• Tidak ada hasil yang ditemukan

Directory UMM :Journals:Journal Of Public Economics:Vol77.Issue3.Sep2000:

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2017

Membagikan "Directory UMM :Journals:Journal Of Public Economics:Vol77.Issue3.Sep2000:"

Copied!
24
0
0

Teks penuh

Loading

Gambar

Fig. 1. Determination of the equilibrium value n*.
Fig. 2. The phase diagram of the dynamical system.
Fig. 3. The effects of a rise in t in the cases of a dominant income effect: case (a).
Fig. 4. The transitional path of consumption in case (a).
+2

Referensi

Dokumen terkait

In this section we first solve the time-consistent optimal tax problem at Stage 3 for the case with complete information: the individuals and the government observe the

The taxpayers were told: (1) that they had been selected at random to be part of a study ‘that will increase the number of taxpayers whose 1994 individual income tax returns are

Proost, Marginal tax reform, externalities and income distribution 343 McGarry, K., The cost of equality: unequal bequests and tax avoidance 179. Newey, W.,

When taxes on wage income raise the after-tax rate of return on human capital investment, growth rates for sufficiently productive individuals may rise.. An increase in the

The instrumental variables estimates (where the instruments are SIMELIG and lagged SIMELIG) suggest that being eligible in the prior period leads to a 46% take-up rate, while

In Section 3 we analyze, for different test scenarios, the ex ante welfare implications of the testing opportunity, taking account of the fact that the equilibrium premium for

Silva, Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility 265.. Cornes, R.C.,

However, in a model of endogenous growth, either a small tax on capital income, whose proceeds are wasted, increases growth and welfare or a small marginal subsidy to