Towards Understanding South African-Malaysian Relations
4. A Relevant Theory and Relating Tales
4.3 Identity: A Crucial Concept for Critical Theorists in IR
made the point that whilst Horkheimer’s paradigm concentrated on ‘redistributory struggles’ and Harbermas’ paradigm was concerned with ‘community’ and ‘identity.’
Since this was the case, let me address and unpack ‘identity’ as a significant concept.
mentioned moments ago - is much about difference or uniqueness as about shared belonging or sameness, and marks out the divisions and sub-sets in our social lives. His views concurred with those of Zalewski & Enloe (1995: 282-283) who argued that the concept is multi-layered in that ‘identity determines how you are treated, what is expected of you, what you expect of yourself …. Whether you will be seen as an enemy or (as) a friend.’ The multi-facet nature of identity and more particularly identity politics force us to explore groups that have been politically privileged such as state decision makers who are in turn influenced by the facets of their personal identities. For example, in apartheid South Africa it was usually the White, Afrikaner, male who made decisions on behalf of the state and the society that it manages and at no stage could an African female find herself in that position; however, in contemporary democratic South Africa the situation has radically changed where its Deputy President – Ms. Phumzile Mlambo- Ngcuka, for example, is an African female. Similar examples are also observed in Malaysia where the Minister of International Trade and Industries has been under the leadership of a Malay female, namely Dato Seri Rafidah Azizan, for many years.
Returning to Hall (1997), the two questions that need a response: ‘Who are we’ and ‘what have we become’ – Burgess (2002: 10) phrased the questions slightly differently when he asked: ‘Who are you’ and ‘Who are you now’ - assist us to fully appreciate the debates that have been, on many occasions, raging around the issue of identity. In fact, many of these have been at the heart of racial conflicts as was the case throughout apartheid South Africa and on occasions in Malaysia. What this all boils down to is that a person holds a multiplicity of identities; these identities are employed to assist in directing behaviour depending on the circumstances in which the person finds him/herself. For example, when Mahathir Mohamed was the Prime Minister of Malaysia, he was the leader of a nation, a medical doctor, a husband, a father, a Muslim, and a Malay (cf. Rajendran 1993;
Khoo 2001); and in the case of Thabo Mbeki, he is the President of South Africa at present, a husband, a brother, a Christian (?), a Xhosa and a key member of the African Union as South Africa’s representative (cf. Gumede 2005). Each of the concepts reflects a particular identity and a special status that each of the two holds in their respective
situations. However, since Mahathir’s retirement from political life, he no more holds that prestigious position as Prime Minister of Malaysia but is still revered by the Malaysians as the ‘Father of Vision 2020’ who modernized Malaysia. And Mbeki, who has retained his position as President for a second term, is known for his ‘African Renaissance’ project and for being the key drivers behind the NEPAD programme on the African continent and for consolidating the democracy project in South Africa.
Based upon these observations, it is noted that everyone including those who hold the highest offices in their respective countries construct networks of related concepts known as schemas in which each of them are associated (Burgess 2002: 11). In a similar fashion the identity of individuals, communities and states are constructed. As the individual moves from one position to another and into the upper echelons of society, he/she encounters experiences on a variety of levels, namely the individual and social levels, and in the process learn more about ‘who they were’ and ‘who they are’ at that point in time.
And as a result of these social interactions, according to Burgess (ibid), individuals construct three different types of schemas – see Figure 2.3 below - about themselves: at the primary level a personal identity, at the secondary level a relational identity, and at the last level a social identity.
Figure 2.3
Levels of Identity
Social Idenity Relational Identity Personal identity
Burgess then points out when taking into account the individual’s upbringing and participation in different stations of social life that no matter how the individual defines him/herself, social identity forms an integral part of that individual’s personal identity.
And this in effect means that the individual is not just a member of a social group but also of a community, a society and a nation; and this in turn implies that the individual is emotionally connected to a specific socio-political group. And when the individual interacts with members of his/her social group, the individual’s identity becomes depersonalized, and a social identity automatically replaces it because he/she sees him/herself as part of a desirable social group that shares similar values and aspirations, and the individual is thus influenced by them and also by the environment in which he finds himself. When reflecting upon the position of Tan Sri Professor Ismail Hussein in this thesis, many of the ideas that Burgess expounded on in terms of identity applies to him.
Burgess appropriated the social identity theory as espoused by Henri Tajfel, the French psychologist, in order to have a deeper and indeed better understanding of the post- apartheid South African society that has been deeply traumatized by years of racial discrimination and social hardships. Grounded in numerous observations social identity theory research, according to Burgess (ibid 17), suggests special reasons for considering its effects in South Africa (and perhaps Malaysia); one of these, he mentioned, was that the contact made by members of one group (i.e. whites in South Africa/Malays in Malaysia) with another (i.e. blacks in South Africa/Chinese in Malaysia) reduced negative perceptions, prejudicial attitudes, stereotyping and other undesirable outcomes.
