Narrating Their ‘Upstairs’ Ties in the Post-Apartheid Period (circa 1990-2005)
3. South Africa and Malaysia’s Socio-Political Bonds
3.2 Re-Connecting: from informal support to diplomatic ties
South Africa during the pre-1994 period, Landsberg (2004: 12-13) pinpointed to three concurrent dimensions: (a) a political transition from apartheid to democracy, (b) an economic transition from a closed, white-dominated economy, to a gradually globalising, more open economy which increasingly strove for black participation, and (c) a military transition from resistance and armed struggle to democratic peace under democratic rule.
As a result of these events, the National Party (NP) under De Klerk’s leadership and the ANC were forced to negotiate. The NP, the ANC under Mandela and a number of other bona fide stakeholders participated in the CODESA negotiations, which involved a fair amount of compromises; these negotiations were part of an important constitutional process that eventually produced the 1993 interim Constitution (Deegan 1999: 16-17);
this interim Constitution contained a few basic values such as ‘the rule of law,’ and
‘freedom and equality’ that underpinned it and was thus able to take the South African society into a new era.
During the time when the negotiations were underway, members of the international community were spurred on by these socio-political developments in South Africa. Many showed an interest to forge links at various levels; some initiated diplomatic ties whilst others, being more circumspect, decided to wait for an official signal from the ANC to enter into a relationship with South Africa since they were aware that the UN sanctions were still firmly in place. Internally, South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was also gradually being overhauled in order to meet the needs of the changing international environment. With its slow shift in foreign policy it set up in March 1992 a Multilateral Affairs division, which accommodated space for countries from Asia (Muller 1999: 597). According to Landsberg (2004: 88), the De Klerk regime formulated three clear foreign policy strategies:
• Bringing to an end South Africa’s international ostracism and reintegrating it into the international community;
• Persuading the international community to end sanctions and support a liberal, free-market economic dispensation; and
• Securing international backing for the NP’s goal of a consociational democratic dispensation in which (white) minorities would enjoy a veto right over decision
making in a majoritarian system.
Evans (1993: 4), the then Director-General of Foreign Affairs under Minister Pik Botha, shared his thoughts on the DFA; he showed how DFA positioned itself to adapt to the new situation and how it anticipated significant links with countries in Asia and the Middle East (Pfister 2005: 125-130). In attempting to define South Africa’s Foreign Policy in the new climate, Evans (1993: 8) acknowledged that it should be a continuous, dynamic process and promote the country’s vital interests. It is indeed ironic for someone who had been part of an apartheid foreign affairs outfit to suddenly come up with a list of factors such as ‘South Africa is part of the African continent, (that is) a reality which creates a whole series of practical interests, needs, common problems, etc’ and ‘The South African government needs to be conscious of the major social and human problems of society’ that would provide parameters for South Africa’s policy determination (ibid 9-10). He admitted that under the De Klerk’s regime since 1990 certain countries were targeted; for example in Asia, on the one level, missions were opened in Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, and China and, on the other, channels of dialogue were created with countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan and India. This concretely demonstrated that De Klerk and his ilk thought they could steal a march on the ANC before it was able to establish a democratic government (Pfister 2005: 130-139). De Klerk was, it may be assumed, also aware that the ANC had ‘a distinctive international personality which enjoyed extensive legitimacy and enjoyed larger space in world affairs than did the South African state’ (Vale 1994: 80). There is no doubt that the apartheid South Africa under De Klerk’s leadership worked tirelessly at improving its international relations profile – part of what Evans (1993: 12-13) called the ‘image building’ process, and also opening up opportunities for its white dominated businesses to benefit before anyone else from South Africa would.
Turning our focus to Malaysia during the first three years of the 1990s, one witnesses some significant internal and external developments. Based on mere speculation, Hassan (1992: 29) posits the notion that the 1990s would mark the watershed decade for Malaysia. This speculative opinion was grounded in his interpretation of Malaysia’s
ambitious Vision 2020 plan that would transform the country into a fully developed country by the year 2020. Prior to peeping into this significant document, let me quickly record a few other developments before the document was issued.
