Narrating Their ‘Upstairs’ Ties in the Post-Apartheid Period (circa 1990-2005)
3. South Africa and Malaysia’s Socio-Political Bonds
3.4 Consolidating Connections: Laying Foundations for a Partnership
During the early part of 1998 Mr. Mbeki delivered his well known African Renaissance speech which echoed similar ideas embedded in the Asian Renaissance speech that was made by the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, namely Dato Anwar Ibrahim (1996) and those made by Dr. Mahathir (cf. Makaruddin 2000; also see Chapter Six the section on ‘Asian Renaissance vis-à-vis African Renaissance’). When Mills (1999: 391) published his article ‘Malaysian Economic Crisis: A Comparative Perspective,’ he quoted a few lines from Anwar Ibrahim’s speech and illustrated how similar they were to those echoed by Mbeki. The African Renaissance speech, which invigorated some debate within South African academic circles, was welcomed in some - and not all - quarters on the African continent. Nevertheless, it stimulated pockets of Africans to reconsider their position within world affairs. Mbeki’s thoughts on this theme were also similar in content to those delivered by Mahathir when the latter spoke about and elaborated upon ‘Asian Values.’ Mbeki highlighted African values, which were and remain rooted in the concept of Ubuntu(i.e. humaneness).
When the 12th Non-Aligned Movement meeting was organized and hosted by South Africa between the 29th of August and the 3rd of September of 1998, South Africa took over the chair and thus demonstrated its ability to lead NAM members into the years that followed. It was within NAM that both South Africa and Malaysia found an added avenue via which they continued to show warmth and friendship towards one another.
And this was given added weight when Mr. Mbeki visited Malaysia during mid September to be at the Commonwealth Games and at the same time pay a visit to the Malaysian government that was publicly celebrating its ‘Malaysian Identity’ and using
‘sport’ as an instrument of foreign policy (cf. van der Westhuizen 2004: 1285-1288).
The recession and economic slump continued into 1998 and this meant that Malaysia had to brace itself for the coming years. As it was trying to manage the crisis, Mahathir used the opportunity to criticize the international media for the negative reporting of Malaysia,
accused the USA of meddling in Malaysian affairs, and question IMF’s tough prescriptions (Felker 1999: 43-54; Funston 2000: 167). Whilst his tough stand against these institutions might be considered understandable in the light of the crisis and the speculations regarding the cause of the crisis, it came as a shock to the Malaysian nation when Mahathir consciously decided to sack his well-liked, popular deputy, Anwar Ibrahim on the 2nd of September 1998. Funston (2000) titled his article ‘Malaysia: A Fateful September’ to capture the mood of that particular month. Prior to this – at the UMNO general assembly of June 1998 - a booklet entitled Fifty Reasons why Anwar cannot be Prime Minister was circulated to its almost 2000 members and this caused a rift within the party; those who fully endorsed Ibrahim’s candidacy for the post as Prime Minister questioned the purpose of the text and in reaction raised corruption charges against government as well as the nepotistic behaviour by government officials (Case 1999: 2-6; Verma 2004: 147-148; Funston 2000: 170-171; Eldridge 2002: 108-110).
Anwar Ibrahim’s sacking and his subsequent incarceration was indeed a blow to the image of Malaysia for he was seen – at that time - as the most obvious successor to Mahathir. Milne & Mauzy (1999: 156) identified three key reasons for Mahathir’s actions: (a) Ibrahim’s conservative economic policies, (b) signs of militancy and aggressiveness displayed within Ibrahim’s wide spread support group particularly the UMNO youth and (c) the perception that Ibrahim had weakened due to the character attacks against him. These authors (1999: 156-157) demonstrated how Mahathir used his executive powers to slowly elbow Ibrahim out of office as Deputy Prime Minister. In fact, this acrimonious event tangibly demonstrated that Mahathir’s actions was that of an authoritarian who disregarded the rule of law and employed unsavoury tactics to get rid of anyone that opposed him. Mahathir did not give any credence to the ‘emancipatory project’ when he exercised his executive powers and nor did he take cognizance of the oppositional voices that echoed far and wide across Malaysia.
