Narrating Their ‘Upstairs’ Ties in the Post-Apartheid Period (circa 1990-2005)
3. South Africa and Malaysia’s Socio-Political Bonds
3.5 Expanding Connections: Towards ‘A Strategic Partnership’?
Since Mbeki took it upon himself and encouraged his colleagues in his cabinet to promote this policy initiative, NEPAD as the name suggest – a new partnership – has been used to attract partners from the North such as the USA as well as those from the South such as Malaysia to assist through striking partnerships in the process of fast tracking Africa’s development. In this regard, Mr. Jacob Zuma, the (former) Deputy President of South Africa, discussed the policy initiative at the 5th LID meeting in November 2002. And on the 5th of November 2002 Mbeki was granted the opportunity via the good offices of the Malaysian government to attend and address the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penn, Cambodia (Henwood & Vickers 2003: 330). This was indeed an important meeting for it was the first time that an African leader addressed ASEAN.
Mbeki addressed ASEAN in his capacity as the AU chairperson and at the end ASEAN leaders unanimously agreed to organize a special ASEAN-NEPAD conference with the purpose of wanting to know how the partnerships will be built between the African leaders/countries and potential donor countries from ASEAN (Landsberg 2004: 196). As far as one could ascertain, nothing substantial developed out of this meeting.
When 2003 ushered in South Africa officially handed over NAM leadership to Malaysia during February at the 13th NAM summit in Kuala Lumpur. By August of that year Mr.
Zuma was invited by the Malaysian World Peace Federation to participate in its conference and to also be involved in a Statesmen Roundtable discussion prior to the conference. Mr. Zuma’s visit also paved the way for Mr. Mbeki’s official visit to Malaysia during the first week of September 2003. Before reflecting on this important visit, a quick comment on Malaysia’s position during 2003 will be in place. According to Ganesan’s (2004) scholarly observations, Malaysia’s economy was buoyant and it was generally stable and in a fairly strong position. Throughout the year speculation was rife as regards Mahathir’s successor; even though Ahmad Badawi – being the deputy - was touted for the post, there was no clear indication from Mahathir on this subject during the early part of the year. However, by the end of October 2003, Mahathir finally resigned and handed over the ‘hot seat’ to Ahmad Badawi. The latter continued to steer Malaysia into 2004 whilst Malaysia was enjoying economic growth and stability. Malaysia,
moreover, occupied itself throughout 2003 (and 2004) with the formulation of policies and the pursuance of the NDP in an aggressive way.
The earlier mentioned visit by Mbeki to Malaysia was a significant one in that it was the first visit in his capacity as South Africa’s president. At the formal meeting bilateral talks ensued, agreements were signed and an MoU was put in place to set up a joint commission between the two countries. The two leaders also discussed other mutual cooperative projects and engaged in a debate North-South relations. In Mr. Mbeki’s reply to the toast by His Majesty, Yang di-Pertuan Agong, on the 2nd of September he expressed his thanks on behalf of the South African government and the South African people for Malaysia’s support against apartheid and he paid special tribute to Mahathir’s unstinting efforts in forging a close partnership that existed between South Africa and Malaysia since the two former statesmen (i.e. Mandela and Mahathir) struck a cordial and brotherly relationship. Mr. Mbeki also stated that South Africa has gained from Malaysia’s Bumiputra programme when it designed and finalized its Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) project. In addition to these remarks, he touched upon the role the two states can play in transforming the UN, NAM, the Commonwealth and similar international institutions for the benefit of all in the South via the AU and ASEAN structures (Mbeki Speech 2003).
The outcome of the Malaysian elections on 21st March 2004 secured the BN a solid victory and this meant that Badawi - or Pak Lah as he is popularly known in the socio- political circles - was given the necessary support and motivation by the Malaysians to lead them. And in April Mbeki began his second term after the South Africans voted the ANC back into power. During April Badawi introduced the ‘National Integrity Plan’ to root out corruption; this plan as well as a few others lined up helped Badawi to create his own identity, though he made himself vulnerable to criticisms from party members as well as from the former Prime Minster, Dr. Mahathir. Whilst he pushed for greater ethnic tolerance through dialogue, he also demonstrated a certain degree of transparency after ordering the release of Anwar Ibrahim during September 2004. On the internal front, Badawi continued to be critical of USA’s invasion of Iraq and its policy towards
Palestine. And under his leadership he warmed up to his ASEAN buddies, namely Singapore and Indonesia. Malaysia, according to Welsh (2005), was ‘fostering quiet cooperation’; a strategy that is not the same as the ‘quiet diplomacy’ adopted by South Africa towards its neighbour, Zimbabwe.
An important official South African visit took place between the 23rd and 24th of June 2005 and it was led by Dr. Dlamini-Zuma (Speech 2005), the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Malaysia to bring into fruition the First South Africa – Malaysia Joint Ministerial Commission meeting that was planned during Mr. Mbeki’s official visit in 2003. In her speech she emphasised the ‘solid foundations’ on which the two countries’
relations have been built and reflected briefly on some of the events that had taken place over the many years. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma reinforced the view that their ‘… countries share common sentiments regarding many international issues and we talk the same language when it comes to … the importance of South-South cooperation or the imperatives for developing countries to participate in the global political and economic system on an equitable basis.’ And she expressed her unstinting support for Malaysia’s efforts to advance the ‘Agenda of the South’ as well as her unqualified support for regional cooperation via the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership ‘Plan of Action’ that was adopted in Jakarta in Indonesia. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma also thanked the Malaysians for giving their support to the AU and NEPAD. Dr. Dlamini-Zuma’s passionate speech tangibly underscored the relationship and partnership that had been formed between the two states. She, for example, mentioned that the two countries have concluded ‘a total of five official agreements and two Memoranda of Understanding in areas of mutual interest…’ and that many others were being concluded and negotiated. The questions that come to mind are: What do these agreements in real terms mean? In which way have they been concluded in the interest of their respective societies and have these agreements also taken into account the needs of their fellow member states from the South? When would the person in the rural area or the disadvantaged sector in South Africa and Malaysia be able to see the tangible results of these agreements? For social scientists these and other related questions need responses for they will assist in changing the images of their communities; particularly when these communities are able to see and
experience what bilateral relations actually mean and how they affect communal relationships in reality.
Dr. Dlamini-Zuma’s significant meeting laid the foundations for Dato Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s first important official state visit in his capacity as Malaysia’s Prime Minister on the 26th and 27th of July 2005 to South Africa. Mr. Badawi’s delegation consisted of 5 cabinet ministers, a parliamentary secretary, 7 members of the federal and state legislators, senior government officials and a number of persons from the Malaysian business community. In Mr. Badawi’s 2005 speech he thanked Mr. Mbeki for the official invitation and expressed his delight to have been able to be in South Africa. He was optimistic about the close partnership that had – until then - been forged between the two nation-states and was of the firm opinion that the Malaysians consider the ‘…relations with South Africa as pivotal and strategic.’ After he briefly reflected upon the historical ties that existed between the two countries and the anti-apartheid stand Malaysia took since its independence in 1957. Mr Badawi reiterated that Malaysia was determined ‘to further elevate Malaysia-South Africa relations… to cooperate to undertake specific ventures and establish various programmes to enrich the tapestry of Malaysia-South Africa ties.’ And he also recognised the nature of the partnership that had up to that moment been established between the two states in trade, commerce and technology; he, however, re-emphasised the need for the relationship to be transformed into ‘a strategic partnership.’ Badawi made the point that he viewed the relationship to be ‘pivotal and strategic’ but also added that there was much room to expand and deepen it in areas that need further exploration via sharing information and devising strategies in order to face the variety of international challenges in different spheres.
And Mr. Badawi acknowledged that both states share much in common; both, he stated, were against any form of unilateralism and the use of force. He strongly suggested that both states should work closely so that the international system is made conducive to economic and social development, and to pursue the idea of promoting dialogue between cultures and civilizations. The question that comes to mind is: how far has the two states’
close relationship succeeded in forcing the international system particularly those from
the North to make the environment conducive for socio-economic development and pursue meaningful dialogue without it resulting in realizing Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis? Nevertheless, towards the close of his speech, he aired his views against terrorism and the adoption of a multilateral approach when finding and identifying its real causes. He ended off by making reference to Malaysia’s position as chair of a number of significant world bodies, namely NAM, OIC and the ASEAN, and the efforts it has made to bring an end to the Palestinian crises and to also give special attention to the empowerment of women and bringing about gender equality and equity;
issues that critical theorists fully support and endorse. He expressed his desire to have a close working relationship with South Africa on all of these and other matters that would
‘advance the interests and concerns of the Non-Aligned Movement.’
The lengthy and detailed speech, which Badawi gave on his visit as Malaysia’s prime minister, brought to the fore a number of critical questions that assist in understanding the relationship that had been ongoing for more than ten years during the post-apartheid era:
To what extent have South Africa and Malaysia reflected ‘good governance’ in their respective regions? Compared to many other states in their midst, they seemed to have faired quite well. Have their governments adopted a critical attitude towards themselves to monitor whether they are upholding and sticking to the ideals of democracy? It seems that whilst this might have generally been the case, there have been occasions when they have fallen short of these ideals by remaining uncritical towards developments within their governments and the parties they represent. Have the governments of these two states not been affected by the rapid rise in white collar crimes and particularly cronyism?
Unfortunately, corruption has been on the increase and members of the ruling parties in both states have been guilty of practicing cronyism; a fact that cannot be wished away but one that needs to be weeded out before the whole government becomes tainted with malpractices and corruption. In South Africa the Shabir Sheik case and in Malaysia the Dato Shamsuddin case are two specific examples. These few questions and responses provide some idea of the nature of the relationship between the two states. Badawi’s plea that both accept the relationship to be a strategic one demonstrated that there was a desire to deepen the links at almost each and every level.