Mahathir had been victorious in the late 1980s elections and he was able to continue his reign as Prime Minister into the 1990s. When the changes took place in South Africa, he adopted a cautious approach and bided his time until the circumstances were more favourable. Since he gained credibility within the ANC leadership and rank-and-file for his tough stand against apartheid throughout the 1980s, he was in constant communication with the leadership. In May 1990, when Nelson Mandela was on his travels to Nigeria, Mahathir, as a member of the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa (CCFMSA), met Mr. Mandela in person in Abuja.
Subsequent to this meeting a trip was planned to visit a few Asian states including Malaysia. In the meanwhile, the De Klerk regime was also hoping to lure Malaysia into allowing a mission to be set up; however, Mahathir was not willing to budge on this and not until after the ANC officially gave him permission. What this stance implied was that the ANC was also flexing it muscles in the international arena to compete with the
‘reformist’ apartheid government led by De Klerk. Malaysia was among the few that were not prepared to ‘break’ the sanctions that were still in place; its neighbours, namely Thailand and Singapore, saw the opportunity and allowed South African missions to be established and they reciprocated likewise. As already noted, Malaysia threaded cautiously and showed concern not to fall out of favour with the ANC, the major stakeholder with whom the Barisan Nasional (BN) had strong links. A month or more before Mandela was to visit Malaysia the BN, which fought one of its most crucial battles, was victorious at the polls and this placed Mahathir and his party in an extremely strong position.
On the 3rd of November 1990 the BN hosted a dinner for Mandela when he came on visit as ANC’s deputy president. Mahathir’s speech reflected the joy the Malaysians shared with Mandela and the black South Africans. Whilst he lauded the transformations that were taking place, he reminded the audience that this was partly because of the
international communities’ pressure on the apartheid regime under De Klerk. Mahathir promised Mandela that Malaysia will continue to apply the pressure until apartheid has been completely dismantled and requested that other states also adopt a similar attitude.
He also declared that he was not in agreement with those Western states that were willing to reward De Klerk for the changes that the latter initiated, and as a CCFMSA member Malaysia continued to monitor the developments in South Africa. He also argued that democracy should not be taken for granted but should be nurtured and protected; this is indeed ironical since he flouted some of the basic democratic principles when he adopted a more authoritarian position during the final years as Malaysia’s Prime Minister. After consultation with the ANC during Mandela’s November 1990 visit to Malaysia (cf.
Mahathir Speech 1990; Makaruddin 2000), which had been experiencing a buoyant economy during that time, the Malaysian government approved the idea of building a working relationship with all the South African stakeholders at the socio-political and cultural levels, and it pledged to support the ANC financially when it prepared itself for the polls in the future.
When 1991 ushered in the BN announced the replacement of the NEP with the National Development Policy/Plan (NDP). Its announcement and introduction was indeed a significant event in the Malaysians’ social history. Many had expected the NEP to be scrapped with a new policy; one that would not ‘discriminate’ against the non-Malays.
The NDP, according to Milne & Mauzy (1999: 74-75), has been more accommodating to the non-Bumiputras than the NEP and this thus tapered the tension among the ethnic groups. The new policy has also positively contributed to the alleviation of poverty in Malaysia. Although these were significant developments, they were and are, however, not enough since the ideal is to effectively bring an end to poverty and obliterate the tension that exist within the Malaysian society.
Nonetheless, soon after the introduction of the NDP, Dr. Mahathir presented his speech entitled Malaysia: The Way Forward in which he had a vision of a Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysia Nation) by the year 2020. This came to be referred to as Malaysia’s Vision 2020 document; a plan that was different from the NDP but one which complemented it.
It was meant to inspire and assist the Malaysians in transforming themselves in both the economic and social sectors into a ‘fully developed’ society. In his formulation of this document, Derichs (2001: 194) argued that Mahathir Mohamed and Anwar Ibrahim, his deputy as from December 1992 after he defeated Ghafar Baba in an UMNO contest, were fully aware of the impact of globalization in trade and industry, and they decided that globalization should be viewed as an opportunity rather than a danger for Malaysia to promote progress and modernize. And one of the outcomes of this decision was the Multimedia Super Corridor.