Apart from the Ibrahim episode, Khoo (2000: 170-175) recorded other developments that added to the crisis. The one was the question of reformasi, a social movement that was proposed by Ibrahim and which demanded justice and reform; and the other was the
emergence of Barisan Alternatif, a coalition of opposition parties including KeADILan (sic) – party led by Ibrahim’s wife, Wan Aziza (Mohamad 2001: 212; Verma 2004: 118).
These two groups posed a threat to UMNO’s, which prepared itself for the general elections in November 1999, hegemonic position. Verma (2004: 118) submitted by stating that the Ibrahim affair was a critical one in Malaysia’s political history because it raised questions about (a) the rule of law, (b) the independence of the judiciary, and (c) the professionalism of the police force. Mohamad (2001: 211) captured the situation quite well when she stated that ‘the Anwar crisis, which began as a contest over leadership in the party, culminated in the manifestation of a dislocation in Malay identity politics.’ She then clarified what was meant by this identity crisis and how it played itself out during the year of Anwar Ibrahim’s arrest and the years thereafter.
On the issue of Ibrahim’s arrest and subsequent incarceration, there was a deafening silence from the side of Mandela’s government as far as could be ascertained. Why the silence, one may wish to ask, when South Africa upheld ‘human rights’ and was generally in the forefront against arrests such as this; one where there was no tangible proof of the allegations that were made by Mahathir and his support group against Ibrahim. It is quite ironic that Mandela did not keep silent in the Ken Saro-Wiwa case and even went so far as to request some form of sanction against the Abacha regime.
Perhaps Mandela realized that he had burnt his fingers in the latter case and thus chose not to say a word and nor in any way interfere in Malaysia’s internal affairs. But is also reflected that there was a cosy and friendly relationship that existed between Mandela and Mahathir and that overshadowed any other development. I assume Mandela was not keen to rock the Malaysian boat that found itself in the choppy Malaysian straits at that time. The incident said much for South African and Malaysian relations and does bring into the open South Africa’s stand on Malaysia’s position with regards to human rights issues such as the Ibrahim case in particular and human rights in Southeast Asia in general (cf. Eldridge 2002). For those critical of realism, this was and remained a grave matter that needed immediate attention by members of the world communities;
unfortunately, the governments were mute but some NGOs – as expected – voiced their concerns. Be that as it may, let me return and continue to narrate the unfolding Malaysian
story.
By June 1999, when Ahmad Badawi was appointed as Mahathir’s deputy after months of speculation (Felker 2000: 49), the South African government appointed honorary consuls in the states of Penang and Sarawak respectively, and in August, the then Deputy President of South Africa, Mr. Jacob Zuma attended the 4th LID meeting, which took place months after the 3rd SAID meeting in Zimbabwe. And in October South Africa sent representatives to participate in the Asia-Africa Business Forum that was held in Kuala Lumpur. During November 1999, just after the Malaysian election took place and when it was announced that the BN was victorious, members of the Northern Province legislature and other stakeholders from the province paid an official visit to Malaysia and on the 15th November; a special gathering was held to meet the delegates. This meeting was jointly organized under the auspices of the South African High Commission, MSABC, Asian Strategy Leadership Institute and the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry Malaysia. The visit was significant in that it was one of the first official visits to Malaysia after the 1997 and 1998 Asian crises and it laid the grounds for the coming of other official delegations to Malaysia.
Malaysia was still reeling after the Ibrahim debacle, and Mahathir had to contend with numerous protests led by Ibrahim’s supporters. Mahathir however kept these protests in check. On the regional front, the relationship between Malaysia and ASEAN was not at all pleasant, and Mahathir chose not to attend the November 1999 Summit that took place in Manila (cf. Felker 2000). The basic reason was that he was busy securing his position at home and preparing for the elections; an election that he was not very confident of because of the Ibrahim affair. Fortunately for him and UMNO, he was re-elected into power. It should be stated that by then many speculated that he would step down but because of his resilience and despite the growing internal opposition, he managed to hold on to power for a few more years. After the elections, he regained his energies and strength and re-directed his energies in championing the course of the South. He thus graced the LID meeting where he addressed heads of state and captains of the industries
as well as the G-15 meeting in Cairo. He also presented the EAEC proposal at the ASEAN Summit of 2000. And he, yet again, took a swipe at the hegemonic role of the West during the era of globalization (Martinez 2001: 199).
