Towards Understanding South African-Malaysian Relations
4. A Relevant Theory and Relating Tales
4.1 Critical Theory
According to George (1994), Rengger (2001) and Devetak (2001), the roots of CT are found within the period of Enlightenment, and they are specifically located in the philosophical works and epistemological writings of W.V. Quine, Ludwig Wittengenstein, Jurgen Habermas and Michael Foucault. Prior to these scholars' invaluable contributions towards the critical debates that ensued and remained influential, the name of Karl Marx continued to loom large since he was the one who critically evaluated the nature of the socio-economic system in Western Europe and went on to demonstrate the inequalities and injustices that it yielded (cf. Marx's Das Kapital). In the light of Marx's numerous studies he had hoped that capitalism as a system would eventually reach a crisis point and come to an abrupt end. Although this was not to be, it was the critical theorists such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer within the Frankfurt School who began to evaluate the reasons for the capitalist system's robustness and resilience despite the economic depression in the 1930s. They realized and concluded that the system was propped up by many other social structures such as the educational institutions and the mass media and that there was little that could be done to halt the capitalist system from forging ahead.
In Horkheimer’s writings he distinguished between CT and traditional theory. Since he critically assessed the traditional theoretical schools and went on to propose an alternative route, he and his colleagues, who also made critical inputs on the subject, were associated with the Frankfurt School of critical theorists. (Steans & Pettiford 2001: 108-109;
Rengger 2001: 94-96). These scholars saw that CT had the potential to critically
investigate theory itself; a task which traditional theory was incapable of doing. CT possessed the capacity to raise, inter alia, the following questions: for whom has the theory been formulated? What does it serve? Why has it been constructed? And how has it been employed? (Rengger 2001: 94). All of these interconnected questions assisted the critical theorists to comprehend the operations of international politics and international relations better and they generally did not accept the traditional limitations on explanations and thus never took for granted phenomena such as contemporary world politics as given (Hutchings 2001: 79-80).
Even though these scholars’ line of thinking was 'that social progress was not dependent upon the scientific discovery and application of universal laws but on concrete social practice associated with critical reflection on dominant knowledge/power relations' (George 1994: 151), they became somewhat disillusioned and pessimistic with the workers who were themselves divided and whose 'revolutionary spirit' had waned. In the course of these critical theorists' assessments and writings about the capitalist system, they became extremely 'sensitive to multiple oppression (that was) inherent in capitalism,' and were thus looking for other ways of addressing these issues in order to bring about a meaningful change. Related to searching for alternatives a string of questions that was subsequently raised in the light of the gross inequalities which existed in different parts of the world was: 'How can critical theorists develop a conception of a fair and just society?, Who will be the agents of radical change? And what does it really mean to be emancipated or have freedom? (ibid 110). These questions formed part of a set of ideas that stimulated the subsequent generation of critical theorists in the Frankfurt School led by Habermas to shift their focus from the workers' struggle to the cultural arena.
Habermas was the one who basically set the 'emancipatory project' on course and pointed out that the earlier critical theorists in the school 'misunderstood the emancipatory task in seeking to overcome the power of instrumental reason in all spheres' (ibid 153). He thus injected a renewed spirit into the school and gave it a new lease of life that went beyond the CT of the earlier masters in the Frankfurt School.
CT tackled and challenged the fundamental philosophy of the traditional theories and
existing world order (Hutchings 2001: 87; Duvall & Varadarajan 2003: 81). The critical theorists’ critique of the realists’ stance such as, for example, taking for granted the state as the only political unit within the international system was not left unchallenged. The realists’ assumptions ought to be questioned and debated, they insisted and argued. And as far as they were concerned, their decisive deliberations on the issue would be better accounted for in rethinking the rationale for this significant position. CT thus brought a more refreshing method of assessing developments within the IR discipline in particular and the process of modernity in general. This theory ventured to prise open new ways of comprehending contemporary changes in the field of IR and thus offered alternative theoretical views to what had traditionally been disseminated by idealists and realists.
