Telling the Tales of Two Sovereign Nation-States (circa 1948-1990)
3. South Africa and Malaysia: Recollecting Stories of their past
3.1 Describing and Comparing the Two States circa 1948-1990
3.2.1 Tunku Abdul Rahman’s Narrative against Apartheid, circa 1957–1970
As soon as Malaya gained its independence in 1957, Tunku steered his nation into the international arena and formulated responses to various developments. Malaya became a significant member in the Commonwealth; this was only after it was given permission by the highest decision making committee to become a member. In this regard, South Africa, which was one of the senior member countries of the Commonwealth, was amongst the handful of members that had the privilege of deciding which states should be granted membership. According to Mohamed Muda (1996: 429), South Africa seemed to have been hesitant in approving Malaya’s application to become a member of the Commonwealth soon after it gained independence; and, according to Muda, the same attitude was adopted towards Malaya when it forwarded its application to become a member of the UN. The rationale for South Africa’s ambiguous role towards Malaya was attributed to the fact that the latter proposed to extend an invitation to South Africa’s Cape Malays to attend the Merdeka (Independence) Day celebration on the 31st of August 1957 in Kuala Lumpur (Adam 2004: 285).
Mr. Ismail Petersen, whose story is narrated in Chapter Five, was the one who was invited to the Independence Celebrations (cf. Haron 1996); unfortunately, due to disagreements among this small South African ethnic community and the objections expressed by the Cape Town based Muslim Progressive Society (est. 1950-1980?) the invitation extended to Mr. Petersen was reluctantly withdrawn. Individuals such as Mr.
Petersen, as a matter of information, were among the very many who suffered at the hands of South Africa’s discriminatory policies and who were hindered from travelling to countries such as Malaya to forge socio-religious and cultural links with their – to use Dr.
Hussaynmia’s phrase (1987) - ‘lost cousins.’ Even though Mr. Petersen was very disappointed at the outcome, it did not deter him from relentlessly pursuing his interest in creating connections with his distant and ‘lost cousins.’
That story aside and returning to Tunku’s story, it was observed that Tunku did not take
umbrage against South Africa’s diabolical role for its hesitancy in approving Malaya’s membership at the outset, he however made good use of the opportunities that came his way when he participated in the Commonwealth gatherings and other international fora;
it was at these gatherings and forums that Tunku diplomatically aired his opinions against South Africa’s policies.
Tunku and his Indonesian counterpart, namely President Soeharto with whom he had been at loggerheads regarding regional issues (cf. Chinyang Liow 2005: 93), were among the most vociferous voices against apartheid at the Commonwealth and UN meetings.
Tunku was part of a group of international leaders who spearheaded ‘a discussion on South Africa’s racial policies at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in 1960’ (Mohamed Muda 1996: 424). The latter argued that Tunku’s opposition to apartheid was in line with the notion that the Commonwealth should be seen as a multiracial forum. And it was also in consonance with Malaya’s policy which stated that:
‘whenever human rights are violated … we always make our stand firm and clear … we never made any distinction whenever there is violation of human rights’ (Malaya Parliamentary Debates 21 April 1960 col. 251). Prior to this he also used the UN fora to attack the apartheid policies and, in fact, co-sponsored a number of UN Resolutions related to these policies. Within Malaya itself, the different political parties were in full agreement with the government’s stance towards South Africa.
The Manifesto of the Alliance, which represented the three ethnic political parties, clearly expressed that ‘the Alliance is determined to uphold the UN Charter, which calls for respect for human rights and contains freedom for all without distinction of race. The policy of the South African government in this respect must be condemned.’ The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) of Malaya not only issued a strongly worded manifesto but also gave a directive as to what should be done in the light of South Africa’s adamant stand; the manifesto stated that ‘it is sheer hypocrisy for pronouncements to be made about the Commonwealth being a brotherhood of nations when the South African government continues to heap indignities on the coloured people of the world … as an immediate measure we will demand that economic sanctions be declared on South Africa
and an embargo be placed on the import of all goods from South Africa.’ The 1959 declaration of the manifesto, which was made when Malaya and South Africa had ongoing trade links, should be read in conjunction with the trade figures between South Africa and Malaya; for example, in 1958 Malaya imported goods worth $19.6 m, whilst South Africa exported $47.2 m – an amount of more than double that of Malaya. The Malayan Trade Union Congress (MTUC) was amongst the many NGOs that came out endorsing the imposition of sanctions and boycotting South African goods. In December of 1959 the MTUC, without any hesitation, fully supported the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to boycott South African products. The Strait Times cautioned MTUC and others that in adopting such a stand would cause the Malayans to suffer financially more than the South African apartheid regime. Despite the position of PPP and the firm stand of MTUC, the government of the Federation under Tunku was conscious of the consequences of such an action and thus did not immediately implement sanctions as had been mooted and supported by the swelling anti-apartheid groups. This is borne out by Dato Ismail’s, the then Minister of External Affairs, public position on the issue; he indicated that the Malayans’ unilateral action will not affect and impact upon the South African government and that it is the UN that should lead the way.