Between the 15th and the 22nd of April in 2000, the same month when the South African Chapter for African Renaissance was established in Pretoria, the Deputy Minister for Finance, Expenditure and Economic Affairs in the Free State province led a delegation to Malaysia. During that visit the then – now Deputy President - Minister of Minerals and Energy, Ms. Phumizile Mlambo-Ngcuka, gave a special address on the ‘Investment opportunities in the Mining Industry’ on the 20th of April. And on the 23rd and 24th of May South African representatives attended the Asia-Africa Forum that was held in Kuala Lumpur under the theme: ‘Joining Hands for Strengthening Partnerships.’ During this period the Asia-Africa Investment and Technology Promotion Centre (AAITPC) was formally established in Kuala Lumpur after continuous consultation since 1993; the main purpose of this centre, which is under UN management, was to build linkages in the form of investments, trade and technology transfer from Asia to Africa. The centre is located within a framework of South-South Cooperation and aimed to assist business communities and institutional partners on both continents to identify business opportunities and create ‘a mutually beneficial win-win situation.’ This was followed by the SAID meeting that was initiated by Malaysia during the month of August 2000 in Maputo. On the 6th of September, Mr. Popo Molefe, the premier of the North West Province, delivered on behalf of his delegation an address in Kuala Lumpur to attract investments to his province. Soon after this event, Ms. Lindiwe Mabuza was appointed as the new South African High Commissioner to Malaysia during October 2000. According Funston (2001: 205), Malaysians have been searching for new opportunities to invest in Africa since it has been viewed as an acceptable model for the South. Their search may be attributed to an accelerated economic growth at 8%, which marked the levels achieved before the 1997 economic crisis, in 2000 (ibid 200).
Whilst Malaysia was enjoying this positive economic performance, the cultural activities
continued between South Africa and Malaysia. Since the ‘Cape Malay’ community shared historical links with the Southeast Asians, the community also shared religious and cultural connections. These connections have been nurtured through organizations such as GAPENA and other religio-cultural groups. In the light of these ties, the Selangor Council of Welfare and Social Development organized the Cape Malay Charitable Concert on the 23rd of June 2001 in Shah Alam to inform the Malaysians about the cultural practices that are still being kept alive in South Africa. During this period the Dr.
Nortier’s Rooibos Museum (NRM), which was established in 2000, decided to create a small permanent ‘Cape Malay’ display within NRM structure to share and show the Malaysians what ‘Cape Malay’ culture was like in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
Although the charitable concert and the latter display were at no stage dragged into an identity debate, some South African scholars such as Shamil Jeppie have been and remain opposed to the use of the term ‘Cape Malay’ and preferred the use of ‘Cape Muslims.’
Whilst I am inclined to accept this view, the employment of the latter term is not that simple either. In any event, reflexive theorists have generally viewed the issue of identity as problematic and contentious; and in essence it is an issue that is not easily resolvable and one that will continue to engage the minds of social scientists. As a matter of fact, I tried to briefly touch on the question of ‘Malay’ and ‘Malayness’ when I conceptualized
‘identity’ as one of the contested IR variables in Chapter Two.
Moving back to the story of consolidating the connections, the SAID meeting that took place on the 20th of August 2001 in Kampala, Uganda, discussed regional issues as well as the agenda for the Afro-Asia Dialogue conference that was to take place in Johannesburg between the 17th and 19th of February 2002. Soon after the Kampala gathering, in early September 2001, Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, met with her Malaysian counterpart to discuss issues of mutual concern and to establish a joint Ministerial Commission. And on the 23rd of October 2001 the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was launched in Abuja, Nigeria (cf. Bond 2002; Herbst & Mills 2003; Kotze & Steyn 2003; Hughes 2004;
Nkuhlu 2005).