Robert Cox, one of the advocates of this theory, expressed the view that ‘(c)ritical theory is conscious of its own relativity but through this consciousness can achieve a broader time perspective and become less relative’. Hoogvelt (1997: 12), from whom this quote was taken, attempted to further explain what Cox actually meant by this statement; she opined that within the arena of CT ‘… the task of theorizing can never be finished in an enclosed system but must continually begin anew, beginning not with abstract conceptions but a description of historical experience, ferreting out the emerging contradictions between changing material conditions and associated social forces on the one hand, and the vested interests or overhangs from past institutions and ideologies on the other.’
According Jackson & Sorenson (1999: 233), Cox made a clear distinction between problem-solving knowledge and emancipatory knowledge. He argued that ‘problem- solving knowledge’ suggested a prejudicial position towards the international status quo which is based on inequality of power and excluded many communities. As far as Cox’s position was concerned, this type of knowledge was basically conservative in construction and this being the case it will not be able assist in the progress of humanity nor in their emancipation. Linklater (1996: 281) captured some of Cox’s thoughts by stating that ‘(p)roblem-solving knowledge is geared to making the international system function more smoothly on the understanding that fundamental change is either impossible or improbable. Critical-theoretical knowledge searches for evidence of change
on assumption that present structures are unlikely to be reproduced indefinitely.’
Critical theorists therefore came to the rescue via the process of deconstruction and, in effect, replace ‘problem-solving knowledge’ with a radically reconstructed form of knowledge – as part of the democratic impulse (Neufeld 2001: 130) - that sought to advance the position of humanity through ‘the emancipatory project’ (Rengger 2000:
143-172); a project, which Rengger (2001: 96) cautioned, also possessed a ‘dark side’
and one that critical theorists will have to confront if they wish to ‘make good on its emancipatory project.’ Although Rengger (2000: 158-156; 2001: 102-106) went on to demonstrate the project’s shortcomings, I will not reiterate his remarks except to say that they should be kept in mind when pursuing it.
This emancipatory project, being an essential part CT, thus effectively gave space to the silenced and marginalized voices that belonged to the world described and categorized as the 'underdeveloped states' or ‘developing states’ (George 1994: 141; Low 2004). In fact, Jackson (1996: 215), who based himself on Linklater’s ideas, captured the idea quite succinctly when he said that ‘(c)ritical theory takes notice of ‘the other’ which could be any social category whose members suffer from exclusion at the hands of the insider.’
However, in order for CT to offer an alternative as a user-friendly and relevant theory, it was largely informed by the traditions of hermeneutics and ideologiekritik (Devetak 2001: 163), and much of which has been appeared in Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interests (1972) in which he stressed his ‘theory of communicative action’ (Linklater 1996: 284; Jones 2001: 17-18). Embedded in this work and other writings of Habermas, Halliday (1994: 53) recognized three forms of knowledge; these three are positivist, hermeneutic and critical and have been captured in Figure 2.2 below.
Linklater (1996: 281), drawing upon the work of Ashley, has however listed the three interests that had been expressed by Habermas; they were:
The technical interest in understanding how to extend control over nature &
society;
The practical interest in understanding how to create & maintain orderly communities; and
The emancipatory interest in identifying & eradicating unnecessary social confinements & constraints.
Figure 2.2
According to George's (1994: 154-155) and Devetak’s (2001: 164) observations, it was the mentioned text that catapulted Habermasian themes into IR. Seans & Pettiford (2001:
112-121) detected six sets of significant themes that cropped up in the agenda of critical theorists; they were 'State and Power,' 'Institutions and World Order,' 'Identity and Community,' and 'Inequality and Injustice,' 'Conflict and Violence' and 'Peace and Security.' Brief attention will only be given to two sets from the list since these directly impact upon the contents of this research project. The first set of themes, namely 'state and power,' consists of two loaded, yet important, concepts in IR theory and practice.
Going back to early IR theoretical literature, the sovereign nation-state was and remained the only political actor in the eyes of the Idealists, Realists, Neo-Realists and Liberalists who deliberately ignored the fact that the state was not a purely European invention;
Habermas and
His Theory of Knowledge
Critical Hermeneutic
Positivist
Three Forms Of Knowledge
similar systems existed in slightly different forms and in another world order between 900 and 1500 in Africa and Asia. And because of this traditionally dogmatic perception, the critical theorists de-linked the concept of the 'state as actor' and placed it alongside other groups of politico-economic actors whose acts have also affected and influenced IR in both the political and economic spheres.
They thus argued that the state as a political entity developed alongside the economic system and it therefore does not make any sense to force them into distinct areas of activities when they should be viewed as 'two sides of the same coin.' And they further advocated the idea that the state should not be regarded as the basic unit of analysis in IR and that it is imperative to grasp and understand the historical nature of the state and the state system. In this regard the critical theorists posed some of the following questions that helped to inform them about forms of socio-political and economic organizations:
What is the state? Why did it take on a dominant role? How does it contribute to the world order? In which way do all the political actors make substantial input towards human emancipation? And who holds the power to bring about the changes globally? The latter question brings into the discussion the second problematic concept, namely 'power;' a concept that has been given significant focus in the critical tradition (Jackson &
Sorenson 1999: 233; Sorenson 2004: 14-15).
In the literature on political science and in other disciplines, the definition for 'power' abounds. Hill (2003: 129) highlighted the fact that power is ‘a foundational concept in political science and a central pillar in international relations.’ Kegley & Wittkopf (2001:
378) made reference to a few scholars’ conceptualization of power; they stated that most of these scholars operate from the traditional assumption that power gives the state the ability: (a) to promote and protect national interests, (b) to win in bargaining situations, and (c) to shape the rules governing the international system. Couched differently, they accepted the notion that power is a political phenomenon that revolved around the capacity of one state to persuade another to do what it otherwise would not. In other words, the one who has the most power is the one that is in control. For example, South Africa's position in relation to its immediate sovereign neighbors demonstrate that it is
the major power in the region and thus generally 'win in bargaining positions' and persuade a neighbor such as Lesotho to act in a way it otherwise would not (cf.
Landsberg 2004: 164-165; Wulf 2005: 90-91). The same argument may be applied to Malaysia in relation to Singapore in the case of the 'water problem.' Nevertheless, based within the state system, one could gather from the afore-mentioned interpretations that power is essentially 'politics.'
And since power is essentially or is inextricably tied to politics, the state exercises its will through the amount of power it has, and this power is usually supported by other state structures, namely the economic and military institutions. When comparing South Africa with other countries in the SADC region it is not difficult to identify where South Africa stands in relation to all of them and the same can be said about Malaysia in the ASEAN.
In each case, their power is assessed according to their economic standing in the region, the political position in relation to their neighbors and their military might within their geo-strategic areas. However, the power that these states possess is normally disseminated through ideas and beliefs in their respective states, which legitimizes the existing order. The critical theorists were thus concerned with the nature of power and power relations that exist among the social groups; for example, the power of the merger between Petronas and Engen over local communities who are dependent upon the employment that these joint ventures generate in South Africa and Malaysia respectively or the power of business over the mining communities (South Africa) and rubber industry communities (Malaysia). This brings us to the second set of concepts, namely ‘identity’
and ‘community.’