South Africans and Malaysians share a common feeling regarding social group identity and that is: it is a sensitive issue; however, it has been more so in the case of South Africa where racial discrimination was ‘legally’ constructed and instituted and which privileged the one social group (i.e. the whites) over another (i.e. the blacks [Africans, Coloureds
and Indians]). In the case of Malay Peninsula and the surrounding areas, the Malays were always in a subordinate position within the British colonial system; the latter privileged the Chinese and Indians, whose forebears were brought to the region as labourers by the colonial powers. Subsequent to the departure of the British, the Malays introduced legislation such as affirmative action as a strategy to counter the Chinese and Indians’
control and influence. In response the off-spring of these communities, who were born and reared in Malaysia, challenged the strategies that had been implemented more than three decades ago and desired a fundamental change in the legal system and attitudes so that they can truly feel that they form part and parcel of the Bangsa Malaysia (i.e. Malay race) and not be discriminated against. Mahathir, being as pragmatic as ever, obliged by opening up the UMNO – the governing ruling party in Malaysia - to the non-Malay bumiputras and included Bangsa Malaysia as a crucial cog in realizing Vision 2020 (Reid 2004: 18). This act of the Malaysian Prime Minister minimized the tension between ethnic and civic nationalism, and forced these diasporic Indian and Chinese communities to view ‘who is a Malay?’ differently in a new context in the 1990s.
In the context of what took place in Malaysia since it became independent in 1957, and what transpired in South Africa throughout the era of apartheid and more so during the post-apartheid period, the issue of identity, namely ‘who is a Malay’ or ‘who is an African’, has been repeatedly raised by individuals and groups whose positions have been threatened within their particular societies or within the geographical boundaries where they were born and bred. In his capacity as South Africa’s deputy president in 1996, Thabo Mbeki ventured to define who is an African when he delivered his passionate speech ‘I am an African.’ In a similar vain, Mahathir Mohamed, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, expressed his candid opinion about who the Malays were in his significant publication titled The Malay Dilemma (1970), and in subsequent writings he continued to comment upon the Malay identity (cf. Reid 2004: 18); the last significant input on this concept was when he was on an official visit as the Prime Minister of Malaysia to South Africa during August 1995.
Academics and cultural activists in South Africa and Malaysia mulled over the notions of both politicians and critically discussed much of what they wrote. However, these concepts were not only debated within the confined borders of these two nation-states;
they were also re-visited by other African and Asian leadership in other parts of Africa and Southeast Asia, namely Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia as well as the diasporic communities living in Sri Lanka, South Africa, Madagascar, Philippines and elsewhere (cf. Barnard 2004). Although there existed diverse opinions on the concepts, there seem to have been a common understanding of the essence of these two concepts within their specific regions towards the end of the 20th Century. The mere fact that societies have been carved up and were boxed into nation-states - which was in essence socially constructing and engineering national identities - by their former colonialists during the specific periods, it forced social science scholars to handle the issue of multiple identities (ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious) in a delicate and sensitive way.
This is clearly illustrated when reflecting upon the position of South Africa’s ‘Cape Malays’ who seemed to have preferred during the late apartheid era (beyond the 1980s) - instead of this ethnic identity, which has been viewed as a colonial invention - their
‘religious identity’ (i.e. as Cape Muslims); it was considered a more convenient – if not a more appropriate, better suited and perhaps a neutral - label than the ‘ethnic identity’ that have been fraught with problems, and one that was constructed and employed by the apartheid regime for their own political objectives (cf. Jeppie 1996). The circumstances in Malaysia was and is, however, very different; but even though this has been the case, Yamashita (2003: 8), Vickers (2004: 28) and Shamsul (2004: 137) cogently argued along the lines that the ‘Malay’ identity was one of the ‘invented traditions’ by the British. Be that as it may, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia clearly defined what was meant by the concept ‘Malay’. But despite this, it continued to be an issue of debate vis-à-vis the other racial groups that exist within the geographically demarcated (and disputed) borders of Malaysia (cf. Kahn 2006).
It might be further illustrated in a slightly different way when we undertake a comparative perspective of how the ethnic/racial identity was accepted by the Malaysians and Cape Malays in their respective regions (cf. Haron 2005). Hall’s (1997) exposé of cultural identity fits in neatly with the discussion that tackles and interrogates the Malay identity, which is not just a cultural identity – as has already been established - but also a religious one in the case of the Cape Malays and a religio-political one in the case of Malaysia’s Malays. If one compares the two, then one will observe the similarities and differences of which Hall so eloquently spoke about. The former Malaysian Prime Minister’s, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, speech in August 1995 in South Africa in which he outlined the Malay identity can be used as one example of how the ‘cultural identity’ was conceptualized and applied within the Malaysian society. With this framework in mind, along with the various ingredients, the role of non-state actors such as cultural activists in South Africa and elsewhere should be borne in mind and will be addressed in Chapter Five.
Bringing this chapter to a close, the general agreement is that identity is not a fixed, closed or an unchanging variable, and that it has always been part of a process of formation and construction. And the acceptance of a multiplicity of identities in the contemporary societies such as those in South Africa and Malaysia respectively – and as illustrated in Figure 2.4 - is indicative of the fact that identity construction has always been in the making. And since this is so, the South African nation building – and as was the case with nation-building process in Malaysia over many decades - has been dynamic and will continue to demonstrate its dynamism for the foreseeable future. That said, the concept of identity is at the heart of socio-political identity structures, religious identity interpretations, and cultural identity analyses (Jacquin-Berdal et al 2002: 5). This has been so particularly during this contemporary era of globalization where contradictions about identity formation abound and where the relationship between the state and different identities has been and continues to be a complex and, in some instances, self- contradictory. Mayall & Vandersluis (2000: 1) cautioned that when an attempt is made to fathom the relationship and processes of identity formation then one should be wary of
the fact that they are by nature tentative and indeed contestable.
Figure 2.4: