right-wing groups in the military to maintain a hold on power, and the royalists who wanted to ensure the continued centrality of King Bhumibol. The sixteenth constitution of 1977 was very different from the 15 previous attempts. It was drafted by independents, open to public scrutiny and consultation and voted on by parliament in an attempt to break the mould of past vested interests (McBride 2002).
These developments came alongside the development of communica- tions technology which challenged the traditional state control of the flow of information across Southeast Asia. Thailand was no exception. In January 1982, shortly after banning an issue of Newsweekfor cover pictures
that ‘unmindfully’ positioned Prem higher than the King, Prem’s govern- ment banned the Asian Wall Street Journalcompletely, for an opinion piece titled ‘Can Thailand’s Monarchy Survive This Century’ suggesting that the monarchy’s political interventions were ‘self-endangering’ (Handley 2006, p. 293).
But, even as the economic development of the 1980s and 1990s contin- ued to play against military control, and the communications media became increasingly independent, the military was able to retain its control of the broadcast media, securing its political role and bringing it into conflict with the entrepreneurial interests emerging from the Thai business community.
Thus, the defining elements of the development of the Thai media were its interplay with authoritarian control, and its manipulation by competing elites. At least until the Second World War, mass media was confined to Bangkok. But, as its influence spread and it was used by new business elites to question the authority of the state, the military and the conservative monarchy reacted to any opposition they feared would undermine their authority. At the same time, as well as expressing political views, the Press was, at least in its popular form, stylistically embracing sensationalism or
‘yellow journalism’ (Keyes 1989, p. 193). The combination of tolerance and free-wheeling capitalism gave rise to a press that was ‘lively, scandalous, licentious, overenthusiastic, and often shallow’ (Mulder 1997, p. 183).
This often meant the media’s reactions seemed to be a far cry from the cultural values of order, obedience and social respect that were said by the proponents of the Asian Values thesis to have underpinned the economic growth rates of East Asian countries (Inoguchi and Newman 1997). It is a trend that has continued into the twenty-first century, with the popular press like Thai Rath, Daily News, Naew Nam Khao Sodand Ban Muengserving up a diet of ‘crime, sex and scandal, and sport’ (Gunaratne 2000a, p. 442).
Even the once quality Thai language press like Matichonhad loosened up, while Siam Rath, Thailand’s oldest vernacular newspaper – created by palace supporters (Handley 2006, p. 194) – lost its reputation for quality when it was sold to a famous gambler, known for operating illegal gambling dens during the Asian financial crisis (Chongkittavorn 2002, p. 256).
By contrast, this has left the English language dailies Bangkok Postand The Nationto maintain investigative journalism. The Nationeven started what it described as a new, mass-market daily; an intelligent ‘family paper’, Kom Chad Leuk – Thai for ‘sharp’, ‘focused’ and ‘deep’ – ‘unlike other Thai newspapers, this one is splashed with colourful, bite-sized stories; it’s long on lifestyle issues, short on sex and crime’ (Granitsas and Crispin 2002).
However, during Thaksin’s rule, the continued independence of The Nation, which had been critical of Thaksin, was the subject of specula-
tion when shares in the company were bought by close relatives of Communication and Transportation Minister Suriya Jungrungreungkij, Secretary General of the Thai Rak Thai party (Daorueng 2003). So, while media owners have reacted to the fact that ‘if a paper becomes too serious or too tame, its readers will complain’ (Heuvel and Dennis 1993, p. 167), and differences in ownership are ‘reflected in the ways . . . [the media]
attend to popular tastes’ (Keyes 1989, p. 192), the Thai media is clearly seen as an important tool to legitimize political elites as they manoeuvre to protect their positions of power and influence.