Although the special attention will be given to the concept of ‘identity’ towards the end of this chapter and that of ‘community’ in a subsequent chapter, at this point it is a useful exercise to explore the concepts according to the insight of the critical theorists. The critical theorists did not only challenge the position and identity of the state, which they argued has the potential to transcend the logic of the state system reflected by realism (Hutchings 2001: 82), as the main political actor within the IR arena, but they also questioned the powers it exercised in adopting an exclusive approach by demarcating
borders – marked out by the disappearance of authors (Neocleous [2003: 123] referred to Denis Wood) - within which it distinguished and decided who should or could be
‘citizens’ and who should or could be ‘non-citizens,’ or for that matter ‘nationalists’ as opposed to ‘foreigners’ or ‘aliens’ (ibid 109-110). It basically identified who belonged to the ‘us’ and who formed part of the ‘other.’ In other words, the identity of the communities and societies, who reside within the state borders, has been defined according to the rules and regulations stipulated within ‘the political order of modernity’;
an order in which the citizen is protected by a set of rights (ibid 108). These identity markers, namely ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’ and ‘nationalist’ and ‘foreigner,’ have been viewed within the CT school as highly problematic and indeed contentious because the rights for the citizen can only be achieved via the political form of the nation-state. And this thus begged the question: ‘if rights are granted to citizens of states, what happens to those with no states?’ or phrased differently ‘what happens to those who belong to no territory or are stateless? (ibid 109). Critical theorists thus proffered the notion that these issues should be judiciously assessed and, in the process, they be displaced and alternatives offered in their place. The work by Mark Neocleous entitled Imagining the State (2003) and that of Seyla Benhabib entitled The Rights of Others (2004) devote a substantial number of pages to this debate and offer significant insights into it.
For the critical theorists, whose main objective was and remains human emancipation, the state's borders and its regulation pose as a threat to the 'emancipation project' in that it restricts the individual and community's movements and development. It decides who it wishes to recognize as a citizen and who it wants to classify as an alien or foreigner.
These acts are all problematic and no 'emancipation project' will be able to achieve its objectives if these rules are strictly applied and enforced; in fact, if these rules are enforced they may inevitably cause the nation-state’s citizens to rebel and overthrow the government which would effectively become ‘illegitimate.’ At the heart of the critical theorists' argument is a desire for the governments or those in power to work in the interest of the societies that they control and manage, and as an extension of this desire is the concern for basic 'human rights' for all. The fundamental concern of the critical theorists is the leveling of the playing fields by bringing about justice and doing away
with all forms of inequality.
Taking our guide from Habermas and (later) Foucault, CT aimed at resuscitating the critical faculty, and it 'is committed to extending the rational, just and democratic organization of political life beyond the level of the state to the whole of humanity' (Devetak 2001: 163). According to George (1994: 153), Habermas insisted that CT undertakes an ‘emancipatory task in seeking to overcome the power of instrumental reason in all spheres.’ The fundamental issue, George continued (1994: 154), was for CT
‘to reconnect (rational) knowledge to human interests,’ and ‘to regenerate the critical potential of modernity in terms of an ideologically unhindered, communicatory process.’
In this regard Linklater (1996: 284-295) elaborated upon the notion of ‘discourse ethics’
as a key method of communication that had been advocated by critical theorists.
‘Discourse ethics,’ he (1996: 295) stated, ‘encourages open dialogue between the diversity of moral views and facilitates the expansion of the range of moral and political points of view.’ ‘Open dialogue,’ he continued, ‘is a check against domination inherent in some claims about cultural difference’ (also see Linklater 2001). I suppose when making this point Linklater was conscious of the racial conditions, ethnic differences and cultural constructions that were prevalent in apartheid South Africa as well as in other countries where open and critical dialogue was stifled rather than encouraged and promoted.
In sum, critical theorists such as Linklater did not dismiss the theoretical standpoints of the realists but preferred to argue against the three basic postulates of positivism. They adopted this approach as a means of demonstrating that concepts and issues are not fixed and given but open to interpretation. The three postulates that Linklater critically assessed were: (a) an objective external reality, (b) the subject/object distinction, and (c) value-free social science (Linklater 1996: 279-281; Jackson & Sorenson 1999: 232; Rengger 2000:
152; Rengger 2001: 97; Neufeld 2001: 130-131). As far as these scholars were concerned the ‘social world is a construction of time and place’ and this implies that ‘the international system is a specific construction of the most powerful states.’ Based upon these observations, they further claimed that since world politics are also constructed, the distinction between subject (the analyst) and object (the focus of analysis) is marginal.