A firmer position was taken by the Malayan government when the world witnessed the tragic Sharpeville massacre that took place on the 21st of March 1960. Nations of the world reacted unanimously in condemning the apartheid regime’s dastardly deeds and demands were made by representatives from the continents of Africa and Asia to take a more decisive action against South Africa. The stand adopted by most of the nations resulted in a more concerted effort from amongst those who co-sponsored the UN Resolutions against Apartheid. Tunku thus dispatched a letter on the 25th of March 1961 to then British Prime Minister; the latter tried to persuade Tunku not to raise the issue at the Commonwealth May 1961 meeting and, in support, of his argument, invoked the non- interference doctrine. Since Tunku could not get joy from the Britain’s lukewarm and nonchalant response, he, at least, received overwhelming support from all the political parties in the Federation particularly from the Alliance. The Alliance showed their full
with the unanimously passed and mildly worded Dewan Rakyat resolution, left to attend the meeting on the 3rd of May 1961 (Mohamad Muda 1996: 426).
At the Commonwealth meeting Tunku was given the honour of addressing the heads of state and to the dismay of Harold Wilson, who was one of the leading members of the British parliament and who had strongly suggested that a different position be adopted, unexpectedly raised the situation in South Africa. In response, an informal meeting was arranged between Mr. Louw, South Africa’s Minister of External Affairs, and a few Commonwealth Prime Ministers in order to trash out the issues that had been brought out at the meeting. Even though the hastily organized informal meeting was held nothing came out of it and it was concluded that the British government under Harold Wilson’s influence was able to suppress the issue. Tunku was indeed upset with this immoral stand by the British and some of his colleagues in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
meeting. And in reaction to their intransigent stand and indifference to what was happening in South Africa, Tunku publicized his stand in defiance of the outcome of the informal meeting. What this political narrative demonstrated was that the British in particular were not at all concerned with the welfare of the oppressed communities in apartheid South Africa and that they were more interested in not jeopardising their commercial interests. Although the British’s hypocrisy was quite conspicuous, the representatives from the South did not have the political clout and nor the will within the international system to force the Western nation-states to observe and support human rights in troubled nation-states.
Even though Tunku’s public stance did not mean that he would stand in the way of the UN if it decided not to expel South Africa, he nevertheless felt that it was his moral duty to take a firm stand against South Africa’s immoral laws and also demonstrate to his colleagues in the Commonwealth that they should not ignore the plight of apartheid South Africa’s masses who were discriminated against by the minority white apartheid regime. Tunku further incensed the apartheid regime when he invited South Africa’s small ‘Cape Malay’ community to migrate to Malaya and take up citizenship, if and when they desire to do so (cf. Muslim News December 1960). The gesture shown by
Tunku was indeed noble, but little did he realize that most of the ‘Cape Malays’ had no interest in taking up the invitation. The reasons for this are based on three facts: the first is that the ‘Cape Malays’ were a heterogeneous group who traced their origins to inter alia the eastern part of India and the Indonesian archipelago (cf. Bradlow & Cairns 1978), and as a result of their genealogical roots did not seriously consider Malaya as their ‘motherland;’ the second is that most of the families, who belonged to this community, adapted to the socio-political circumstances even though they – along with their fellow oppressed - abhorred and rejected the way they were treated by the white minority regime; and the third is that they saw themselves first and foremost as ‘citizens’
of South Africa - even though the government of the day treated them as second class citizens – and were therefore not prepared to exchange their citizenship for another even if it was freely offered. Since this was the case, the invitation was taken up by a few
‘Cape Malay’ families whose fascinating story will be told in Chapter Five.
Pressure slowly mounted against South Africa’s policies after the March 1960 Sharpeville massacre. Tunku persisted in applying sustained pressure without forcing the international bodies to expel South Africa. South Africa was pushed into a corner and, as expected, rebutted by highlighting the fact that many Commonwealth countries practiced discrimination too. The South African government made direct reference to Malaya, which implemented discriminatory policies against its fellow citizens, i.e. the non- Malays; this below-the-belt posture was however not enough to secure its membership in the Commonwealth and the UN. In the end, the apartheid regime under Verwoerd decided to voluntarily withdraw on from the Commonwealth; however, it was automatically expelled from the UN agencies. Despite its expulsion from the UN structures, it still kept diplomatic and trading ties with nation-states that derived valuable economic benefits. Unsurprisingly, Britain and France, the former colonial powers, along with Japan were among those who did not sever diplomatic ties and thus continued to enjoy the diplomatic and commercial connections with the apartheid state. This once again reinforced the view that the international system as it was constructed by the North worked in its interest and not in the interest of the Afro-Asian block that formed an integral part of the South/Third World.
Most of those in the Afro-Asian bloc took a bold stand by cutting off diplomatic links and trade ties (cf. Haron 1997: 6-7); Malaya was among this group. Sharma (1969: 273) was critical of Western powers that had to be persuaded to support the Afro-Asian bloc’s quest for South Africa’s expulsion. He applauded those countries (of which Malaya was an active member) that were involved the drafting of the resolution against South Africa;
this was with special reference to the Five-Power Asian states’ (Ceylon, Malaya, India, Indonesia and Afghanistan) draft resolution (ibid 279-281). Sharma was critical of those in the Afro-Asian bloc who abstained from supporting the resolution. Nevertheless, Malaya imposed a complete boycott of South African products and severed all ties. The decision was, of course, in line with the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 1761(XVII) of the 6th of November 1962. Malaya also participated and co-sponsored another resolution that demanded total economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa, and it fully endorsed the UN General Assembly Resolution 1978(XVII) of 1963 that sought to find ways and means of providing relief and assistance to all persecuted South Africans.
The Federation of Malaya, which was re-named the Federation of Malaysia after Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak joined the Federation in 1963 - the same year when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed, demonstrated its sincere and firm stand by making a small contribution in this direction in contributing $5,000.00 towards bringing about substantial changes in South Africa. But despite the commitment shown by the Federation of Malaysia and members of the Afro-Asian bloc, apartheid South Africa steadily powered ahead into the 1960s with its inhumane and dreadful policies.
Malaysia and many Afro-Asian states observed the Gleneagles Agreement, which discouraged any sporting ties with South Africa, as well as all other forms of sanctions.
There were, regrettably, Afro-Asian states such as Japan, Taiwan, and Malawi that broke the sanctions and deliberately ignored the plight of the oppressed. Fortunately, none of the founding members of ASEAN, a regional organization founded in 1967, was part of the sanction busters group of states; states that financially benefited from and which were given preferential treatment by the South African apartheid government.
Tunku was indeed the prime force behind the Federation’s successful regionalism such as the formation of ASEAN and international role such as his stand against apartheid. It was however unfortunate that he seemed to have lost sight at what was taking shape on the home front where ‘racial’ confrontations were brewing and resulted in the 13th of May 1969 race riots. Even though this event cost him his premiership of the Federation, he only relinquished it by mid 1971. Tunku handed over the reins to Tun Razak, his deputy who became well known for introducing the affirmative action project under the NEP (Hng 2004: 97). Whilst Tunku’s immediate successors – Tun Razak (from 23rd of September 1970 until his death on 16th of January 1976) and Tun Hussein Onn (from the 15th of January 1976 until January 1981) - did not divert from Malaysia’s anti-Apartheid policy, they did not give much attention as to what was happening in the Republic of South Africa because they were forced to deal with a number of internal issues and regional developments. One specific example that showed the Malaysians were somewhat affected by the internal developments was when a special committee in the UN ratified certain policies against South Africa after the 1976 uprisings in Soweto.
When Mahathir came to power in 1981, he made his mark from the very outset as a statesman that had to be reckoned with internally and externally; on the internal front he was concerned with the question of Malay identity and the process of Malaysia’s modernization, and on the external front he stressed Malaysia’s Islamic identity and demonstrated his unstinting support for the communities from the South/Third World (cf.
Hng 2004: 135-141). In the light of his dynamic, charismatic leadership and his support for the communities of the South, he threw all his weight behind the liberation movement(s) in South Africa from the moment he stepped into office. The first few years of the 1980s, he was involved with his deputy in directing foreign policy, and towards the end of the decade he took over that responsibility and thus became the chief foreign policy architect (Nair 1997: 87) In the section hereafter an attempt will be made to record Mahathir’s fascinating story and important contribution.
3.2.2 Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s Story: Showing support for the ANC, circa 1981-1990:
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad’s leadership style differed from that of his predecessors in many ways. This could be attributed to his charismatic character and the way he demonstrated his leadership qualities. For a more insightful understanding of his style of leadership, the works of Adam, Khoo and Rajendran as well as others may be consulted. Mahathir had by then become Malaysia’s fourth Prime Minister, and ‘his accession to power … has meant that the locus of foreign policy decision-making has effectively shifted from Wisma Putra to the Prime Minister’s office’ (Zakaria Hj Ahmad 1990: 127). In this powerful position and being pragmatic, innovative decision-maker, Mahathir literally moved the foreign policy project from its traditional moorings to a pro-active one, which engaged its partners; it was a foreign policy that marketed Malaysia as a destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) and where healthy trading could freely take place, and one which brought into sharp focus South-South linkages. Mahathir, in effect, progressively worked towards developing Malaysia into a ‘middle power.’ Among the list of issues that cluttered Mahathir’s busy agenda was the anti-Apartheid cause; he followed through this cause with great passion because he saw that the communities of the South were hamstrung by obstinate governments such as the apartheid regime in South Africa that were given all the financial and moral support by the nation-states of the North.
He was thus an ardent supporter of sanctions against South Africa, and he was in the vanguard actively carving out a vibrant foreign policy for Malaysia and leading the way on behalf of the Southeast Asians. Mahathir led Malaysia from the front and by example and as a consequence his international profile as a campaigner for human emancipation from the hegemonic forces of the North steadily increased. When Mahathir became Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981, he adopted a hard stance towards South Africa and those who tacitly supported its inhumane domestic discriminatory policies (cf. Mohamed Muda 1996; Hamidin 1995). One of the clear signs of his commitment was when he
consciously decided as Malaysia’s Prime Minister to absent himself from the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Melbourne and New Delhi respectively; the former was held in 1981 and the latter in 1983. He accused the rich members of the Commonwealth of dragging their feet when it came to taking action and applying sanctions against South Africa and its apartheid policies. This stand, in addition to others, tangibly reflected that Mahathir was committed to South affairs and South Africa was thus an important state to target since it violated and transgressed many international laws and defied UN sanctions. Whilst it assisted in building his international profile, it did not endear him to the major international players, namely the USA, UK and other Western states that continued to maintain trade ties with the pariah state.
When Mahathir attended CHOGM, which took place in Nassau during 1985, he took the opportunity of lambasting the policies in South Africa and blamed the First World states for their lack of support and decision making in South Africa. At the meeting, Mahathir pleaded for tougher economic sanctions and reiterated his stand at CHOGM that took place in Vancouver and Kuala Lumpur in 1987 and 1989 respectively. Apartheid was placed high on CHOGM’s agenda at Mahathir’s insistence. This was intensified as Mahathir’s respect steadily grew within the Commonwealth camps, particularly those in the Afro-Asian bloc. Mahathir was appointed with eight others to be part of a specially selected Commonwealth Committee that would attend to South African affairs (cf.
Landsberg 2004: 82). It was this position that granted him the unique chance in May 1990 to have a face-to-face meeting with Nelson Mandela at Abuja, Nigeria, soon after Mandela’s release in February. Mandela requested that the sanctions be kept in place until sufficient evidence emerged that the De Klerk regime had made substantial progress in their negotiations. Mahathir concurred with this view and only reacted and moved when Mandela gave the green light to have the sanctions lifted.
Returning to the CHOGM that was hosted by Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur in 1989, Mahathir took advantage of being on home turf, and being the host nation it drafted a strongly worded statement against South Africa. By then Mahathir had convinced many Commonwealth members of the need to take decisive action and oversee its