Mahathir identified the variety of challenges, one of these being establishing ‘a united Malaysian nation with a sense of common and shared destiny’ and another being
‘fostering and developing a mature democratic society’ (Milne & Mauzy 1999: 165;
Cheah 2002: 65-66). Hassan (1992: 29) argued that Vision 2020 encompassed Malaysia’s key domestic goals and aspirations for the following two decades. And he stated that the
‘national unity’ has been ‘the overriding objective of all national policies,’ and that it has been the single most important challenge confronting the nation in its quest to become a fully developed country by the year 2020. Nation-building thus continued to be of continuous concern for the Malaysian government and its multiracial society; the non- Malays were indeed satisfied with the Vision’s formulation because it counted them in and saw them as an integral part of Malaysia. This was indeed a departure from the previous policy which favoured the Malays and the affirmative action project that intended to rectify the imbalances (also cf. Nazaruddin Hj. Mohd Jali et al 2003:
314-315); developments that were welcomed by political pundits and other observers. As far as Malaysia’s ‘new thinking’ in foreign policy goes, Nathan (1995: 226-227) highlighted the fact that it ‘rests firmly on the assumption of a stable, Malay-led, multi- ethnic Malaysia that is broadly capable of satisfying national aspirations across a wide spectrum of competing demands and interests.’ This document has not only inspired the Malaysians as a society to look towards the future, but it also gave other international communities the opportunity to adopt and adapt the document to suite their needs. Two examples from SADC member states will suffice; the one is Malawi’s Vision 2020 and the other is Botswana’s Vision 2016.
Coming back to South Africa – Malaysia relations, one noted that after a long wait, the Malaysians eventually set up a liaison office in Johannesburg during 1992; it was an office that was to pursue some basic field work in order to suss out the existing opportunities for potential Malaysian investors and corporations before formal diplomatic ties could be cemented. The office was a life-line between the Malaysian government and the office of the ANC, and, by then, a direct line of communication had been established between Dr. Mahathir and Mr. Mandela in order to keep tabs on the internal developments and progress and also to provide the technical assistance to the ANC when necessary. The Malaysian liaison office fast tracked trade relations after sanctions were lifted, and along with the Malaysian Airlines company supervised the first MAS flight from Kuala Lumpur to Johannesburg during October 1992.
Towards the end of 1993 the influential Foreign Affairs journal published Mandela’s
‘South Africa’s future foreign policy’ paper; in this particular paper Mandela stressed that human rights was going to be one of the key principles that would underpin democratic South Africa’s foreign policy (Venter 1997: 78; Suttner 1997: 300). This was indeed the case when the ANC and later Mandela, as the president of the new democratic state, got involved in the Nigerian affair (see later). Nevertheless, the ANC indicated in September 1993 that an attempt was already underway to revamp the foreign affairs; this, however, seems to have begun only after certain technical changes had taken place (Muller 1997:
63). More-or-less at the time Mandela and the ANC were busy preparing for their future role in the new South Africa, the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the Malaysian Federation of National Writers’ Union (GAPENA) under the leadership of Tan Sri Professor Drs Ismail Hussein from the National University of Malaysia permission to travel with a contingent of about 50 academics and non-academics to participate in seminar that was held at the University of the Western Cape during April;
this was the first formal cultural links that was made between Malaysia and South Africa bearing in mind that Malaysia had lifted the people-to-people sanction at the end of 1991 in accordance with the Harare Declaration of Commonwealth Heads of State in Zimbabwe (cf. Haron 2005: 54-55). And by the 25th of September Malaysia lifted all the
sanctions and on the 8th of November 1993 it established formal diplomatic ties with South Africa; its High Commission subsequently replaced the one that was located in Harare to represent Malaysia in the region. South Africa reciprocated when it established an Embassy on the 17th of January 1994; this Embassy was eventually transformed into a High Commission when South Africa formally re-joined the Commonwealth (Mills 1997:
192). When returning to November 1990, Dr. Mahathir had, by then, pledged Malaysia’s moral and financial support to the ANC. And it fulfilled this promise when UMNO gave the ANC financial support to prepare for the historic 1994 April elections.